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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DORTHA NIELSON ] 
MORTENSEN and STANLEY ] 
MORTENSEN, ] 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
vs. ) 
DWIGHT BROWN dba ; 
DWIGHT'S AUTO WRECKING, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
> BRIEF OF 
1 DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
I DWIGHT BROWN dba 
) DWIGHT'S AUTO 
> WRECKING'S 
i Case Nos. 20080713-CA 
I Sixth District 
> Court No. 050600282 
Interlocutory Appeal from Summary Judgment Denial by 
the Honorable David L. Mower, Sixth District Court Judge 
viii 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
After assignment by the Utah Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals granted 
Defendant/Appellant's, Dwight Brown dba Dwight's Auto Wrecking (hereinafter 
"Dwight's"), Rule 5 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure petition for permission to appeal 
the "Memorandum Decision on its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment" entered by 
Sixth District Court Judge David L. Mower August 6, 2008.l Judge Mower denied 
Dwight's motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Was Dwight's insured for workers' compensation purposes as 
required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201 on the date of the accident 
which took the life of James Mortensen? That is, did Dwight's 
fulfill its duty of insuring, and keeping insured the payment of this 
compensation2 with the Workers1 Compensation Fund3? 
*See "Memorandum Decision on Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", entered 
August 6, 2008, as Appendix 1. 
2The benefits provided by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act for injured workers 
and for the dependent heirs of workers killed by accident arising out of and in the course 
of their Utah employment. 
3Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201 Employers to secure workers' compensation 
benefits for employees - Methods. Appendix 3 
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its 
employees by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the 
Page 1 
The operative conduct is insuring and keeping insured*... If Dwight's did insure 
and kept itself insured, then the "Exclusive Remedy" provision5 of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("WCA") bars the wrongful death action by James Mortensen's 
parents should be barred. 
For the purposes of the motion below and this appeal, the parties do not contest the 
trial Court's ruling that James was in the course of his employment for Dwight's at the 
time of the accident which took his life.6 
Also, the Mortensens ...do not dispute that as of the date of the decedent}s death 
Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock 
corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' 
compensation insurance in this state; or 
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance with Section 34A-2-201.5 
to pay direct compensation as a self-insured employer in the amount, in the 
manner, and when due as provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(Emphasis added.) 
4See Anabasis v. Labor Commission, 30 P.3d 1236 at 1239 (Utah App. 2001). See the 
case in its entirety as Appendix 4. 
5See, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105. Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, 
agent, or employee of employer. Appendix 5. 
6See Memorandum Decision, dated May 9, 2007 ( R 230-235) at Page 3. Appendix 2. 
Page 2 
Dwight's Auto Wrecking had a policy of worker's Compensation Insurance.1 
Notwithstanding the admission regarding insurance coverage, the trial court 
erroneously ruled, the Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF") policy of 
workers5 compensation insurance was not in force to satisfy the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-201(2)8. Dwight's is not entitled to the "exclusive remedy" protection 
of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l)9. The trial court's rational was Dwight's had under-
reported the employee payroll upon which its insurance premium was based.10 
7Emphasis added. Page 6 of "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment" (R 528-624) 
%An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its 
employees by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund... 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201 in its entirety as Appendix 3. 
9(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained 
by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against 
the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of 
the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place 
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the...to the 
employee's...parents... on account of any...death..incurred by the employee in the course 
of ..and no action at law may be maintained against an employer...based upon 
[the]...death of an employee... 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l) in its entirety as Appendix 5. 
10See "Memorandum Decision on Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", entered 
August 6, 2008, at Page 4. (R.663-668) Attached as Appendix 1. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and 
reviews them for correctness.77 
Dwight's recognizes the evidentiary standard applicable to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 motions for summary judgment.12 Here, there is no ...genuine issue as to 
any material fact. Where there is evidentiary discrepancy, none creates a conflict in the 
material facts. All such conflicts are incidental and not material 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL: 
See (iDefendant Dwight Brown Dba Dwight 's Auto Wrecking 's Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment" dated December 6, 200713, "Defendant Dwight Brown Dba 
Dwight's Auto Wrecking's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment" dated December 6, 200714, "Defendant Dwight Brown dba Dwight's Auto 
Wrecking's Reply Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment" 
nKrantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991). See also, Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, P 13, 70 P.3d 35. 
12See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ( c) and A C. Fin, Inc. vs. Salt Lake County, 948 
P.2d 771, 784 (Utah 1997) Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c). The Court must consider "all of the facts and evidence 
presented, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion." Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah App. 
1987). 
13(R 250-254) 
14(R 255-528) 
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dated April 28, 2008 and "Defendant Dwight Brown Dba Dwight's Auto Wrecking's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure" dated August 25, 200815. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dortha Nielson Mortensen and Stanley Mortensen (the "Mortensens") brought this 
wrongful death action against Dwight Brown d/b/a Dwight's auto Wrecking ("Dwight's"). They 
generally allege their adult son, James Mortensen, lost his life November 20, 2003, in an accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment due to Dwight's negligence. Dwight's 
responded alleging, among other things, no negligent conduct on its part caused James' death. 
Further, apropos to this appeal, Dwight's alleged, as James' employer, the wrongful death action 
is barred by the "Exclusive Remedy" provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act16. 
Dwight's filed an initial Motion for Summary Judgment raising the "Exclusive Remedy" 
as a bar to the Mortensens' claims.17 The Mortensens responded asserting the bar is inapplicable 
because Dwight's under-reported payroll to its insurance carrier, WCF; and it could not tie the 
reported payroll directly to James' salary. Mortensens also asked the trial court for the 
opportunity to do some additional discovery18. The trial court entertained oral argument. 
15R 672-740. 
16See, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105. Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, 
agent, or employee of employer. Appendix 5. 
17R 90-92 and 69-89, October 18, 2006. 
18See Mortensens' memorandum dated December 7, 2006, at R 101-116. 
-5-
The By Memorandum Decision Dated May 9, 200719, the Court denied defendant 
Dwight Brown dba Dwight's Auto Wrecking's ("Dwight's") motion for summary 
judgment. The denial was "without prejudice". Further discovery was ordered by the 
Court. Dwight's renewed motion and an opening memorandum in support of that motion 
were filed December 6, 2008. Before the Mortensen's were required to respond to the 
motion, the parties agreed to additional discovery. The additional discovery was in the 
form of depositions of the parties and of Workers Compensation Fund employees. The 
discovery completed, the Mortensens filed their opposing memorandum April 1, 200820. 
After Dwight's reply memorandum21 and oral argument, on August 6, 2008, the 
trial court issued his "Memorandum Decision on Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment" denying the motion.22 
After assignment by the Utah Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals granted 
Defendant/Appellant's, Dwight Brown dba Dwight's Auto Wrecking (hereinafter 
"Dwight's"), Rule 5 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure petition for permission to appeal 
the denial of Dwight's motion. 
19R 230-235. See Appendix 2. 
20R 548-624 
21R 625-658 
22See "Memorandum Decision on Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", entered 
August 6, 2008. R 663-668, Appendix 1. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purposes of its summary judgment motion below and for this appeal, 
Dwight's accepts the following facts as true: 
1. Dwight's Auto Wrecking is a hardware and auto wrecking business.23 
2. Dwight's hired the decedent James Mortensen as yard man/parts puller in 
about September, 2003, or earlier. He was to work 40 hours per week. His pay was $300 
per week. That is reflected in the withholdings/time sheet that was kept at the time and 
the W-2 Form filed with the IRS for the tax year 2003.24 
3. The Mortensens dispute the hire date, periods employed, the methods of 
payment, the pay rate, the amounts actually paid and the accuracy of records kept. They 
argue Dwight's misrepresented those facts. They further argue Dwight's under-reported 
payroll to WCF.25 
4. Sometime the morning of November 20, 2003, Dwight Brown, the owner of 
Dwight's Auto Wrecking, received a phone call asking if a fuel tank that would fit a 
Crown Victoria was available. Dwight responded there was one available on a vehicle in 
the yard. Sometime later, the customer, a Mr. Dalton, came to pick it up. Dwight sent 
James Mortensen to remove the tank from the vehicle. James took a handyman jack and 
23See Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant No. 3. ( R 167) 
24See "Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant No. 5" ( R 167-
166); 
25R 624-604. 
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went out to pull the gas tank from a car. The actual accident was not witnessed. From 
observations of the accident scene, it appeared James, used the handyman jack to lift the 
car. He placed the jack under the sheet metal wheel well. He did not use available 
wooden blocks as cribbing under a solid frame part to support the vehicle. He crawled 
under the vehicle. The soft sheet metal gave way. The vehicle fell causing the fatal 
injuries to James Mortensen.26 
5. As required by the Utah Workers Compensation Act, Dwight's Auto 
Wrecking years before had acquired a policy of workers5 compensation insurance 
covering its employees. It was in full force and effect as of November 20, 200327. The 
coverage was with the Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF"). Policy # 2039798 was 
current for the period of March 2, 2003 to March 2, 2004 (the "Policy").28 That included 
the date of the fatal accident. 
6. The determinative material fact in this case is conceded by the Mortensens 
at Page 6 of "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment": 
26See Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Nos. 6 & 8. R 
166-164. 
27The operative statutory language is, insuring, and keeping insured. Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-201 (Emphasis added.); Anabasis, supra, at 30 P.3d 1239, Appendix 4. 
28See Appendix 6, WCF Policy "Information Page" and Endorsements for Coverage 
Year, March 2, 2003-March 2, 2004 12:01 a.m. We also included a complete exemplar 
of the policy at issue. 
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Plaintiffs do not dispute that as of the date of the decedent's 
death Dwight's Auto Wrecking had a policy of worker's 
Compensation Insurance.29 
7. WCF's Policy of Workers Compensation Insurance30, "Part Five-Premium" 
states the following regarding when premium payments are due31: 
E. Final Premium 
The premium shown on the Information Page 
schedules, and endorsements is an estimate. The final 
premium will be determined after this policy ends by using the 
actual not the estimated, premium basis and the proper 
classifications and rates that lawfully apply...Ifthe final 
premium is more than the premium you paid to usy you must 
pay us the balance. If it is less, we will refund the balance to 
you... 
G. Audit 
You will let us examine and audit all your records that 
relate to this policy...Information developed by audit will be 
used to determine final premium... 
8. The Policy, "Part Six-Conditions" states the following regarding 
involuntary "cancellation"32: 
D. 
29Emphasis added. R619. 
30See the entire policy at Appendix 6. 
31The premium section is found on the next to last page of the policy. 
32The cancellation section is found on the last page of the policy. 
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2. We may cancel the policy. We must mail or deliver 
to you not less than ten days advance written notice stating 
when the cancellation is to take effect... 
3. The policy period will end on the day and hour 
stated in the cancellation notice. 
9. Further, regarding involuntary cancellation of coverage, the "Utah 
Cancellation Endorsement" endorsement to the policy states in relevant part33: 
A. Cancellation 
2. ...We may cancel this policy for one of the 
following reasons: 
a. You fail to pay all premiums when due; 
b. A material misrepresentation; 
H e * * * 
d. Substantial breaches of contractual duties, 
conditions or warranties. We will mail or deliver to you not 
less than 30 days advance written notice stating when the 
cancellation is to take effect, except in the event you fail to 
pay your premiums when due, in which case we will mail or 
deliver to you not less than 10 days advance written notice 
stating when the cancellation is to take effect... 
B. Renewal/Nonrenewal 
1. You have the right to have the insurance renewed 
unless: 
a. The policy has been cancelled; 
The document is found on the fourth page of the Policy. 
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* * * * 
c. You fail to pay the renewal premium by the due 
date... 
d. We give you 30 days notice of nonrenewal prior to 
the expiration or the anniversary date... 
10. At no relevant time did WCF cancel or give notice of cancellation of the 
Policy of Workers Compensation Insurance34. 
11. At all relevant times and for all employees including the decedent, Dwight's 
was covered for workers' compensation insurance purposes. WCF underwriter Patricia 
Bryan informs in an affidavit provided to the trial court35: 
5. ...As of November 20, 2003, Dwight's Auto Wrecking's 
workers' compensation policy with WCF was current and active. Dwight's 
Auto Wrecking was insured by WCF for workers' compensation purposes 
by Policy Number 2039798 and was thereby in compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-201 as of November 20, 2003... 
6. As with all such policies, regardless of the premium charged 
and/or paid, all employees of the insured employer are covered until the 
policy is canceled by the employer or by WCF for failure of the employer 
to pay its premiums when due. The final premium charged is based on the 
total employee payroll as reported and verified by the employer and/or by 
WCF audit at the end of the covered period. However^ the final employer 
verification or WCF audit does not alter the coverage of all employees of 
the employer during policy period. All employees of the employer are 
covered. Therefore, all employees of Dwight's Auto Wrecking were 
covered by WCF Policy Number 2039798 for workers' compensation 
purposes on November 20, 2003. 
See Affidavit of WCF Underwriter Patricia Bryan as Appendix 7. 
See Affidavit of WCF Underwriter Patricia Bryan as Appendix 7. 
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(Emphasis added.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For the purposes of this interlocutory appeal, the parties do not contest the trial court's 
ruling that the deceased, James Mortensen, was in the course of his employment for Dwight's at 
the time of the accident which took his life.36 The Mortensens conceded that point: 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that as of the date of the decedent's 
death Dwight's Auto Wrecking had a policy of worker's 
Compensation Insurance. 
(Emphasis added.)37 
Dwight's contends there is neither statute nor case authority supporting the 
foundational legal conclusions expressed in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. 
Specifically, The trial court ruled that notwithstanding the fact Dwight's procured 
workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees through a policy with the 
Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF") and that the insurance policy was in 
full force at the time of a fatal accident to its employee as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-201(2)38, Dwight's is not entitled to the "exclusive remedy" provision of Utah 
36See Memorandum Decision, Page 3. R. 233. 
37Page 6 of "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment". R. 619. 
Once again recall the operative statutory language, insuring, and keeping insured. Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-201 (Emphasis added.); Anabasis, supra, at 30 P.3d 1239. 
3ZAn employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its 
employees by: 
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Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l)39. The erroneous rational for that conclusion as expressed by 
the trial court is Dwight's had allegedly under-reported the employee payroll upon which 
its insurance premium was based.40 The trial court disregarded the provisions of the 
Workers' Compensation Act which keep workers' compensation insurance effective to 
the date of formal cancellation by notice after a grace period during which the defaulting 
employer can correct the premium payment deficiency.41 
Continuing the erroneous rationale, the trial court concluded, having failed to pay a 
complete premium, Dwight's failed to keep... insured, the payment of this compensation 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the 
Workers9 Compensation Fund... 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201 in its entirety as Appendix 3. 
39
 (1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained 
by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against 
the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of 
the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place 
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the...to the 
employee's...parents...on account of any...death...incurred by the employee in the course 
of...and no action at law may be maintained against an employer...based upon 
[the]...death of an employee... 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105(l) in its entirety as Appendix 5. 
40See "Memorandum Decision on Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", entered 
August 6, 2008, at Page 4. 
41See Utah Code Ann. §§31A-22-1002, 31A-21-303 and 34A-2-205. 
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with the Workers' Compensation Fund*2 and it should be stripped of the benefits provided 
employers by the Utah Workers5 Compensation Act. 
Of decisive note, WCF affirmed by affidavit it's continuing coverage of on the job 
injuries suffered by Dwight's employees for the period during which the fatal accident 
occurred. Dwight's duty was to provide a qualifying policy of insurance, which it did.43 
The Mortensen's, as James' non-dependent heirs, also argued it is unfair to deprive them 
of a wrongful death cause of action. Unfortunately, "fairness" is not the issue. In Utah, parents 
of workers who are killed in the course of their employment are barred from bringing a wrongful 
death cause of action against their child's employer.44 
42See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201(l), Employers to secure workers' compensation 
benefits for employees - Methods. Appendix 3. 
43See as instructive, Smith vs. American Express Travel-Related Services, 765 F. Supp. 
1061, 1064 (D. Utah 1991), Appendix 11. 
Plaintiff misinterprets § 35-1-46 (essentially identical to current 
§34A-2-201) by failing to read the section in its entirety. The section 
actually requires the employer to (i secure "payment of benefits "by" one of 
three described methods...by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of 
this compensation... " The duty therefore, imposed on the employer by this 
section is merely to provide a qualifying insurance policy. 
That Defendant provided a qualifying insurance policy for Plaintiff.. is not 
disputed by the parties. The court, therefore, finds that the parties have 
presented no issue of material fact that could be resolved so as to permit 
Plaintiff to escape the exclusive remedy provision based on this line of 
argument. (Emphasis added.) 
44See Pages 19-20 of Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment". (R 607-606) We will not argue that issue further herein, the 
Supreme Court decided the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Act applies to bar a mother's 
civil claim against her son's employer in Morrill vs. J & M Construction Company, Inc., 635 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION HAS A SUBSTANTIVE 
HARMFUL IMPACT ON THE INSURANCE COVERAGE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
WHICH GOES BEYOND THE FACTS AND PARTIES OF THE 
CURRENT CASE. 
A. "PROPERLY INSURED" MEANS WORKERS 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE COVERAGE 
CONTINUES UNTIL THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED 
CANCELLATION NOTICE PROVISIONS ARE 
ACCOMPLISHED. 
We will address, among other things, what it means to be "properly" insured. In a year 
2001 decision, the Utah Court of Appeals held "properly" insured means once having secured 
insurance, the employer cannot allow it to lapse while still employing workers: 
First, an employer must insure its employees with workers' compensation 
insurance [Citation omitted] An employer must comply with this requirement 
when it hires its first employee. [Citation omitted.] ("The duty to secure in 
advance the compensation provided for by the act by one of the foregoing 
methods...has by this court been held to be compulsory. ") Second, an employer 
must keep all its employees insured for workers9 compensation. See Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-2-201 (Supp 2000). "Keep" means "to cause to continue in a state9 
condition, or course of action. " [Citation Omitted] Thus, this second requirement 
imposes an obligation on employers to provide workers' compensation insurance 
continually while they employ employees. If an employer allows workers' 
compensation insurance coverage to lapse at any time while it employs 
employees, the employer has violated the Insurance Statute and "is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in [the insurance statute. " Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii).45 
P2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981). 
^Anabasis v. Labor Commission, 30 P.3d 1236 at 1239 (Utah App. 2001). See 
Anabasis in its entirety as Appendix 4. 
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(Emphasis added.) 
Once the employer has complied by obtaining the required insurance, it does not lapse as 
a matter of law until it is canceled after the insurance carrier has given notice for cancellation46: 
(1) ten days to the employer47 and (2) to the Labor Commission48. The Workers' Compensation 
Act itself provides the employer's coverage obligatorily continues in effect from inception until 
canceled by filing... a notification of cancellation... The insurance carrier has continued 
liability...until the date that notice of cancellation is received by the division or its designee..,49 
The Workers Compensation Act assured Dwight's compliance. Dwight's workers' 
compensation insurance coverage was never canceled. Dwight's was properly insured during the 
relevant period. Workers' Compensation Fund remained liable as Dwight's carrier for the on-
the-job injury and death of James Mortensen. 
Once workers' compensation insurance is obtained by an employer, it continues 
until the statutory procedure is taken to terminate it. WCF through its representatives 
attest that coverage continued. The only notice provisions in the Insurance Code and in 
the Workers Compensation Act are those requiring affirmative action by the insurance 
carrier to terminate insurance coverage after proper notice to the insured employer and 
'See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1002. 
'The notice is to be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-303. 
*The notice is to be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205. 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205. 
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the Labor Commission50. No such notices were given. There was no basis to give such 
notices at any time relevant to the date of the accident at issue. 
B. THE WCF POLICY OF INSURANCE IS FOR ALL 
EMPLOYEES AND IS BETWEEN WCF AND 
DWIGHT'S. THE INSURANCE BY STATUTORY 
MANDATE COVERS ALL EMPLOYEES. 
SELECTIVE EMPLOYEE COVERAGE IS AGAINST 
PUBLIC POLICY. ALL EMPLOYEES ARE COVERED 
ONCE A POLICY IS IN EFFECT. 
WCF ACKNOWLEDGES JAMES MORTENSEN'S 
DEATH OCCURRED DURING A PERIOD OF ITS 
COVERAGE. JAMES MORTENSEN AND HIS 
PARENTS LACK PRIVITY OF CONTRACT WITH 
WCF. THE MORTENSENS HAVE NO STANDING TO 
CLAIM A BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR DWIGHT'S 
ALLEGED UNDERPAYMENT OF PREMIUM. 
Because of the importance of the public policy toward inclusive workers' 
compensation insurance coverage provided by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, 
Dwight's will further address the conceptual disconnects in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision. There are multiple presumptive and assumptive errors. The flaws include an 
assumption that there is some direct connection between the insurance carrier and the 
insured's deceased employee through the payroll. First, there is no privity of contract 
between an employee and the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. 
50This concept of continuation of coverage until notice of cancellation was the subject of a 
Supreme Court reversal of the Industrial Commission when it had ordered coverage extended to 
an injured employee after the State Insurance Fund (a predecessor name of WCF) had followed 
the notice provisions correctly in canceling the employer's coverage for nonpayment. See State 
Insurance Fund v. E-Z Way construction etal, 620 P.2d 69 (Utah 1980). 
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James parents have no first party relationship with WCF, Dwight's insurance carrier. The 
contract of insurance is between the employer and the insurance carrier. 
Second, the trial court's flawed analysis is completely contrary to the strong public 
policy bias built into the Act which mandates blanket workers' compensation insurance 
policies assuring payment of the scheduled benefits for all Utah employees. 
Third, a logical inferential extension of the trial court's ruling allows mischief to 
the Act's benefit framework. The ruling leaves the inference that an employee can elect 
in or out of the workers' compensation system unless the employer can tie the employee's 
salary to the payroll report. Such reporting is not required by the Act or by WCF. That is 
simply a bad interpretation of the Act. The Act does not require such reporting. The Act 
does not allow selective coverage. In compliance with the Act, WCF's contract covers 
the entire employment, not just selected individual employees. All employees in an 
employee/employer relationship are entitled to the scheduled statutory benefits. 
Likewise, by operation of the Act, all employees are subject to the limitations placed on 
them by the Act. Once again, the Act is biased toward inclusion, not illusive exclusions. 
-18-
C. AS A MATTER OF LEGISLATIVE MANDATED 
PUBLIC POLICY, THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF 
THE ACT ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT GAPS IN 
AND LAPSES OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE COVERAGE. "PROPERLY INSURED" 
MEANS TO "KEEP THE INSURANCE FROM 
LAPSING". DWIGHT'S POLICY NEVER LAPSED. 
Once the employer has complied with the mandate of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
201(1) to purchase insurance to cover the potential Workers' Compensation Act 
liabilities, the employer is entitled to the concomitant shield from any and all civil liability 
afforded by the Act's "exclusive remedy" provision51. That is the quid pro quo built into 
the Act. That makes the Act constitutional. The worker gets the "no-fault" benefits and 
the employer is shielded from civil liability of whatever nature. 
POINT 2 
THE "EXCLUSIVE REMEDY" PROVISION OF THE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT OF UTAH PRECLUDES THIS ACTION SO 
LONG AS DWIGHT'S HAD ACQUIRED INSURANCE FROM 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND AND THAT POLICY WAS IN 
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE ON-THE-JOB ACCIDENT SUFFERED 
BY JAMES MORTENSEN. THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION WHICH IS VESTED BY LAW EXCLUSIVELY IN THE 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION. 
Again, there is a basic constitutional quid pro quo that underlies the workers' 
compensation system in Utah: 
The essence of a workers' compensation system is that it is a mutual 
arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and an employee 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105. Appendix 5. 
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whereby both parties give up and gain certain advantages,52 
In 2006, the Supreme Court strongly reiterated the dominating public policy behind the 
Workers Compensation Act: 
Workers' Compensation not only is a "question ...of...importance to the 
public, " but also furthers a "public interest [that] is so strong. ..that we should 
place the policy beyond the reach of contract. "53 
An earlier Utah Supreme Court provided the primary analytical tool for determining 
workers' compensation coverage issues. The Court discussed the inclusive bias of the 
Workers' Compensation Act: 
...the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect employees who 
sustain injuries arising out of their employment by affording financial security 
during the resulting period of disability. Wilstead v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 214, 407 P. 2d 692 (1965). To give effect to that purpose, the Act 
should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any doubt 
respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee. McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1977)54. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The fundamental interpretive bias is to envelope accidental injuries within the coverage 
of the Act. That includes creating a mandatory coverage umbrella to compensate those who 
are injured. That inclusive bias is a two way street. It is to be applied consistent with the 
quid pro quo balancing of rights. If the "liberal construction" results in accidental injury 
coverage for the employee, then, the converse is also true. The employer having his 
52Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 6785 679 (Utah 1985). 
53Touchardv. La-Z-Boy, 148 P.3d 545 (Utah 2006), 2006 Utah Lexis 207 at P 16. The 
case is produced in its entirety as Appendix 13. 
54State Tax Comm'n v. IndustrialComm% 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1984) 
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employment insured is in return entitled to "exclusive remedy'' protection. If that were not 
so, the system loses its balance. It breaks down.55 
The Mortensens' claim to the additional benefit of a civil wrongful death cause of 
action when there is workers' compensation insurance coverage in place is a right not 
anticipated by the Act. It represents an unprecedented right to pick and choose between civil 
tort remedies and statutory workers' compensation benefits. That is far beyond the 
legislatively created public policy dominance of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
The public policy of the Act is to continue insurance coverage until the specific 
required statutory cancellation steps are taken. Once it is established that the decedent 
suffered his fatal injuries by an accident "arising out of and in the course of [his] 
employment"56 for Dwight's Auto Wrecking57, we then apply the expansive standard to the 
insurance coverage. For, if James was in the course of his employment at the time of the fatal 
accident and he was covered under Dwight's insurance policy with Workers Compensation 
Fund, his and his parents' exclusive remedy is the benefits provided by the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act58. 
55See Appendix 14, "A Careful Balancing of Rights". 
56Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401. 
57An accident arises out of the course of employment if there is a causal connection 
between the employment and the accident. M&K Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 
112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948). An accident arises in the course of employment if it 
occurs on the premises where the work is being performed, Edwards v. Industrial 
Commission, 87 Utah 127, 48 P.2d 459 (1935). 
58Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105 
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It is well-established that the employer's "exclusive remedy" protection applies to bar 
parents' civil claims against their child's employer59. 
In their response to Dwight's arguments below, the Mortensens made the argument that 
unless James' payroll was specifically included in the payroll reported to Workers 
Compensation Fund, he would not be covered and Dwight's would not be entitled to the 
"exclusive remedy" protection. That proposition is neither supported by the evidence nor is it 
a correct analysis of the insurance coverage required by the Workers' Compensation Act. 
In his Memorandum Decision, the trial court cited Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 110 P.2d 125, 127. (Utah 1989)60: 
...[I]fan employee is injured in an accident during the course of 
employment and the employer is properly insured, the employee's 
sole means of obtaining redress is through the workers' 
compensation system. 
The concept of being "properly" insured was discussed in more detail in the case of 
Anabasis v. Labor Commission, supra.61 To be "properly" insured means once having secured 
'Morrill vs. J & M Construction Company, Inc., 635 P2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981): 
...the Act is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for injury 
or death, against the employer and other employees to the exclusion of 
"any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise," and that it bars all next of kin or dependents, or anyone else, 
from using any other means of recovery against employers and others 
named in and covered by the Act, than the Act itself.. See also, Henrie v. 
Rocky Mountain Packing, 113 Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487 (1948), and Smith v. 
Alfred Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972). 
}See the Paulsen case in its entirety as Appendix 12 . 
1
 Appendix 4. 
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insurance, the employer cannot allow it to lapse while still employing workers. 
Once the employer has complied by obtaining the required insurance, it does not lapse as 
a matter of law until it is canceled after the insurance carrier has given notice62: (1) ten days to 
the employer63 and (2) to the Labor Commission64. The Workers' Compensation Act as a matter 
of law requires that the employer's insurance policy continues in effect from inception until 
canceled by filing...a notification of cancellation... The insurance carrier has continued 
liability...until the date that notice of cancellation is received by the division or its designee.65 
Because the Workers Compensation Act assured Dwight's compliance, Dwight's workers' 
compensation insurance coverage for its employees was in full force and effect on the date of the 
accident. 
The contract between Dwight's and Workers Compensation Fund follows the statutory 
scheme regarding premium calculation dates and cancellation. As with the Act, the contract 
assures continuing coverage until affirmative cancellation action is taken which must include 
notice of a contractual failure. Such procedures did not take place here. Dwight's was properly 
insured during the relevant period. Workers' Compensation Fund remained liable as Dwight's 
carrier for the on the job injury and death of James Mortensen. Workers Compensation Fund so 
states in the Affidavit of Patricia Bryan found in Appendix 8. The Mortensen's argument carries 
no weight when the insurance carrier correctly accepts liability adhering to the terms of its 
62See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1002. 
63The notice is to be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-303. 
64The notice is to be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205. 
65Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-205. 
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contract and the statutes requiring coverage to continue until cancellation. 
At the Order to Show Cause hearing in August 2007, the trial court asked counsel for the 
Mortensens to provide a citation to any statutes or rules that stand for the proposition that an 
employer is required to report the name of each employee as well as that employee's payroll to 
either the Labor Commission or the insurance carrier. The further proposition is that if that is not 
done then that individual employee is not covered for workers' compensation purposes and, thus, 
the employer is not entitled to the "exclusive remedy" of the "Act". 
First, there is no such statute and there is no such rule. That is because premium 
estimates for a given coverage period are made prospectively66. Mr. Mortensen's actual salary 
for the 2002-2003 coverage period was not reportable until the reconciliation that would occur 
after the time of his death. 
Second, the final premium is determined sometime after the conclusion of the covered 
period.67 Therefore, Dwight's could not be in violation of any payroll reporting regarding Mr. 
66
 The premium shown on the Information Page schedules, and endorsements 
is an estimate. The final premium will be determined after this policy ends 
by using the actual, not the estimated, premium basis... 
See Fact Number 7 above citing to the Insurance Policy found in its entirety at Appendix 
6. 
67See also the affidavit of Workers Compensation Fund's Patricia Bryan found in 
Appendix 7, at Paragraph 6: 
As with all such policies... all employees of the insured employer are 
covered until the policy canceled...for failure of the employer to pay its 
premiums when due. The final premium charged is based on the total 
employee payroll as reported...However, the final employer verification or 
WCF audit does not alter the coverage of all employees of the employer 
during the policy period. All employees of the employer are covered... 
-24-
Mortensen until the required accounting at the end of the coverage period. 
Third, no statute, rule or the actual contract requires reporting payroll amounts tied to the 
name of a particular employee. The payroll reports require only the total payroll broken down 
into line items for each job classification in the employment. 
Fourth, even if there is a payroll discrepancy between the first of the period estimate and 
the final actual payroll, the system contemplates a premium adjustment up or down by an 
accounting of actual payroll at end of the covered period. Such estimate discrepancies are 
common. They do not constitute a breach of the contract. 
Fifth, even if there was a failure to pay the adjusted premium or some other substantive 
breach of the contract considered sufficient to terminate the coverage, that termination would be 
prospective following the contractual and statutory notice to the employer and the Labor 
Commission. No such notice was ever given before or for that matter the unfortunate accident 
that took Mr. Mortensen's life. The "all employee" coverage was in effect on the date of the 
accident. 
It is significant to note, the insurance actually covers the employer for liability he may 
have to pay workers' compensation benefits to employees. Individual employees are not the 
insureds. In the Policy, the "General Section"68 states: 
B. Who is Insured 
You are insured if you are an employer named in Item 1 of the 
Information Page.,. 
At all times relevant to this cause of action, Dwight's was fully covered by the Workers 
68
"Page 1 of 6" found in Appendix 6. 
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Compensation Fund insurance. As the statutorily required quid pro quo Dwight's is entitled to 
the protection of the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. As a 
matter of law the Mortensen's cannot state a cause of action upon which to base a recovery 
against Dwight's. Because of that status, this Court lacks jurisdiction: 
Although the Act does not specifically state that no court may award benefits 
provided by the Act, that is its clear import. District courts have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of the Workers' 
Compensation Act (Citations omitted.)69 
CONCLUSION 
The bases stated by the trial court for denying Dwight's summary judgment motion are 
flawed by multiple analytical assumptive errors leading to incorrect conclusions as follows: 
(1) At the beginning of the coverage year, Dwight's underestimated its payroll; 
(2) Dwight's under reported final payroll figures for the coverage year after James' 
accident in its final report to Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF"); 
(3) WCF thus was underpaid premium for its coverage; 
(4) as a result WCF had no obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits for on-the-
job accidental injuries to Dwight's employees; therefore, 
(5) Dwight's failed to ...[keep] insured, the payment of this compensation with the 
Workers* Compensation Fund70; and finally, 
(6) Dwight's thus lost the workers' compensation system quid pro quo balancing right of 
69Sheppick, v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996) (Emphasis Added.) 
70Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201(l). 
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the exclusive remedy protection71. 
Cancellation notice provisions of the Utah Workers5 Compensation Act do not allow the 
result ruled by the trial court. No Utah case authority allows for such a tortured limitation of the 
protection afforded Utah employers by the Exclusive Remedy statutory provision. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, workers' compensation insurance coverage continues 
until the statutory notice of failure to pay is sent to the defaulting employer. Even then coverage 
continues until the required grace period to pay the adjusted premium amount has expired. 
The Workers' Compensation Act has a consistent bias toward affording continued 
coverage of the employment so that injured employees and the dependent heirs of employees 
killed in the course of their employment will be assured payment of the compensation benefits 
provided for in the Act. 
Employers are "properly" insured so long as they do not allow their insurance to lapse72. 
Finding no support in Utah Law, the trial court adopted reasoning the Mortensens 
attribute to three cases from California, Montana and West Virginia. These cases are based on 
dissimilar statutes and have distinguishable facts. They carry no authoritative weight as they are 
contrary to Utah statutes and Utah appellate court authorities73. 
71Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105. 
72See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-1002; Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-303; Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-205 and Anabasis, supra. 30 P.3d at 1239 (Utah App. 2001). Appendix 4. 
73For the Court's convenience, we attach the three cases in their entirety in Appendices 
8-10: 
Appendix 8: 
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The trial court should have granted Dwight's motion for summary judgment. We ask this 
Court to remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the wrongful death 
cause of action with prejudice and on the merits.74 
Muffetv. Royster and State of California, \A1 Cal. App. 3d 289; 195 Cal Rptr. 73; 1983 
Cal. App. LEXIS 2191; 49 Cal. Comp. Cas. 806. An employer who seeks payment from 
his employees for the cost of workers5 compensation insurance in violation of California 
workers' compensation statutes cannot be found to have secured payment of 
compensation and is precluded from asserting the exclusivity provisions. The reasoning 
is the employee has paid for his or her own workers' compensation insurance in that 
instance. 
Appendix 9. 
Buerkley v. Aspen Meadows, 294 Mont. 263; 980 P.2d 1046. (1999). Montana had no 
continuing coverage statute as does Utah. Unlike the Utah system where there is no 
qualifying enrollment requirement to identify specific employees in payroll reporting, the 
Montana Court concluded: ...a condition of Parkview's enrollment in Plan No. 1 of the 
Workers' Compensation Act was the accurate and honest identification of its employees 
on a quarterly basis, and that by deleting Buerkley's name from that payroll report, 
defendants had no properly complied with the enrollment requirement o/[the statute], 
and, therefore, were an "uninsured employer" for purposes of part 5 of the...Act. 
Appendix 10. 
Shifflett Jr. V. McLaughlin, 185 W. Va. 395; 407 S.E.2d 399 (1991). Shifflett determined 
that a notice provision with some similar provisions to that found in Utah was not 
applicable to an accident that happened before its effective date: ...we conclude that the 
appellees do not receive the benefit of the notice provisions... since the 1984 amendment 
to that statute cannot be applied retroactively. 185 W. Va. at 399. 
74
 Below, Mr. and Mrs. Mortensen, as James' non-dependent heirs, argued it is unfair to 
deprive them of a wrongful death cause of action because they receive only the funeral and burial 
benefit provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. Unfortunately for them, the Utah Supreme 
Court decided the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Act applies to bar a parent's civil claim 
against her son's employer in Morrill vs. J & M Construction Company, Inc., 635 P2d 88, 89 
(Utah 1981). 
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DATED this 22nd day of December, 2008. 
JAMES R. BLACK, P.C. 
6ngs R. Black 
lsel for Dwight Brown 
ight's Auto Wrecking 
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CLERK ^ 
DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY, UTAH 
895 E. 300 N. 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
Telephone: 435-896-2700 Fax: 435-896-8047 
DORTHA NIELSON MORTENSEN and 
ROBERT STANLEY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DWIGHT BROWN dba DWIGHT'S AUTO 
WRECKING, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 050600282 
Assigned Judge: D A V I D L. MOWER 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 18, 2006 was denied 
without prejudice by Memorandum Decision of May 9, 2007. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion was 
granted by the same decision allowing the parties to conduct additional discovery. 
The parties conducted the necessary discovery. Defendant renewed his Motion for 
Summary Judgment on December 7, 2007. On April 1, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum 
in Opposition. Defendant replied on April 30, 2008. 
The Motion was argued on May 12, 2008. It is now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
Case number 050600282, 
Page - 2 -
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs in this case are the parents of the deceased James Mortensen. James Mortensen 
died in the course of his employment with Dwight's Auto Wrecking when a vehicle fell on him. 
The parents filed this suit alleging a wrongful death cause of action. 
Defendant filed his Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment asking the Court to dismiss 
this case for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy for the 
death of their son is under the Workers' Compensation Act. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 
34A-2-105(l). 
The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act shields an employer 
from civil liability when an employer complies with Section 34A-2-201. See Id., Section 34A-2-
207(1 )(a). Section 34A-2-201(l) directs an employer to 
secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its 
employees by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation 
with the Workers' Compensation Fund. 
The main dispute in this case is whether the Defendant insured and kept insured the 
payment of workers' compensation benefits for his employees. 
Defendant argues that it is sufficient for an employer to simply have a policy of workers 
compensation insurance at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs disagree and argue that an employer 
must honestly report its payroll for purposes of premium calculation in order to be insured. 
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I agree with the Plaintiffs. In order to be insured, an employer must be "properly insured." 
Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1989). A definition of 
"properly insured" is further explained in Anabasis, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 30 P.3d 1236 
(Utah App. 2001). There are two requirements. First, "an employer must insure its employees 
with workers' compensation insurance." Id. at 1240. Second, "an employer must keep all its 
employees insured for workers' compensation." Id. 
An important word is "all" its employees. In order to insure all the employees, an 
employer must report payroll for all of them. This requirement is found in the Employer's 
Handbook provided by the Workers' Compensation Fund to employers. It reads: "[p]ayroll for all 
persons meeting this definition of an employee [definition of an employee in Section 34A-2-
104(l)(b)] should be reported . . ." 
Defendant argues that underreporting of payroll makes no difference for purposes of 
determining proper coverage. The defendat's reasoning is as follows. First, in Utah, workers' 
compensation insurance coverage is a continuous coverage. Continuous coverage means that 
insurance once purchased remains in effect until it is cancelled. Utah Code Annotated, Section 
34A-2-205(l)(b). Defendant reasons that since he had a valid policy of workers' compensation 
insurance on the day of the accident, he was properly insured 
Second, an employer is only required to report an estimated payroll to the Workers' 
Compensation Fund at the beginning of the coverage period. Nevertheless, all employees of that 
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employer are covered during the relevant period. At the end of the coverage period, an employer 
should report an actual payroll and receive an adjustment of its premium either upward or 
downward. Defendant concludes that even if his reported payroll at the beginning of the coverage 
period was inaccurate, all employees were still covered. 
Both of these arguments fail because the Plaintiffs presented some evidence that the 
Defendant intentionally underreported his payroll at the end of the coverage period. Thus, during 
the entire period, the Defendant had insufficient insurance and was not properly insured. 
The parties dispute whether the payroll was underreported. 
There is evidence in this case that James Mortensen was employed by the Defendant since 
late spring or summer of 2002. However, his payroll was not reported until the last quarter of 
2003 when the fatal accident happened. 
Robbie Mortensen, James's brother, testified that James Mortensen and other employees 
at Dwight's Auto Wrecking were paid "under the table" with cash at the end of each work day. 
Affidavit of Robbie Mortensen, ffi[ 7, 8. 
In addition, Robbie Mortensen testified about several conversations he had with Dwight 
Brown concerning workers' compensation coverage. He said that on several occasions in the 
summer of 2003 Dwight Brown told him that he did not have workers' compensation insurance 
for Robbie. Id., If 14. 
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Further, the Defendant reported three employees on his payroll for year 2003. However, 
Robbie Mortensen testified that the Defendant employed seven employees during that year. Id., 
H16. 
The Defendant disputes that it was underreporting its payroll. 
Thus, there remains an issue of disputed fact whether or not the Defendant's payroll was 
underreported; and consequently, whether or not the Defendant was properly insured by workers' 
compensation insurance. This disputed issue prevents granting of Defendant's Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
David L Mower 
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DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY, UTAH 
895 E. 300 N. 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
Telephone: 435-896-2700 Fax- 435-896-8047 
" 
DORTHA NIELSON MORTENSEN and 
ROBERT STANLEY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DWIGHT BROWN dba DWIGHT'S AUTO 
WRECKING, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No 050600282 
Assigned Judge D A V I D L M O W E R 
The following motions are pending in this case: (1) Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (October 18, 2006); (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (November 16, 2006); and (3) 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery (December 21, 2006). 
Oral argument was held on March 19, 2007. These motions are now ready for a decision 
DECISION 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery should be 
granted. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel should be granted. Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be denied without prejudice. 
ANALYSIS 
This is a suit for wrongful death by the parents of the deceased. The deceased James 
Mortensen worked for the Defendant. The length of his employment term is disputed. He 
Memorandum Decision 
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performed the duties of parts puller from automobiles in the yard. Defendant provided him with 
the necessary tools and equipment. On November 20, 2003, James Mortensen went to pull a fuel 
tank from a vehicle in the Defendant's yard. He used a handyman jack to support the vehicle but 
did not use any support blocks as cribbing. The vehicle fell on James Mortensen and caused him 
fatal injuries. 
The main dispute in this case is about Defendant's workers' compensation insurance 
coverage. It is important because if the Defendant had the coverage on November 20, 2003, the 
Plaintiffs may not file a civil suit. Their only remedy would be under Workers' Compensation 
Act ("the Act.") See Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-105(l). 
Defendant submitted the Affidavit of Patricia Bryan ("Bryan Affidavit") to show that he 
complied with the insurance requirements of the Act. Ms. Bryan is employed by the Workers 
Compensation Fund ("WCF") as a Small Business Underwriter. See Bryan Affidavit %L. She 
testified about Defendant's insurance coverage as follows: 
[a]s of November 20, 2003, Dwight's Auto Wrecking's workers' 
compensation policy with WCF was current and active. Dwight's 
Auto Wrecking was insured by WCF for workers' compensation 
purposes by Policy Number 2039798 . .. 
Id. 1J5. 
Defendant asks for summary judgment because it is undisputed that his business provided 
coverage to its employees on the date of the accident at issue. 
Plaintiffs' argument in opposition is two-fold. First, Plaintiffs argue that James 
Mortensen was not an employee of the Defendant. 
The definition of an employee for purposes of the Act is found in Section 34A-2-
104(l)(b). Employee is defined as "each person in the service of any employer . . . under any 
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contract of hire: express or implied; and oral or written." I conclude that James Mortensen was 
an employee of the Defendant because he was in the service of the Defendant. He had certain 
duties assigned to him in the Defendant's business; he was provided with tools and equipment to 
perform those duties; and he was acting for the benefit of the employer. Thus, Plaintiffs' first 
argument fails. 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant did not report James Mortensen on the payroll 
report to the WCF for purposes of obtaining insurance. Plaintiffs do not have any direct evidence 
that James Mortensen was not reported but they believe such evidence exists. Plaintiffs filed 
Rule 56(f) Motion for additional time to discover such evidence. 
The question is whether Defendant's alleged under-reporting of his business' payroll 
makes any difference for purposes of determining Defendant's insurance coverage. In other 
words, would Defendant still be in compliance with Section 34A-2-201 even if he did not report 
some of his employees on the payroll report to WCF. 
Section 34A-2-201(l) requires an employer to "secure the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits for its employees by: insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this 
compensation with the Workers' Compensation Fund . . . " I found the case of Thomas A. 
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989), that helps interpret the 
meaning of the words "insuring, and keeping insured." The following language from the case is 
relevant: "[i]f an employee is injured in an accident during the course of employment and the 
employer is properly insured, the employee's sole means of obtaining redress is through the 
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workers' compensation system.1" At 127. 
Employer is properly insured when the employer complies with all the requirements of 
applying and keeping current the workers' compensation insurance. One of the requirements is 
reporting payroll for all employees. This requirement is found in the Employer's Handbook. It 
reads: "[p]ayroll for all persons meeting this definition of an employee [definition of an 
employee in Section 34A-2-104(l)(b)1 should be reported . . ." 
Therefore, if the Defendant failed to report James Mortensen, he would not be properly 
insured for the purposes of Section 34A-2-201(l). This means that the Plaintiffs should be 
permitted to conduct further discovery. 
I am also persuaded that the statute requires the employer to be properly insured because 
of the policy behind the statute. This statute is a quid pro quo between the employers and 
employees. See Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 560 (Utah 2000), citing 
Humaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 899 (Utah 1993). This means that the employees and the 
employers give away certain rights in return for benefits. The employees are assured 
compensation for injuries sustained on the job for giving up their right to sue the employers for 
job-related injuries. The employers receive protection from civil litigation but are required to 
maintain workers' compensation insurance for all their employees. 
It would be unfair to shield the employers from civil liability when they fail to comply 
with insurance requirement by under-reporting their payroll. 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel asking the Court to compel production of documents 
1
 Interpreting Utah Code Annotated Sections 35-1-57 and 35-1-60 (1988) and Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-46 (1983). These Sections are substantially similar to the provisions in Utah Code Annotated (2006). 
Section 35-1-57 corresponds with Section 34-2-207 (2006); Section 35-1-60 corresponds with Section 34A-2-105 
(2006); and Section 35-1-46 corresponds with Section 34A-2-201 (2006). 
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that they have requested in numbers 2, 8, and 9 of Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production 
of Documents. The following documents were requested in numbers 2, 8, and 9: (1) all 
documents that "constitute, refer, reflect, or relate to any federal, state, FICA, and other payroll 
deductions deducted from the compensation paid to the decedent by defendant[;]" (2) all 
documents that "constitute, refer, reflect, ore relate to any and all communications between 
defendant and any and all insurers providing Workers' Compensation coverage for defendant in 
which the decedent was provided coverage[;]" and (3) all documents that "constitute, refer, 
reflect, or relate to any and all Workers' Compensation insurance coverage for defendant in 
which decedent was provided coverage[.]" 
These documents may be relevant to a determination of whether the Defendant had 
proper insurance coverage. Therefore, Defendant should be compelled to produce these 
documents if they are in his possession. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion for Additional Time to Conduct Discovery is granted. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is granted. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
denied without prejudice. 
Date _, 2007 
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APPENDIX 3 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201 
Employers to secure workers' 
compensation benefits for employees 
Methods. 
34A-2-201. Employers to secure workers1 compensation benefits for employees -
Methods. 
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its employees 
by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund; 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock 
corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation 
insurance in this state; or 
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance with Section 34A-2-201.5 to pay 
direct compensation as a self-insured employer in the amount, in the manner, and when due as 
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 53; C.L. 1917, § 3114; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 1923, ch. 64, § 1; 
1925, ch. 80, § 1; R.S. 1933,42-1-44; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-44; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 
1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 3; 1986, ch. 204, § 271; 1986, ch. 211, § 
5; 1989, ch. 183, § 1; C. 1953,35-1-46; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 122; renumbered 
by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 95; 1999, ch. 55, § 4; 2000, ch. 222, § 13. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R612-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Constitutionality. 
Compulsory. 
Defenses by insurance carrier. 
Employer. 
Extent of duty. 
Lapse in coverage. 
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Operation and effect of insurance. 
Penalties. 
Powers of commission. 
Rejection of policy by commission. 
Self-insurance. 
Validity of insurance policy. 
Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional. Industrial Comm'n v. Daly Mining Co., 51 Utah 602,172 P. 301 (1918). 
Compulsory. 
This section is compulsory and not permissive. Industrial Comm'n v. Daly Mining Co., 51 Utah 602, 
172 P. 301 (1918); Lovato v. Beatrice Foods, 22 Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969). 
This section imposes an unconditional obligation on employers to be properly insured. Therefore, an 
employer's good-faith effort to obtain insurance would be irrelevant where his insurance agent absconded 
with the employer's premium and failed to arrange for a policy. Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989). 
Defenses by insurance carrier. 
Insurance carrier cannot, by its conduct in paying compensation over long period of time, and after 
either full investigation or opportunity and time for such inquiry, and after claimant's position has changed 
and rights to which he was entitled are lost by lapse of time, interpose defense that policy of insurance did 
not cover employee. Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 91 A.L.R. 1523 (1934). 
In absence of prejudice to employee or of facts giving rise to estoppel, an insurance carrier may, 
notwithstanding voluntary payment of compensation, furnishing of hospital or medical care, entry of 
appearance, or statement made that policy covered employee, urge defense that employee did not meet 
with accident, or that policy did not meet with accident, or that policy did not cover employment, or that 
there was no causal connection between injury and disability. Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 Utah 376, 
28 P.2d 182, 91 A.L.R. 1523 (1934). 
Employer. 
The word "employer" is used in this section to encompass only an employer in a situation where the 
employment status is localized in Utah. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 
175 P.2d 752 (1946). 
Extent of duty. 
© 2008 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
The duty imposed on the employer by this section is merely to provide a qualifying insurance policy. 
Smith v. American Express Travel-Related Servs., 765 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Utah 1991). 
Lapse in coverage. 
If an employer allows workers' compensation insurance coverage to lapse at any time while it employs 
employees, the employer has violated this section and is conducting business without securing the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in this section. Anabasis, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 
2001 UT App 239, 30 P.3d 1236. 
Operation and effect of insurance. 
Employer, by procuring insurance, was not relieved from all liability to pay compensation to its injured 
employee, since employer is primarily liable for compensation to employee, and insolvency of either 
insurer or employer will not excuse payment by other. American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 
483, 187 P. 633, 8 A.L.R. 1342 (1920). 
Penalties. 
The Labor Commission's penalty on an employer for failure to carry workers' compensation insurance 
could not be avoided by the purchase of retroactive coverage for a portion of the employer's period of 
noncompliance. Anabasis, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 239, 30 P.3d 1236. 
Powers of commission. 
Industrial Commission is empowered to enforce payment of compensation when it becomes payable 
in accordance with terms of act (now see § 34A-2-101 et seq.), and proceed in mandamus to compel 
delinquent employers to comply with provisions of act. Industrial Comm'n v. Daly Mining Co., 51 Utah 602, 
172 P. 301 (1918). 
Rejection of policy by commission. 
Industrial Commission was justified in refusing to accept insurance policy issued by private company 
which contained clause permitting employer to participate. Scranton Leasing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 
Utah 368, 170 P. 976(1918). 
Self-insurance. 
Sums set aside in reserve fund as required by Workers' Compensation Act by employer who had 
elected to become self-insurer were not deductible expense in computing income tax. Spring Canyon Coal 
Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78, 76 A.L.R. 1063 (10th Cir. 1930), cert, denied, 284 U.S. 654, 52 S. Ct. 
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33 7 6 L Ed. 555(1931). 
Fact that employer failed to furnish Industrial Commission with annual financial statement as proof of 
financial ability to pay direct compensation to an injured employee did not disqualify employer as 
self-insurer as provided under this section and did not give employee right to maintain civil action under 
former § 35-1-57. Lovato v. Beatrice Foods, 22 Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969). 
Validity of insurance policy. 
Workman has right to assume that he is given insurance coverage for all hazards incident to business 
in which he is regularly employed. Empey v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 234, 63 P.2d 630, 108 A.L.R. 801 
(1937). 
Attempted exclusion in policy of compensation insurance of part of hazard incident to conducting a 
business is contrary to public policy. Empey v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 234, 63 P.2d 630, 108 A.L.R. 
801 (1937). 
Neither assured nor state insurance fund should be permitted to escape liability for compensation 
because husband of one applicant and other applicant were not employed by assured at time of accident 
where those who drew policy misconceived legal relations existing between assured, employees, and 
company by which were employed, after having been furnished facts relative thereto. Empey v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 91 Utah 234, 63 P.2d 630, 108 A.L.R. 801 (1937). 
Provision of policy of compensation insurance excluding from its coverage shooting of oil wells, while 
binding upon parties thereto, did not preclude applicants from recovering compensation from assured and 
state insurance fund for death of husband of one and injuries to other applicant due to accident incident to 
shooting well. Empey v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 234, 63 P.2d 630, 108 A.L.R. 801 (1937). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. -100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 639 et seq. 
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of liability policy provision requiring insured to reimburse insurer for 
payments made under policy, 29 A.L.R.3d 291. 
Workers' compensation: reasonableness of employee's refusal of medical services tendered by 
employer, 72 A.L.R.4th 905. 
Workers' compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of 
earlier compensable injury, 83 A.L.R.4th 110. 
Pre-emption by Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 USCS §§ 901 et seq.) of state 
law claims for bad-faith dealing by insurer or agent of insurer, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 723. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Anabasis v. Labor Commission 
30 P.3d 1236 at 1239 (Utah App. 2001) 
Anabasis, Inc., Petitioner, v. Labor Commission, Respondent. 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2001 UT App 239:30 P.3d 1236:427 Utah Adv. Rep. 18;2001 Utah App. LEXIS 61 
Case No. 20000832-CA 
August 9, 2001, Filed 
Editorial Information: Prior History 
{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 1} Original Proceeding in this Court. 
Disposition: Affirmed. 
Counsel Larrie A. Carmichael, Layton, for Petitioner. 
Sherry Hayashi and Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent. 
Judges: Before Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, 
Judge, Judith M. Billings, Judge. 
Opinion 
Opinion by: NORMAN H. JACKSON 
{30 P.3d 1237} JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
P1 Anabasis, Inc. (Anabasis) seeks judicial review of the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board 
(Appeals Board) decision affirming the penalty imposed on Anabasis for failure to provide workers' 
compensation insurance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (Supp. 2000) (the Insurance 
Statute). 1 Anabasis asserts that the outcome of this case, as succinctly stated by a former President 
in another proceeding, "depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000) allows the Labor Commission (the Commission) to impose a penalty 
on employers if the employer "is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in 
one{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 2} of the three ways provided in [the Insurance Statute]." Anabasis 
argues that the word "is" in the statute relieves Anabasis of liability because "is" requires a present 
state of noncompliance at the time a penalty is imposed, and Anabasis had purchased workers' {30 
P.3d 1238} compensation insurance by the time the Commission imposed the penalty. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
P2 Anabasis began doing business in Utah as "John's Salon" in 1994. Since then, Anabasis has 
continually employed two to six employees at the salon. In October 1998, the Utah Labor Commission 
(the Commission) received information that Anabasis did not have workers' compensation insurance. 
Subsequent{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 3} investigation confirmed that this information was correct. 
P3 On January 6, 1999, the Commission sent a Notice of Noncompliance in Providing Workers* 
Compensation Insurance to Anabasis. This notice asked Anabasis to "provide proof of workers* 
compensation insurance," and warned that "failure to maintain workers' compensation insurance for . . 
. employees could result in a penalty." Anabasis did not respond to the notice. On February 12,1999, 
the Commission sent a Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty (Notice) to Anabasis, 
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stating that it intended to impose a $ 1,000 penalty on Anabasis for its failure to maintain coverage for 
the period of November 2, 1998 to January 12, 1999. Anabasis then obtained a policy for workers' 
compensation insurance with retroactive coverage to February 1,1999. On March 3,1999, and again 
on March 30,1999, the Commission notified Anabasis that it was liable for the $ 1,000 penalty 
imposed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2) (Supp. 2000). 
P4 Anabasis contested the penalty, but an administrative law judge from the Commission upheld 
the penalty, and the Appeals Board affirmed. Anabasis{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 4} now petitions us to 
review the Appeals Board decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-1-303(6) 
(1997) and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
P5 Anabasis asserts that the word "is," as it is used in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 
2000), relieves Anabasis of liability. The parties do not dispute which statute controls this central 
issue, they only disagree on its interpretation. Thus, the central issue presents us with a question of 
statutory construction, which we review for correctness. See Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, 
P13, 7 P.3d 777 (stating, '"matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness"' (quoting Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997)). P6 
Anabasis next alleges that the Commission has a policy of imposing a penalty when an employer fails 
to comply with the Insurance Statute. Thus, alleges Anabasis, the Commission abused its discretion 
by "not exercising discretion at all" when it imposed the penalty on Anabasis. "When the 
Legislature{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 5} has granted an agency discretion to determine an issue, we 
review the agency's action for reasonableness." Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141,143 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). P7 Finally, Anabasis argues that it is entitled to attorney fees under the Small 
Business Access to Justice Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27a-1 to -6 (1996). We may award 
attorney fees at our discretion if a small business prevails on appeal from an agency action. See id. § 
78-27a-5(1). 
ANALYSIS 
P8 The Insurance Statute requires that all Utah employers "secure the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits for [their] employees by: (1) insuring, and keeping insured, [with workers' 
compensation insurance]." 2 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (Supp. 2000). If an employer fails to insure 
and keep insured for workers' compensation, the employer faces many adverse consequences. The 
employer loses certain defenses in employee-initiated law suits, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor for 
each day it is not in compliance, can be enjoined from further business operations, can be ordered by 
a court to comply with the lnsurance{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 6} Statute, {30 P.3d 1239} and can have 
penalties imposed on it by the Commission. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-207, -209 to -211 (1997 & 
Supp. 2000). None of these remedies is exclusive. See id. Here, we examine the language of section 
34A-2-211. 
P9 Anabasis and the Commission dispute the meaning of section 34A-2-211(2)(a), which states 
the following: 
(2)(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the [Commission] may impose a penalty against the employer 
under this Subsection (2): 
(i) subject to the notice and other requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act; and(ii) if the [Commission] believes{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 7} that an employer of one or more 
employees is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in Section 34A-2-201.Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2) (Supp. 2000). '"When we interpret 
statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve.'" State v. Cruz, 2000 UT App 65, P6, 999 P.2d 579 (citation omitted). The 
'"statute should not be construed in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole.'" V-1 Oil Co. 
© 2008 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexIs Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
v. Dep't of EnvtI. Quality, 904 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Further, "if there is 
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to 
analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with its intent and purpose." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
A. Possible Interpretations of Section 34A-2-211(2) 
P10 The Commission argues that the word "is" in section 34A-2- 211 (2)(a)(ii) does not affect the 
Commission's ability to impose a penalty{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 8} for failure to comply with the 
Insurance Statute, even though an employer has obtained workers' compensation insurance after a 
period of noncompliance. Anabasis argues that the word "is" in section 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) allows the 
Commission to impose a penalty only if an employer does not have workers' compensation insurance 
on the date the Commission imposes the penalty. "Even if we were to accept the Commission's 
statutory interpretation as plausible, [Anabasis's] interpretation is likewise plausible. The statute would 
therefore be ambiguous " Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 270 n.8 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); cf. Hercules, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT App 372, P12 n.6, 21 P.3d 
231 ("The dissent's use of statutory construction to reach a different conclusion only supports our 
conclusion that the meaning of this statute is unclear and susceptible to several possible 
interpretations."). P11 We see a third possible interpretation. Here, the verb "is" is "used with the 
present participle of a verb to express a continuing action." The American Heritage Dictionary 163 (2d 
ed. 1985); see also State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, P11, 992 P.2d 986(2001 Utah App. LEXIS 9} 
(stating, courts in Utah have a "long history of relying on dictionary definitions to determine plain 
meaning"). The word "is" may appear connected to "conducting business without [workers' 
compensation insurance]," which would require a continuing action of conducting business without 
workers' compensation insurance at the time of notice. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-211(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 
2000). However, the phrase, "is conducting business," is connected in time to the Commission's 
belief. Section 34A-2-211(2)(a) allows the Commission to impose the penalty when the Commission 
"believes that an employer... is conducting business without securing [workers' compensation 
insurance]." Id. (emphasis added). Under this third interpretation, the Commission's ability to impose 
the penalty would attach once the Commission forms a belief that an employer is not complying with 
the Insurance Statute. 3 
{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 10} P12 In view of these three plausible interpretations, we conclude that 
the statute is ambiguous. Accordingly, we must analyze the statute in accordance with the rules of 
statutory construction to determine the intent of the Legislature. 
{30 P.3d 1240} B. The Requirements of the Insurance Statute 
P13 Section 34A-2-211 allows the Commission to impose a penalty "if the [Commission] believes 
that an employer of one or more employees is conducting business without securing the payment of 
benefits in one of the three ways provided in [the Insurance Statute]." Id. Thus, an employer must be 
in full compliance with the Insurance Statute to avoid a penalty from the Commission. Accordingly, we 
must evaluate the requirements of the Insurance Statute to determine whether Anabasis was in full 
compliance. P14 The Insurance Statute requires that an employer "secure the payment of workers' 
compensation" by "insuring, and keeping insured." 4 Id. § 34A-2-201(1). The requirement to insure 
and keep insured is mandatory for all employers in Utah. See Industrial Comm'n v. Daly Mining Co., 
51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301, 303-06 (1918). Further, the lnsurance{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 11} Statute 
"imposes an unconditional obligation on employers to be properly insured." Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 128 n.4 (Utah 1989). 
P15 Thus, the Insurance Statute sets forth two workers' compensation insurance requirements for 
employers. First, an employer must insure its employees with workers' compensation insurance. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (Supp. 2000). An employer must comply with this requirement when it 
hires its first employee. See Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394,174 P. 825, 826 (1918) ("The 
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duty to secure in advance the compensation provided for by the act by one of the foregoing methods 
[of the Insurance Statute] has by this court been held to be compulsory."). Second, an employer{2001 
Utah App. LEXIS 12} must keep all its employees insured for workers' compensation. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-201 (Supp. 2000). "Keep" means "to cause to continue in a state, condition, or course of 
action." The American Heritage Dictionary 698 (2d ed. 1985). Thus, this second requirement imposes 
an obligation on employers to provide workers' compensation insurance continually while they employ 
employees. If an employer allows workers' compensation insurance coverage to lapse at any time 
while it employs employees, the employer has violated the Insurance Statute and "is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in [the Insurance 
Statute]." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000). Consequently, even if the employer 
later resumes workers' compensation coverage, the employer has not kept insured for workers' 
compensation. Thus, notwithstanding an employer's purchase of retroactive workers' compensation 
insurance to cover a portion of its period of noncompliance, the portion without coverage remains as a 
period of the employer's noncompliance and the employer's violation continues. 
{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 13} C. Harmonization With Other Provisions P16 This interpretation of the 
Insurance Statute's requirements is in harmony with the provisions of section 34A-2-211 and other 
sections of the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -803 (1997 & Supp. 
2000). See V-1 Oil Co., 904 P.2d at 217 (stating that courts should harmonize provisions of an act 
with its purpose and intent if its application or meaning is uncertain); Mesa Dev. Co. v. Sandy City, 
948 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ('"We examine the entire statutory scheme and harmonize 
its provisions if possible."* (Citation omitted.)). First, Section 34A-2-211(2)(b)(ii) instructs that the 
penalty should be calculated as a function of how much the employer should have paid in workers' 
compensation premiums "during the period of noncompliance." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(b)(ii) 
(Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). A "period" is "an interval of time characterized by the occurrence of 
certain conditions or events." The American Heritage Dictionary 922 (2d ed. 1985). Thus, "period of 
noncompliance," as used in{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 14} section 34A-2-211(2)(b)(ii), is a finite time 
period for which a penalty can be calculated. "Period of noncompliance" refers specifically to the time 
period beginning when an employer's workers' {30 P.3d 1241} compensation insurance coverage 
lapses and ending when the employer again obtains the insurance coverage or is enjoined from 
further business operation. 5 See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-210(1)(b) (1997). Accordingly, the 
employer's period of noncompliance must be a specific past interval of time. 
{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 15} P17 Next, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-209 (1997), which details the 
criminal aspects of noncompliance, supports our interpretation. Section 34A-2-209 states that "each 
day's failure to comply with [the Insurance Statute] is a separate offense." Id. § 34A- 2-209(1 )(a)(ii). 
Thus, an employer cannot escape criminal liability for failing to secure workers' compensation 
insurance by purchasing a policy prior to an administrative proceeding. Any action an employer 
undertakes to purchase retroactive insurance does not reduce criminal liability, it merely stops the 
number of offenses from increasing. Section 34A-2-211 allows imposition of penalties for past 
noncompliance, just as section 34A-2-209 imposes criminal liability for past noncompliance, in spite of 
an employer's attempt to purchase retroactive workers' compensation insurance coverage prior to a 
proceeding. 
P18 Finally, Anabasis contends that this interpretation of "is" -which really is an interpretation of 
the phrase "if the [Commission] believes that an employer... is conducting business without securing 
[workers' compensation insurance]," Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(b) {2001 Utah App. LEXIS 16} 
(Supp. 2000)--contradicts the meaning of an identical phrase in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-210(2) 
(1997). The alleged contradiction is a present and past verb tense interpretation for the same verb 
form, "is." We are not convinced that our interpretation of section 34A-2-211 contradicts section 
34A-2-210. P19 '"In cases of apparent conflict between provisions of the same statute, it is the 
Court's duty to harmonize and reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court cannot presume that the 
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legislature intended to create a conflict."' Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1235 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Section 34A-2-210 contains the procedure for enjoining an 
employer from "further operation of the employer's business" if the Commission "has reason to believe 
that an employer is conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one of 
the three ways specified in [the Insurance Statute]." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-210(2) (1997). As we 
stated earlier, the Insurance Statute requires an employer to obtain workers' compensation insurance 
when it hires its first employee, {2001 Utah App. LEXIS 17} and to maintain continual coverage 
during the time the employer has employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (Supp. 2000). Failure 
to comply with either of these requirements exposes the employer to the possibility that the 
Commission will enjoin the employer from conducting business until it fully complies with the 
Insurance Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-210 (1997). Thus, the application of our interpretation 
of the Insurance Statute and section 34A-2-211 does not contradict section 34A-2-210. 
D. Legislative History P20 The legislative history of amendments to section 34A-2-211 confirms that 
our interpretation {30 P.3d 1242} is in accord with the Legislature's intent. See State v. Garcia, 965 
P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating, "if the plain language is ambiguous, 'we may seek 
guidance from the legislative history'" (citation omitted)). P21 Prior to 1995, section 34A-2-211 
contained a procedural hurdle that the Commission had to overcome before imposing a penalty on an 
employer. Section 34A-2-211 required that the Commission first "give an employer written notice of 
noncompliance"{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 18} and allow the employer fifteen days to "remedy the 
default." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46.10(1) (1994) (amended 1995). "If the employer [did] not remedy 
the default within 15 days," the Commission then had to "issue an order to show cause why the 
employer should not be ordered to comply with [the Insurance Statute]." Id. § 35-1-46.10(2) (amended 
1995). Finally, the Commission could impose a penalty "at the time of the hearing" to show cause. Id. 
§ 35-1-46.10(4) (amended 1995). 
P22 The 1995 amendments to the Penalty Statute addressed the inefficiencies of this procedural 
hurdle. Senator Buhler, the co-sponsor of the bill, explained that the intent of the amendments to 
section 34A-2-211 was to "strike out against those employers who are not following the law and who 
are not providing the insurance that they are required to." Recording of Utah Senate Floor 
Proceedings (S.B. 124), 51st Legislature, General Session (February 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Buhler). Specifically, Senator Buhler addressed the problem of non-compliant businesses which 
create a revolving door by paying the relatively small fine when caught in non-compliance, {2001 Utah 
App. LEXIS 19} complying by purchase of a short-term coverage policy, and then letting that policy 
lapse once the Commission had turned its attention elsewhere. Senator Buhler noted that "the 
Industrial Commission estimates that up to 10% of employers do not have the required coverage. 
Once they're caught, they obtain their coverage and the Industrial Commission can fine them . . . but 
it's usually a cost effective, although illegal way to do business." Id. Senator Buhler added, the 
problem that we're trying to solve is that there's 10% of our employers who do not have coverage, and 
they're supposed to. They're told at the time that they register their corporation that they're supposed 
to have coverage . . . and so we're trying to get the point across that if you don't have coverage, 
there's a severe penalty. 
Id. 
P23 The language was amended so that the imposition of a penalty was no longer tied to the 
hearing on the order to show cause. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46.10(1) to -46.10(3) (1994) 
(amended 1995), with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46.10(1) to -46.10(2) (Supp. 1995) (amended 1996). 
The new language{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 20} stated, "in addition to the remedies specified in 
Subsection (1) and Section 35-1-46, the commission may impose a penalty against the employer." 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46.10(2)(a) (1995) (amended 1996) (emphasis added). This amendment 
signaled a break from the statutory procedure that gave rise to the revolving door problem explained 
by Senator Buhler. 
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P24 A 1997 amendment reinforced the new policy by stating that "notwithstanding Subsection (1), 
the division may impose a penalty against the employer." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(a) (1997) 
(emphasis added) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(a) (Supp. 2000)). Further, the 
1997 amendment to section 34A-2-211 added language that triggers the Commission's ability to 
impose penalties on employers: the Commission can impose a penalty when "the [Commission] 
believes an employer... is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in one of 
the three ways provided in the [Insurance Statute]." Id. § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) (current version at Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-211 (2)(a)(ii) {2001 Utah App. LEXIS 21} (Supp. 2000)). 
P25 Thus, our examination of the legislative intent reveals that the word "is" was not intended to 
impede the Commission's ability to impose a penalty on employers for past noncompliance with the 
Insurance Statute. As Senator Buhler indicated, the Legislature amended section 34A-2-211 to stop 
the revolving door through which employers evaded their responsibility to employees. The Legislature 
intended to allow the Commission to more effectively deter businesses {30 P.3d 1243} from 
noncompliance with the Insurance Statute. That ability to deter noncompliance rests in the 
Commission's power to impose penalties on businesses that fail to comply with the continuing 
requirement of the Insurance Statute. 
P26 The Legislature intended to preclude the statutory meaning which Anabasis has proposed. 
Anabasis's failure to understand the intent of the legislation is clear in its statement, "the purpose of § 
34A-2-211(2) is to obtain and maintain compliance before a workers' compensation claim is made. 
The best insurance is a policy in effect when a claim is made." (Emphasis added.) Anabasis's 
proposal is misguided. The purpose of section 34A-2-211(2) is to ensure{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 22} 
that employers comply with the Insurance Statute from the time they begin employing employees, not 
to ensure they comply only when a workers' compensation claim is imminent. Thus, the best and only 
insurance that qualifies under section 34A-2-211 is a policy in effect at all times when an employer 
employs employees. We conclude that retroactive insurance coverage for a portion of a period of 
noncompliance does not relieve Anabasis from the penalties imposed on it by the Commission. 
Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's ruling. 
II. Exercise of Discretion by the Commission P27 Anabasis's assertion that the Commission abused 
its discretion by "not exercising discretion at all" is without merit. "We review the agency's action for 
reasonableness." Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). P28 Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-211(2)(a) (Supp. 2000) states that the Commission "may impose a penalty against 
the employer." Id. (emphasis added). The word "may" is the legislative grant of discretion to the 
Commission. The discretion granted to the Commission allows it to impose or not to impose a 
penalty.{2001 Utah App. LEXIS 23} If the Commission imposes the penalty, "the penalty imposed . . . 
shall be the greater of: (i) $ 1,000; or (ii) three times the amount of the premium the employer would 
have paid." Id. § 34A- 2-211(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
P29 Here, the Commission's investigation found that Anabasis did not have workers' compensation 
insurance. Accordingly, the Commission had the discretion to impose or not to impose a penalty. See 
id. The Commission imposed the penalty for failure to comply with the Insurance Statute. The 
mandatory language of section 34A-2-211(2)(b) required the Commission to impose a minimum $ 
1,000 penalty for the period of noncompliance. 6 Thus, we cannot say that the Commission's 
imposition of a penalty for noncompliance with the Insurance Statute was unreasonable. 
P30 Finally, Anabasis claims that it is entitled to an award of attorney fees from the State pursuant 
to the Small Business Access to Justice Act (the Act). Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27a-1 to -6 (1996). The 
Act states that "a court may award reasonable litigation expenses to any small business which is a 
named party if the small business prevails in the appeal and the court finds that the state action was 
undertaken without substantial justification." Id. § 78-27a-5(1). We reject Anabasis's claim. 
P31 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27a-3(1) (1996), defines prevailing on appeal as "obtaining favorable 
© 2008 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
final judgment... on the merits, on substantially all counts . . . and with respect to the most significant 
issue or set of issues presented." Anabasis has not obtained a favorable judgment on any issue. 
Further, even if Anabasis had prevailed, the Commission had received information that Anabasis 
failed to provide workers' compensation insurance for its employees for up to six years. Subsequent 
investigation confirmed that the information was correct. Thus, the Commission had "substantial 
justification" {2001 Utah App. LEXIS 25} for seeking a civil remedy to correct this problem. Id. § 
78-27a-5(1). Accordingly, we conclude that Anabasis is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
{30 P.3d 1244} CONCLUSION 
P32 We conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211 empowers the Commission to impose a 
penalty on an employer for past periods of noncompliance if the Commission acquires information that 
the employer has not kept its employees insured for workers' compensation. Imposition of the penalty 
cannot be avoided by an employer's purchase of retroactive insurance coverage for a portion of its 
period of noncompliance. Next, we conclude that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by 
imposing the statutory minimum penalty on Anabasis. Finally, we conclude that Anabasis is not 
entitled to attorney fees under the Small Business Access to Justice Act. 
P33 We affirm. 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge 
P34 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Footnotes 
1 
The applicable law in this case includes Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-211 (Supp. 1998), which became 
effective May 4, 1998; and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (1997), which became effective July 1,1997. 
The relevant portions of these statutes have not changed; thus, we cite to the most current version. 
2 
An employer may also satisfy the Insurance Statute if it "obtains approval from the division in 
accordance with Section 34A-2-201.5 to pay direct compensation as a self-insured employer." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-201(3) (Supp. 2000). However, Anabasis has not obtained this approval from the 
Commission. 
3 
The Commission's belief could arise upon receiving notification of noncompliance through information 
obtained by investigation, informers, or other means. 
4 
Employers remain liable for workers' compensation claims for up to six years from the date of an 
accident. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). 
5 
We note that an employer's exposure to liability in a civil suit, as explained by section 34A-2-207, is 
limited to claims arising during the specific time period during which the employer does not have 
workers' compensation coverage. An employer's civil liability, as described in section 34A-2-207, 
ceases for claims that arise during the time period for which the employer has workers' compensation 
coverage. This limitation is evident in the language and history of section 34A-2-207. 
© 2008 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
First, section 34A-2-207 states that "employers who fail to comply with [the Insurance Statute] are not 
entitled to the benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, during the period 
of noncompliance" Utah Code Ann. § 34A- 2-207(1 )(a) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
Legislature limited an employer's liability to a specific time period. Further, Utah courts have stated 
that, "the [Workers' Compensation] Act has a correlated purpose in its benefit to the employer.... [If] 
it appears that the employer has complied with the act and provided coverage for [its] employees, [the 
employer] should be entitled to the protections from lawsuits and possible judgments it expressly 
grants him." Buhlerv. Gossner, 530 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added). Thus, an employer 
is civilly liable, as described in section 34A-2-207, and loses listed defenses, only if the employer does 
not have workers' compensation insurance coverage for the time when a claim arises. 
6 
We note that the Commission only sought to impose the penalty for a short portion of the alleged six 
years of noncompliance. Had the Commission sought to impose a penalty for a longer period, the 
penalty could have been over $ 5,400. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-105. Exclusive 
remedy against employer, and officer, 
agent, or employee of employer. 
34A-2-105. Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, agent, or employee of 
employer. 
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer and is 
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or arising out of the 
employee's employment, and an action at law may not be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death 
of an employee. Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the employee's dependents, 
from filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance with Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) The exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to both the client and the 
professional employer organization in a coemployment relationship regulated under Title 31 A, 
Chapter 40, Professional Employer Organization Licensing Act. 
(3) (a) For purposes of this section: 
(i) "Temporary employee" means an individual who for temporary work assignment is: 
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing company; or 
(B) registered by or otherwise associated with a temporary staffing company. 
(ii) "Temporary staffing company" means a company that engages in the assignment of 
individuals as temporary full-time or part-time employees to fill assignments with a finite ending 
date to another independent entity. 
(b) If the temporary staffing company secures the payment of workers' compensation in 
accordance with Section 34A-2-201 for all temporary employees of the temporary staffing 
company, the exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to both the temporary staffing 
company and the client company and its employees and provide the temporary staffing company 
the same protection that a client company and its employees has under this section for the acts of 
any of the temporary staffing company's temporary employees on assignment at the client 
company worksite. 
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History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, § 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C 1943, 
42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1994, ch. 224, § 5; 1995, ch. 307, § 3; C. 1953, 35-1-60; 
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 109; 1997, ch. 93, § 1; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 
87; 1999, ch. 199, § 3; 2001, ch. 9, § 57; 2005, ch. 71, § 21; 2008, ch. 318, § 25. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, corrected the code citation in 
Subsection (3)(b). 
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, substituted "Professional Employer Organization 
Registration Act" for "Professional Employer Organization Licensing Act" in Subsection (2). 
The 2008 amendment, effective May 5, 2008, rewrote (2), which read: "The exclusive remedy 
provisions of this section apply to both the client company and the employee leasing company in an 
employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Professional Employer Organization 
Registration Act," and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. - Utah Occupational Disease Act, § 34A-3-101 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Apportionment of negligence. 
Compulsory. 
Damage to reputation. 
Effect of no-fault insurance. 
Emotional distress. 
Employer. 
- Multiple employers. 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
- Automobile insurance. 
- Exceptions. 
- Minor engaged in hazardous employment. 
- Scope. 
Farmers and domestics. 
Federal law. 
Hospital charges. 
Indemnification agreement. 
Intentional tort. 
Joint venture. 
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Liability to third parties. 
Nature and adequacy of act. 
Negligent injury by co-employee. 
Negligent supervision. 
Occupational disease. 
Statutory employer. 
Statutory indemnification. 
Subcontractor's employee. 
Temporary employees. 
Tort liability of employer. 
- "Dual capacity" doctrine. 
Cited. 
Apportionment of negligence. 
When apportioning comparative negligence among the responsible parties, the jury may apportion the 
fault of employers under §§ 78B-5-818 to 78B-5-823 notwithstanding their immunity under this section. 
Dahl v. Kerbs Constr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah 1993). 
Compulsory. 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act is compulsory and not elective. Lovato v. Beatrice Foods, 22 
Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969). 
Damage to reputation. 
Suits for damage to reputation are not barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers' 
compensation act, since damage to reputation does not fall within the coverage formula of the act. 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
Effect of no-fault insurance. 
A state employee who was injured in a car accident in the course of her employment was entitled to 
collect personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under § 31A-22-309 to the extent those benefits were not 
covered by workers' compensation. The workers' compensation exclusivity provision does not bar such 
action; moreover, the provision of the state's self-insurance program excluding PIP benefits to any person 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits is not in harmony with statutory requirements and is therefore 
invalid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
Emotional distress. 
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Trial court properly dismissed an employee's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, absent any proof that his employer had directed or intended a co-employee's using a 
loudspeaker to accuse the employee of using drugs. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 
(Utah 1991). 
Employee's cause of action for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress was properly 
dismissed because any such damages would clearly come within the purview of the workers' 
compensation act. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
Trial court properly granted employer's motion for summary judgment because Industrial Commission 
had already compensated employee for her alleged emotional injuries and employee failed to present any 
facts to show that employer assented to the intentional acts of one of its employees. Hamilton v. Parkdale 
Care Ctr., Inc., 904 P.2d 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Where employee submitted no evidence to prove that employer's manager intended to cause her to 
suffer emotional distress, her federal civil rights claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the 
workers' compensation act. Metcalf v. Metropolitan Life, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1536 (D. Utah 1997). 
Employer. 
Worker was employee of cable television company, its subsidiary, and its limited partner for purposes 
of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act where the cable television 
company, as part of its management style, grouped all employees together under its direct control and 
where the worker's time sheets and checks were managed by the cable television company. Freund v. 
Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272 (D. Utah 1985). 
When an injured worker asserts derivative liability, a parent corporation and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary are to be considered a single employing unit for purposes of this section. Aragon v. Clover Club 
Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
- Multiple employers. 
An employee, for the purpose of workers' compensation, may have two employers, and either 
employer may invoke the exclusive remedy provision if an employer-employee relationship existed at the 
time of the injury to the employee. Bliss v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Utah 1994). 
Under the loaned-employee doctrine, a special employer is immune from suit for employer injuries 
sustained on the job if it pays workers' compensation insurance for the loaned employee. Hardman v. 
Specialty Servs., 177 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
Under this section when the injury is caused by the negligent act of the employer, no willful 
misconduct being claimed, the injured employee or, when the injur/ causes death, his dependents, must 
be content to accept the compensation provided by the act. Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 112, 
263 P. 78(1927). 
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Since the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy of an 
employee who is injured in the course of his employment is the right to recover the compensation provided 
for in the act (now see § 34A-2-101 et seq.). Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 
(1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885 (1945). 
Employee of railroad was not precluded from filing claim for compensation by application filed under 
Federal Employers' Liability Act on ground of election since employee did not have two remedies but only 
one; if injury was incurred while he was engaged in interstate commerce, his remedy was under Federal 
Employers' Liability Act and if not, it was under state act. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 
Utah 364, 35 P.2d 842, 94 A.L.R. 1423 (1934). 
This section abrogates employee's common-law right to sue employer for injuries suffered while in 
course of employment, except where employer is not subject to this act or common-law remedy of 
employee is expressly reserved. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 
P.2d 612, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L Ed. 411 (1948). 
This section makes it clear that this chapter is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for 
injury or death, against the employer and other employees to the exclusion of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, and that it bars all next of kin or dependents, or anyone else, 
from using any other means of recovery against employers and others named in and covered by the act, 
than the act itself. Morrill v. J & M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). 
Former county employee's claims against the county or against individual co-employees based on 
negligent infliction of emotional distress or otherwise based upon negligence were barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision of this section. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
The exclusive remedy provided for in this section and the means for adjudicating the right to such a 
remedy rests with the Industrial Commission only. Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 
1996). 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act barred an employee's claims of bad faith and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress based solely on the late payment of her workers' compensation claims. 
Gunderson v. May Dep't Stores Co., 955 P.2d 346 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
This section applied to daughters' action against their mother's employer for its alleged denial of sick 
leave for mother to obtain the medical attention necessary to arrest the progression of her cancer. Cook v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002 UT 105, 57 P.3d 1084. 
Automobile insurance. 
The exclusive remedy provision precluded an insured's entitlement to benefits pursuant to the 
underinsured motor vehicle clause of his automobile insurance policy. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. 
Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997). 
- Exceptions. 
The only exceptions to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation act are where the injury is caused 
by a willful or intentional tortious act of an employer or fellow employee, or where the employer fails to 
comply with the state employer insurance requirements. Horvath v. Savage Mfg., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 
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1296 (D.Utah 1998). 
- Minor engaged in hazardous employment. 
Even if a minor employee was injured while engaged in hazardous employment in violation of former § 
34-23-2, prohibiting the employment of minors in hazardous occupations, the minor's exclusive remedy 
was through this chapter, and the minor could not void her employment contract and sue in tort. Bingham 
v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985). 
- Scope. 
This section does not bar an employee's wrongful discharge cause of action brought against an 
employer who has discharged an employee in retaliation for the employee's exercise of rights. Touchard v. 
La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2006 UT 71, 148 P.3d 945. 
Farmers and domestics. 
Farm laborers and domestic servants, in the event of an accident or injury, are entitled to pursue their 
common-law remedies in an action against the employer because they are excepted from the act by §§ 
35-1-42 and 35-1-43 (now see §§ 34A-2-103 and 34A-2-104). Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 
(1930). 
Federal law. 
Federal government employee was barred from bringing negligence suit against a fellow employee 
where, under federal law, the employee's exclusive remedy was against the United States and she had 
filed for and received benefits from the United States government. Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Hospital charges. 
The only power given the commission by the workers' compensation statutes over hospital charges 
for services rendered to injured employees is the right to refuse to pay that part of them which is excessive 
in amount or for care which was not reasonably necessary; Industrial Commission does not have the 
power and authority to set maximum rates which hospitals may charge for services rendered injured 
employees, and hospitals are not prohibited from holding an injured employee liable for any amounts not 
paid by the commission. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 
1982). 
Indemnification agreement. 
Where employer and third party voluntarily enter into a written indemnification agreement whereby the 
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employer agrees to indemnify the third party against claims arising out of injuries to the employer's 
employees, and where an employee is injured and is compensated by the employer in accordance with 
the workers' compensation law, the exclusive remedy provision of this section does not preclude the 
enforcement of the indemnification agreement by the third party against the employer for amounts paid by 
the third party to the employee as a result of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). 
An indemnity agreement is a separate undertaking by the employer that will be enforceable despite 
workers' compensation if the indemnity provision expressly covers the indemnitor's employees, but the 
phrase "person or persons" does not cover indemnitor's own employees given the dramatic consequences 
of such an interpretation. Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987). 
The exclusive remedy provision of this section bars a claim by a third party that a statutory employer 
impliedly agreed to indemnify the third party against claims for injuries sustained by an employee. Freund 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). 
The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act does not prohibit or alter express 
contractual indemnification agreements. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994). 
Intentional tort. 
Provision prohibiting action for damages against fellow employee does not prohibit maintenance of 
action for premeditated and intentional act of fellow employee. Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1975). 
Requiring an injured employee to show that his employer or fellow employee manifested a deliberate 
intent to injure him before allowing an exception to the statute for an intentional tort is fully consistent with 
the purpose of the workers' compensation act. Knowledge to a substantial certainty that injury will follow is 
not sufficient to invoke the exception. Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Summary judgment was properly denied to employer who asserted that workers' compensation 
exclusivity barred employees' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress for pervasive and severe 
sexual harassment by a supervisor. Evidence that the employer had knowledge of the supervisor's 
conduct and intentionally covered up the investigations in order to protect the supervisor created a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer directed or intended the injurious acts. Derijk v. 
Southland Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Utah 2003). 
Joint venture. 
Construction company obtained contract to construct diversion tunnel at dam and entered into 
agreement with corporation by which the two organizations would unite their efforts to complete such 
construction and share in profits or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by the construction company, 
who was injured while working on the tunnel and who obtained workmen's compensation benefits, could 
not sue corporation for alleged negligence of corporate employees since the two companies were 
regarded as the employing unit. The employees of both companies were engaged in the same 
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963). 
This section barred suit by workmen against joint venturer that was his employer for injuries sustained 
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Statutory employer. 
The legislature has, in clear and unmistakable language, evinced an intention to allow suits by an 
injured worker against those persons who might be his or her statutory employers as defined in former § 
35-1-42. The immediate, or common-law, employer, who actually pays compensation, and its officers, 
agents, and employees are shielded by the exclusive remedy immunity conferred by this section. Pate v. 
Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989). 
The decision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), holding that the state Workers' 
Compensation Act should no longer be construed to provide tort immunity to statutory employers who 
have not been required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker, should be given retroactive effect. 
Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1989). 
A worker can sue a statutory employer who has not been required to pay workers' compensation 
benefits, and the latter is not protected by the immunity afforded by this section. Bosch v. Busch 
Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431 (Utah 1989). 
Utah courts do not recognize "common law employer" as a distinct classification of employer. The 
passing reference in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), to "common law employer" 
was not intended to create a new classification of employers; it was simply referring to the immediate 
employer, as opposed to a "statutory employer." Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Statutory indemnification. 
Utility's indemnity claim against employer under § 54-8c-4 was not barred by the exclusive remedy 
provision of this section. Snyder v. PacifiCorp, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Utah 2004). 
Subcontractor's employee. 
This section does not forbid or render invalid a clause in a construction subcontract by which the 
subcontractor has agreed to indemnify the prime contractor and save him harmless for all liability arising 
out of the injury or death of an employee of subcontractor. Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th 
Cir. 1966). 
Subcontractor's employee could not recover from general contractor in civil action for injuries on 
theory that subcontractor was his employer and general contractor was a third person not in the same 
employment. Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972). 
Temporary employees. 
A temporary employment service is not like a subcontractor since it does not perform any work for its 
customers but merely supplies or "loans" workers who are under contract to the service to work for its 
clients; the relationship between the service, a "loaned" or temporary employee, and the temporary 
employer is different from statutory employee-employer relationships, and different legal principles govern 
that relationship. Ghersi v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1994). 
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A temporary employment service and the company using a temporary employee assigned by the 
service were protected by the exclusive remedy provision of this section by application of the "loaned 
employee doctrine," since an employment contract was implied between the company and the employee, 
the work being done was essentially that of the company, and the company had the right to control details 
of the work, and because, under the agreement between the company and the service, a portion of the fee 
paid by the company was used by the service to carry workers' compensation insurance. Ghersi v. 
Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1994). 
A temporary employee on loan to a client (special employer) of a temporary employment service 
(general employer) becomes the employee of the special employer for the purpose of the exclusive 
remedy provision of workers' compensation if: the employee has made a contract of hire, express or 
implied, with the special employer; the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and the 
special employer has the right to control the details of the work. Bliss v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 866 F. 
Supp. 1362 (D.Utah 1994). 
Clients (special employers) of temporary employment services (general employers) are not included in 
the categories enumerated in § 35-1-62(4), delineating entities not occupying an employer-employee 
relationship with an injured employee. Bliss v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Utah 1994). 
Although a worker was a temporary employee, he was considered an employee of the principal 
contractor for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision of this section. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243. 
Tort liability of employer. 
- "Dual capacity" doctrine. 
Utah law does not recognize, as an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Worker's 
Compensation Act, the so-called "dual capacity" doctrine under which an employer, shielded from tort 
liability by the act, may become liable in tort if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a 
second capacity that confers on him an obligation independent of those imposed on him as an employer. 
Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985). 
An employee cannot hold his employer liable in tort for injuries resulting from the employer's 
maintenance of unsafe premises, on the reasoning that the employer occupies a separate capacity and 
owes separate duties to his employees as an owner of the premises, since the employer's duty to maintain 
a safe workplace is inseparable from the employer's general duties as an employer toward his employees. 
Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985). 
The dual capacity doctrine did not apply to a products liability claim brought on behalf of a decedent 
who was killed when he was pulled into a large screw-auger manufactured by defendant while decedent 
was working on his employer's premises, where the employer had not assumed a separate and distinct 
obligation toward his employee other than as employer. Stewart v. CMI Corp., 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987). 
A service station was not liable on the basis of the dual capacity doctrine for the death of an employee 
who was kidnapped and murdered while on duty. The facts did not show that the employer was acting in a 
"dual capacity," as an employer and provider of security; rather, the efforts to provide security were part of 
its obligations and closely related to its role as an employer. Hunsaker ex rel. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 
893 (Utah 1993). 
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APPENDIX 6 
WCF Policy "Information Page" and 
Endorsements for CoverageYear 
March 2,2003-March 2,2004 12:01 a.m. 
Exemplar 
"Workers Compensation and 
Employers Liability Insurance Policy" 
YV 
INFORMATION PAGE 
Insurer: Workers Compensation Fund Number: 2 039798 
392 East 64 00 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
1- The Insured: DWIGHTS AUTO WRECKING 
Mailing Address: PO BOX 570 03 7 
SIGURD UT 84 6 57 
Legal Status: Sole Proprietorship 
Workplaces; 
DWIGHTS AUTO WRECKING 
14 0 0 W SUB STATION RD 
SIGURD UT 846 57 
2. The policy period is from 03/02/2003 TO 03/02/2004 12:01 A.M., 
at the insured's mailing address. 
3, A. Workers Compensation Insurance: Coverage A of the policy applies 
to the Workers Compensation Law of the states listed here: Utah 
B- Employers Liability Insurance: Coverage B of the policy applies 
to work in each state listed in Item 3. A. The limits of our 
liability under Coverage B are: 
Bodily injury by accident (each accident) $100,000 
Bodily injury by disease (policy limit) $500,000 
Bodily injury by disease (each employee) $100,000 
C. Other states insurance; NONE 
D. This policy includes these endorsements and schedules: 
WC 00 00 00 A, WC 0 0 00 01 A, WCFU 107-0, 
WC 43 06 02. 
4 . Premium f o r t h i s p o l i c y w i l l b e d e t e r m i n e d by o u r M a n u a l s of R u l e s , 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , R a t e s and R a t i n g P l a n s . A l l i n f o r m a t i o n b e l o w 
i s s u b j e c t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n a n d c h a n g e by a u d i t . 
C l a s s E s t i m a t e d R a t e P e r 
Codes D e s c r i p t i o n A n n u a l P a y r o l l $100 P a y r o l l Premium 
3321 AUTOMOBILE DISMANTLING Sc 1 2 , 2 9 3 6 . 1 0 $743 87 
DRIVERS 
D,-iHe Issued: 01/15/03 
wc oo oo oi A 
/orkers Compensation Fund * 392 East 6400 South * Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 - 800-446-CGMP * www.wd 
Continued from Page 1 
Number: 2 03979 8 
MANUAL PREMIUM $749.87 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL PREMIUM $749.87 
Minimum Premium $400.00 
If policy is cancelled prior to expiration the Final Premium will 
not be less than the Minimum Premium. 
wc oo oo oi A 
Workers Compensation Fund • 392 East 6400 South * Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 * 800-446-COMP • WWW.VVCM 
PREMIUM BILLING SCHEDULE 
P o l i c y Name: DWIGHTS AUTO WRECKING 
P o l i c y Number : 2 03979 8 
C o v e r a g e P e r i o d : 0 3 / 0 2 / 2 0 0 3 t o 0 3 / 0 2 / 2 0 0 4 1 2 : 0 1 A.M. 
Due D a t e Amount 
0 3 / 0 3 / 2 0 0 3 7 4 9 . 8 7 
T o t a l : 7 4 9 . 8 7 
WCFU 107-0 
Workers Compensation Fund * 392 East 6400 South • Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 * 800-446-COMP * www.wc 
UTAH CANCELLATION ENDORSEMENT 
This endorsement applies only to the insurance provided by the policy because Utah is 
shown in Item 3.A. of the Information Page. 
Cancellation Section (D) of Part Six-Conditions is replaced by the following: 
A. Cancellation 
1. You may cancel this policy. You must mail or deliver advance notice to us stating 
when the cancellation is to take effect. 
2. If this policy has been previously renewed or has been in effect for at least 60 
days, the provisions of this paragraph 2 apply. We may cancel this policy for 
one of the following reasons: 
a. You fail to pay all premiums when due ; 
b. A material misrepresentation -
c. A substantial change in the risk assumed, unless we should reasonably 
have foreseen the change or contemplated the risk when entering into 
the contract-
d. Substantial breaches of contractual duties, conditions or warranties. 
We will mail or deliver to you not less than 30 days advance written notice 
stating when the cancellation is to take effect, except in the event you fail 
to pay your premiums when due, in which case we will mail or deliver to you 
not less than 10 days advance written notice stating when the cancellation 
is to take effect. Should we cancel for non-payment of premiums, we must 
state this as the reason for the cancellation on our notice of cancellation. 
Should we cancel for any of the other reasons above, we must either state 
the facts on which our decision is based or notify you of your right to 
make a written request for that information. Mailing a cancellation 
notice via first class mail to you at your mailing address last known to us 
will be sufficient to prove notice. 
3 . If this policy has not previously been renewed and has been in effect less than 
60 days, we may cancel the policy for any reason and without a statement of 
reasons. We will deliver to you not less than 10 days advance written notice 
stating when the cancellation is to take effect. 
4. The policy period will end on the day and hour stated in the cancellation notice. 
B - Renewal/Nonrenewal 
1. You have the right to have the insurance renewed unless: 
a. The policy has been cancelled; 
b. The policy is expressly designated as nonrenewable; 
c. You fail to pay the renewal premium by the due date. We will mail the 
renewal notice to you not more than 4b days nor less than 14 days prior 
to the renewal effective date. The renewal notice will include the 
estimated renewal premium, how it may be paid, and state that failure to 
pay the renewal premium by the due date extinguishes your your right to the 
renewal; or 
d. We give you 30 days notice of nonrenewal prior to the expiration or the 
anniversary date. We must deliver or send the not ire by first class mail 
to your last known mailing address. 
2. If we offer to renew the policy but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, 
the new terms or rates will take effect on the renewal date if we delivered or 
sent by first class mail to you notice of the now terms or rates at least 
30 days prior of the expiration date of the prior pol Ley. The prior notice 
requirement does not apply if the only change is a rate increase generally 
applicable to your class of business, a rate Ln^ i/easo resulting from a 
classification change, or a policy form change made to make the form consistent 
with Utah law. 
WC 43 06 02 
Copyr igh t : 2002 Na t iona l Counc i l on Compensation Insurance. Inc . 
Workers Compensation Fund * 392 East 6400 South * Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 » 800-446-COMP • www.wcf-
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICY 
302 Fas! WOO gauih * Salt Like City, Utah 84107 * 8CXM4G-COMP * www.wcf-uiah.com 
WORKERS COMPENSATION' r UNO 
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS LiABitTY INSURANCE POLICY 
QUICK REFERENCE 
BEGINNING 
ON PACE 
BEGINNING 
ON PAGE 
INfORMATlON PAGE 
CENFKAL SF.CHON . . 
A. llit! Polity 
Si. Who is Insured . 
C. Workers Compensation Law. 
D. Slate 
\r. Locations 
PART ONE-WOKKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
A. I low This Insurance Applies 1 
B. We Will Pay , I 
C W« Will Odew! 
Wo Will Also Pay 
Other Insurant e 
Kiymenb You Must Make 
D, 
f. 
f. 
G. Ri'covwy Prom Others 2 
j L Siatuiory Provisions 2 
PAftT TWOwEMPLOYEKS I lAItlLITV INSURANCE. . . . 2 
A. 1 low litis livsuranco Applies 2 
B. We Will Pjy 2 
C Fxt. lusioiis 3 
D. We Will OHfchd. . 1 
E. We Will Also Pay 3 
F. i Kher Insurant, o 4 
G 1 imils of I mlnlity , . . 4 
PAftT TWO-EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE. . . . 2 
(ConPdL) 
I!. Recovery Prom Others 4 
I. Actions Against Us 4 
PART THREE OTHlEk STATES INSURANCE 4 
A. How This Insurance Applies 4 
B. Notice 4 
PAftT FOUK-YOUK DUTIES IF INJURY OCCURS ;. . 4 
PART FIVE-PREMIUM 5 
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IMPORTANT. Y]?is Quick Reference is not part of ilie Workers Compensation and Employers liability Insurance 
Policy and does not provide coverage Refer to the Workers Compensation afU* Employers liability 
Insurance Policy ksclf for acrual contractual provisions. 
PLEASE READ THE POLICY CAREFULLY 
W( i IHIVJ JttVIUW) 
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS LSABSUTY INSURANCE POLICY 
Cn itimn for the payment of the premium and subject to all 
terms of this policy, wc agree with you as follows: 
KKNttttAI. SECTION 
Au Th* Polity 
'I'iiis policy includes at its effective date the 
Information Vt\ge and all endorsements and schedules 
lisial there. It is a contract of insurance between you 
(the employer named in Item i of the Informal ion 
h(ge) and us (the insurer named on Hie Information 
Page;. The only agreements relating TO this insurance 
are stated in this policy The terms of this policy may 
not be changed or waived except by endorsement 
issued by us io he part of this policy. 
B, Who Is insured 
Yon are insured if you arc an employer named in Item 
1 of the Information Page. If that employer is a 
partnership, 4i|d if you are. one of its partners, you are 
insured, but only \a your capaciry as an employer of ihe 
partnership's cm ploy ccs. 
C Workers Compensation Law 
Workers Compensation Law means* the workers or 
Wiukrtun'a compensation law and occupational 
disease law of tacit si are or territory named in Items 
.s.A of the Information i'age. !t includes any 
amendments to that law which are In tifcci during the 
policy period, h does not include any federal workers 
or workmen's compensation Saw, any federal occupa-
tional disease law or die provisions of any law that 
provide nonoccupational disability benefits. 
State means any stare of the United States of America, 
and Lhe OLsiriei of Columbia. 
L 1 ocatfons 
This policy covers all of your workplaces listed in 
items i or A of the Information Page; mid it covers all 
oilier workplaces in htm 3.A. states unless you have 
other insurance or are self-insured for s,uch 
workplaces. 
l'ARTONE 
WORKRJtS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
A. How This Insurance Applies 
This workers compensation insurance applies to 
bodily injury by accident or bodily injury by disease. 
Bodily injury includes resulting death. 
1. Bodily injury hy zeektent must occur timing the 
policy period. 
2, Bodily injury by disease must be caused or aggra-
vated by the conditions of your employment.The 
employee's last day of last exposure IO the condi-
tions causing or aggravating such bodily injury by 
disease must occur during the policy period. 
fit We Will Pay 
Wc will pay promptly when due die benefits required 
of you hy the workers compensation law. 
C We Will Defend 
We have the right and duty to diiwul ,u our expense 
my claim, proceeding or suit against you for benefits 
payable by this insurance. We have ihe right to investi-
gate and settle these, claims, proceedings or suits. 
Wc have no duty to defend a c!a*m» proceeding or suit 
that is not covered fay this insurance. 
D. We Will Also Pay 
Wc will also pay these costs, In addition to other 
amounts payable under this insurance, as pan of any 
claim, proceeding or suit we defend' 
1, reasonable expenses incurred at our request, hut 
not loss of earnings; 
2. premiums for bonds to rclea-sc attachments and for 
appeal bonds in houd amounts up to the amount 
payable under tills insurance; 
3. litigation costs raxed against you; 
4. interest on a judgment as required by law until we 
oiler the amount due under this insurance; and 
5 expenses we incur. 
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We witt wn pay more than our share of benefits and 
coats covered by this Insurance and other Insurance or 
scif-insurancc Subject to any limits of liability thai may 
nppty, ah .shares will be cqiai until die lass is paid. If 
any insurance or scif-lnsurance is exhausted,the .shares 
of ah icm:shvii«ii insurance will be equal until the loss is 
paid 
h Payments You Must Mate 
You arc responsible for any payments in excess of the 
benefits regularly provided by the workers compensa-
tion taw including those required because: 
I. of your serious and willful misconduct; 
L yon knowingly employ an employee in violation of 
tow, 
i yon fail to comply with a health or -safety law or 
rcgtiLifiiui.or 
A. you discharge, coerce or otherwise discriminate 
against any employee m violation of the workers 
compensation law. 
If we make Arty payments in excess of the benefits 
regularly provided by the workers compensation law 
on your behalf, you will reimburse us promptly. 
C. Recovery firtim Others 
VtV have your rights, and the1 rights of persons entitled 
jo che benefits of this insurance, to recover our 
payments from anyone liable for the injury You will do 
everything necessary to protect those rights for us and 
la help ON enforce tbeih. 
H- Statutory Provisions 
These statements apply where they are required by 
law. 
1. As between an injured worker and us, we have 
notice of the injury when you have notice. 
2 Your default or die bankruptcy or insolvency of 
you nr your estate will not relieve us of our duties 
und^r this insurance after an injury occurs. 
.S We are directly and primarily liable to any person 
ritfhltff to die benefits payable by this insurance. 
Those person!! may enforce our duties; so may an 
agency atiihimzrd by law. Enforcement may be 
against as or against ynu 2nd us. 
4 }i\riwaction over you is jurisdiction over us for 
purposes of the workers compensation law. We are 
bound hy decisions against you under thai law, 
subject to the provisions of this policy that are not 
in conflict wtrh thai law. 
.. ,
 s«a iuaiurtm-v Li/muims TO me parts of the 
workers compensation law that apply to: 
a. benefits payable by this Insurance; 
b. special taxes, payments into security or other 
special funds, and assessments payable by us 
under dsat Law. 
6, Terms of this insurance thai conflict with the 
workers compensation law are changed by this 
statement ro conform to that law. 
Nothing in these paragraphs relieves you of your 
duties under this policy. 
PART TWO 
HMPLOYTEHS LIABILITY JflSUftANCE 
A. How This Insurance Applies 
This employers liability insurance applies to bodily 
injury by accident or bodily injury by disease. Bodily 
injury includes resulting death. 
1. The bodily injury must arise out oi md in the 
course of the injured employee's employment by 
you. 
2. The employment must be necessary or incidental 
to your work in a state or territory listed in Item 
3A. of the Information Page. 
3. Bodily injury by accident must occur during the 
policy period. 
4. Bodily injury by disease must be caused or 
aggravated by the conditions of your employment. 
The employee's last day of last exposure to the 
conditions causing or aggravating such bodily 
injury by disease must : cur during die policy 
period. 
5. If you are sued, the original suit and any related 
legal actions for damages for bodily injury by 
accident or by disease muse be brought in ihc 
United States of America, hs territories or 
possessions, or Canada. 
B, We WiJI Pay 
We will pay ail sums you legally must pay as damages 
because of bodily injury io your employees, provided 
the bodily injury Is covered by this Employers Liability 
Insurance. 
The damages wc will pay, where recovery is permitted 
by law, include damages: 
1. for which you uc liable to a third parly by reason 
of a claim or suit against you by that third parly 
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to recover the damages claimed against Mich third 
party as a result of Injury to your employee; 
2, for eare and k)S& of .services; and 
5. for consequential bodily injury to a spouse* child, 
parent, brodser or sister of oV Injured employee; 
provided that these damages arc the direct conse-
quence of bodily injury thai arises out of and in the 
course of \hc injured employee's employment by you; 
and 
-1. because of bodily injury to your employee that 
arisen oui of and In the- course of employment, 
damicd against you in a capacity other than as 
employer. 
This iftsurartcc? does noi cover: 
i. liability assumed under a coniraei.ThJs exclusion 
does not apply to * warranty thai your work will he 
done in a workmanlike manner; 
>. punUivu or exemplary damages because of budily 
injury to an employee employed in violation of law; 
^ bodily Injury 10 an employee while employed in 
viotoiion of law with your actual knowledge or the 
actual knowledge of any of your ejtcconvc officer; 
4. any obligation imposed by a workers compensa-
tion, occupational disease, unemployment compen-
sation, or disability benefits law, or any similar law; 
5 bodily injury InicnHonatly caused or n;ggrav<ued by 
you; 
6. bodily injury occurring outside ihe United States of 
America, lis territories or possessions, and C-an'jda. 
This e&c.hislon (Jots not apply to bodily injury to a 
ciftocn or resident of (he United States of America 
or Canada who is temporarily outside these 
conn tries; 
7 daa'Mges ft rising out of coercion, criticism, 
demotion, rvaluaiion, realignment discipline, 
defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination 
aj^inst or termination of any employee, or any 
personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions; 
K. bodily injury to any person in work subject to the 
longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 
0 3 USC Sections 901-950), the Nonappropriated 
Fund Instrumentalities Act (5 USC Sections H171-
8173), Uw Outer Continental Shelf lands Act (43 
USC Sections I33l-B56)>ihe Defense Jtasc ha (42 
USC Sections 165M651), the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 19#) (30 USC Sections 901-
942), any othrr federal woikers or workmen's com-
pensation law or other federal occupational disease 
bw, or any amendments 10 these Jaws; 
9. bodily injury to any person in work subject in the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USC Sections 
51-60), any other federal laws obligating an 
employer to pay damages to an employee due to 
bodily injury arising out of or in the eoursc of 
employment, or any amendments to those laws; 
10. bodily injury to a master or member of the crew of 
any vessel; 
1t. fines or penalties imposed for violation uf federal or 
state law; and 
12. damages payable undtr the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Workrr Protection Act (29 VAC 
Sections 1801-1872) and under any oilier federal 
law awarding damages for violation of those laws or 
regulations issued thereunder,and any amendments 
to ihose laws 
O. We Will Defend 
We have the right and dory to defend, at our expense, 
any claim, proceeding or suit against you for damages 
payable by this insurance. We have the right to investi-
gate ;md settle these claims,proceedings and suits. 
We have no duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit 
that is nor covered by this insurance. We have no duty to 
defend or continue defending after we have paid our 
applicable limit of liabillry under this Insurance. 
E. We Will Also Pay 
We will also pay these costs, in addition to other 
amounts payable under this insurance, as part of any 
claim, proceeding, or suit we defend: 
1. reasonable expenses incurred at our request, but 
not loss of earnings; 
2. premiums for bonds TO release attachments and for 
appeal bonds in bond amounts up to die limit of 
our liability under this insurance; 
3- litigation costs taxed against you; 
4. interest on a judgment as required by law until we 
offer the amount due under this Insuranee; and 
1. expenses we incur. 
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r\ Oilier !nsur«we 
we wiii not jvay more liian our share of damages and 
ecus revered by ibis insurance and other insurance or 
self-insurance. Subject to any limits of liability thru 
apply, all «hnrcs will be equal until die loss 1$ paid. If 
-any insurance or self insurance is exhausted, die shires 
of ail remaining insurance and self-insurance will be 
equal unii\ the Joss i« paid. 
G. limits of liaMliiy 
f >m liability io pay for damages is limited. Our limits of 
liability axe hhown in Item 3-B-of the Information Page. 
They apply as explained below. 
1. Bodily Injury by Accident. The limit shown for 
''bodily injury by accident-each accident" is die 
may we will pay for .ill damages covered by this 
insurance because of bodily Injury to one or more 
employees in any one accident. 
A disease t,s not bodily injury by accident unless u 
results directly from bodily injury by accident. 
2. Bodily injury by Disease. The limit shown for 
"bodily injury by disease-policy limit" is the most 
we will pay for all damages covered by this insur-
ance and arising our of bodily injury by disease, 
regardless of ihc number of employees who sus-
tain bodily injury by disease. The limit shown for 
"bodily Injury by disease-each employee" is the 
mast we will pay for all damages because of bodi-
ly injui y by disease ro any one cmployec-
boddy injury by disease does not include disease 
that results d'utnly from a bodily injury by 
accident. 
S. We will not pay any claims for damages after we 
have paid the applicable limit of our liability under 
I his insurance. 
H„ Recovery from Others 
We have your rights to recover our payment from 
anyone liable for an injury covered by this insurance. 
You will do everything necessary to protect those 
fifilus for ns and id help us enforce them. 
L Actions Agjiiist Us 
There will be no right of-action against us under this 
insurance unless: 
L You have com pi led with all the terms of this 
policy, and 
2. The amount you owe has been determined with 
our consent or by actual trial and final judgment, 
Tliis insurance does not give anyone the right to 
Add us as a defendant in an action against you to 
determine your liability. The bankruptcy or 
insolvency of you or your estate will not relieve m 
of our obligations umltr this Pan. 
PART THREE 
OTHER STATES INSURANCE 
A. How This Insurance Applies 
1. 'ITiis other swies insurance applies only if one or 
more states are shown in Hem '5.(1. of the 
Information Page. 
2. If you he&in work in any one of those states after 
the effective date of this policy -md are not insured 
or are not .self-insured for such work, all provisions 
of the policy will apply as though thai stale were 
listed in hem 3 A of the Information Page. 
3- We will reimburse you for the benefits required by 
flic workers compensation hiw of that state ii we 
are not permitted to pay the benefits directly to 
persons entitled to them. 
4. 11 you have work on the effective date of this 
policy in any state not listed in hem 3.A. of the 
Information Page, coverage will not be afforded for 
that state unless we are noiiGed within thirty days. 
B, Notice 
Tell us ar once if you begin work in any state listed in 
Item 'i.C. of the Information Page. 
PART FOUR 
YOUR DUTIES IF ItyJURY OCCURS 
Tell us at once if injury occurs that may be covered by 
this policy. Your other duties arc listed here. 
1. Provide for immediate medical md oiher services 
required by the workers compensation law. 
2. Give us or our agent the names and addresses of 
the injured persons and of witnesses, and other 
information wc may need. 
3. Promptly give us all notices, demands and legal 
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papers rrl;iin.l 10 the injury, claim, proceeding or 
ami. 
'\ Cooperate wilh ns and assist us, as we may request, 
in lhe investigation, settlement or defense of any 
claim, proceeding ° f suit 
5. Do nothing after an Injury occurs that would 
interfere wiili ourrighr to recover from others. 
6. Do not voluntarily nuke payments, assume obliga-
tions or incur expenses, except at your own cosh 
PART 1-JLVIt - PfWMUTM 
A. Our M;tft(i;t!s 
All premium for this policy will he determined by our 
manual* of rules, rates, rating phms and classifications. 
Wc may cjian^c our manuals and apply the chants to 
this policy if amhorweU by law or a governmental 
agency regulating this insurance. 
B. C!iV&iTuft(ions 
Item A of ihc information Page .shows the rate and 
premium (mis for certain business or work 
classifications. These classifications were assigned 
ba.-.cd on ao estimate of the exposures you would have 
during the policy period. ]f your actual exposures are 
not property described by those classifications, wc will 
assign proper dassilfcariom, rates and premium basis 
by endorsement to this pohey. 
l \ ttemuoorafiun 
Vivminm for each work classification is determined 
by multiplying a rare limes a premium basis. 
Remuucruiiot) is The most common premium ba.sii-.Tlus 
premium basis includes payroll and all other 
remuneration paid or payable during the policy period 
Uw the services of: 
I. All your officers arid employees engaged in work 
covered by this; policy; and 
2 yli other persons engaged in work that could make 
us table tinder Part One (Workers Compensation 
Jnsm\mcr)of this policy. If yon do not have payroll 
records LOT these persons, the contract price for 
their services and materials may be used as the pre-
mium basis. This paragraph 2 will not apply if you 
give UN proof that the employers of these persons 
lawfully secured their workers compensation obli-
gations. 
D< ?t(:m\um Payments 
You will pay ail premium when due. You will pay the 
premium even if part or all of a woikers compensation 
law is not valid. 
E. Final Premium 
The premium shown on the Information 1'age, 
schedules, and endorsements is an estimate. The final 
premium will be determined after this policy cads by 
using the actual, not the estimated, premium basis and 
the proper classifications and rates that lawfully apply 
to ihe business and wort covered by this policy. If the-
rmal premium is more than die premium you paid to 
us, you must pay us the balance. If h is less, we will 
refund the balance to you.The final premium will not 
be less than the highest minimum premium for the 
classifications covered hy this policy. 
If ihis policy is cnnccled, final premium will be 
determined m the following way unless our manuals 
provide otherwise: 
1. If wc caned, final premium will be calculated pro 
rata based on the time this policy was in force. 
Final premium will no be less thm the pro rata 
share of the minimum premium. 
2. If you cancel, final premium will be more ihan pro 
rata; ir will be based on ihe time this policy was in 
force, and increased •••-•• >ur shorr-me. cancelation 
table and procedure ;'\S.L:II premium will not be less 
rhan the minimum premium. 
F. Records 
You will keep records of information needed to 
compute premium.You will provide m with copies of 
those records when we ask for them. 
G. Audit 
You will lei us examine and audit all your records that 
relate ro this policy. These records include ledgers, 
journals, registers, vouchers, commas, tax reports, 
payroll and disbursement records, and programs for 
storing and retrieving da la. We may conduct the audits 
during regular business hours during the policy period 
-and within thrc^ years after the policy period tads. 
Information developed by audit will be used to 
determine final premium. Insurance rate service 
organizations have the same rights we have under This 
provision. 
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I»ART SIX.-t%ON!MTlONS D. Cancels ion 
A. Inspection 
We have ihe right, but arc not obliged to inspect your 
workplaces a.1 uny mur Our inspections ate not safety 
inspections They relate only to Ihe iiisurahilliy of the 
workplaces and the premium!; 10 be charged. We may 
give you reports on liter eunditkms we find. We may 
abo rmwnjwmi changes. While rhey may help reduce 
josses, wc do not undertake to perform the duty of any 
persnn lo provide Tor the health or wfciy of your 
employees or the public We do not warrant fjiai your 
workplaces an: safe, or healthful or that they comply 
wiiii fuws, rcjjulinioas, emdes or standards. Insurance 
raic service organization* have the same rights we 
have under ihis provision. 
B- Long To KYI Policy 
If the policy period is longer than one year and .sixteen 
days, all provisions at this policy will apply as though a 
new policy were issued on each animal anniversary 
lh:\\ ihis policy is in fnrre 
t . transfer Of Vuiir Rights And Duties 
Your ripju-s or duties under this policy may not he 
transferred wlehour our written consent. 
U you die and we receive: notice within thirty days after 
yoor deaih, we will cover your legal representative as 
insured. 
1. You may cancel ihis policy. You must mail or 
deliver advance written notice 10 us stating when 
the cancelation is to tike effect. 
2. We may cancel ihis policy. We most mail ur deliver 
to yon not less than ren days advance written 
notice stating when the cancelation Is to take 
tltect. Mailing that noVwt to yon ar your mailing 
address shown in Item I of ihe Information Paj*c 
will be sufficient lo prove notice. 
3. The policy period will tnd on the day and hour 
stated in the cancelation notice. 
A. Any of these provisions thar conflict with a law 
that controls Ihe cancelation of the insurance in 
Ihis policy is changed by litis statement to comply 
with the law. 
L Soie .Representative 
The insured first named in Item 1 of ihe Information 
Page will act on behalf of all insureds to change this 
policy, receive rcium premium, and give or receive 
notice of cancelation. 
In Witruss Whereof, the company lus caused ihis policy to bo cxectuted. 
WUUL. ^W 
Pros i dent 
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APPENDIX 7 
Affidavit of Workers Compensation Fund Underwriter 
Patricia Bryan 
James R. Black #0347 
BLACK & INGLEBY 
265 EAST 100 SOUTH, Suite 255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6737 
Facsimile: (801)531-6847 
E-Mail: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Dwight Brown dba 
Dwight's Auto Wrecking 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DORTHANIELSONMORTENSENand ) Affidavit of Patricia Bryan 
ROBERT STANLEY MORTENSEN, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) Civil No. 050600282 
v. ) 
) Judge: David L. Mower 
DWIGHT BROWN dba DWIGHT'S AUTO ) 
WRECKING, ) 
Defendant. ) 
The undersigned hereby certifies under oath that the following is true and accurate to 
his/her personal knowledge: 
1. My name is Patricia Bryan. My date of birth is September 15, 1962. 
2. I am employed by the Workers Compensation Fund (WCF). My current job title 
is Small Business Underwriter. 
3. The Workers Compensation Fund is designated by statute as one of three means 
ORIGINAL 
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by which Utah employers can comply with the statutory requirement to provide workers' 
compensation insurance for their employees. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-201. 
4. It is a part of my duties to maintain and review records regarding insurance 
coverage of WCF's policyholders. 
5. I have been asked to review whether or not Dwight Brown dba Dwight's Auto 
Wrecking was insured by WCF as of November 20, 2003. I have researched WCF's policy 
records. As of November 20, 2003, Dwight's Auto Wrecking's workers' compensation policy 
with WCF was current and active. Dwight's Auto Wrecking was insured by WCF for workers' 
compensation purposes by Policy Number 2039798 and was thereby in compliance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 as of November 20, 2003. The period at issue for which workers' 
compensation insurance coverage was provided by WCF was from 03/02/2003 to 03/02/2004, 
12:01 A.M. 
6. As with all such policies, regardless of the premium charged and/or paid, all 
employees of the insured employer are covered until the policy is canceled by the employer or by 
WCF for failure of the employer to pay its premiums when due. The final premium charged is 
based on the total employee payroll as reported and verified by the employer and/or by WCF 
audit at the end of the covered period. However, the final employer verification or WCF audit 
does not alter the coverage of all employees of the employer during policy period. All 
employees of the employer are covered. Therefore, all employees of Dwight's Auto Wrecking 
were covered by WCF Policy Number 2039798 for workers' compensation purposes on 
November 20, 2003. 
Page 2 of 4 
"<*? Dated this ^Pday of &m$4&- 2006 
Workers Compensation Fund 
By 
FT \s\k \ 
NOTARY 
U ^ < \ appeared personally before me this P.<5 day 
of 4^>.2C£%? and after being placed under oath stated that the information contained in the 
above affidavit is true and accurate to his/her personal knowledge. 
Salt Lake County ) 
State of Utah ) 
iJft TESTE; VJJK.S! 3T33P» SZT'SHB. S3BS5TC •;-.•«„«* iXi'VSi. 'F5SEE TJICrc 3K3W" Si^jj 
Notary Puixic 
KATHRYNS. JENSEN | 
i 730 Three Fountains Drive. UnK 8" s 
% Commission Expires « 
$ttto of Utah L 
' «&&& wasp w»t? #w«* SSBWS -*ssm w&%' mm ***** saw? ^ r 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
, / 
was mailed via U.S. Postal Service postage prepaid this^_ day of^jsj o the following 
Marvin D. Bagley 
669 North Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
rftmtfy 
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APPENDIX 8 
Muffet v. Royster and State of California, 147 Cal. 
App. 3d 289; 195 Cal Rptr. 73; 1983 Cal. App. 
LEXIS 2191; 49 Cal. Comp. Cas. 806. 
Page I 
LEXSEH 195 CAL RPTR 73 
DIANE MUFFETT et al, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v, SILAS RO YSTER et aL, 
Defendants, Cross-compMnants and Appellants; THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Cross-defendant and Respondent 
Civ. No. 65781 
Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four 
147 Col App. 3d 289; 195 CaL Rptr. 73; 1983 Col App. LEXIS 2191; 49 Cal Comp. 
Cm §06 
September 23,1983 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] A petition for a 
rehearing was denied October 18, 1983, and the petition 
of appellants Royster and Harmon for a hearing by the 
Supreme Court was denied December 22,1983. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, No. C268389, Charles H. Older, Judge. 
DISPOSITION: The judgment in favor of defendants 
on the complaint is reversed; the judgment in favor of the 
state on the cross-complaint is affirmed. Appellants shall 
recover their costs on appeal. 
SUMMARY: 
CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY 
The survivors of a man who was killed ID a freeway 
accident while riding as a passenger in a truck brought a 
wrongful death action against the track owner and others. 
Decedent was a subhauler and had entered into truck 
purchase and subhaul agreements with defendant owner, 
as had the driver of the truck, whom decedent was 
training. The subhaul agreement identified decedent as an 
independent contractor and provided that the owner 
would not carry a workers' compensation policy. The 
owner did so, however, although he deducted $ 40 per 
month from die $ubhaulers, gross hauling receipts for 
such purpose- Defendants asserted that workers' 
compensation was plaintiffs* exclusive remedy {Lab. 
Code, § 3601), and the jury returned special verdicts 
Finding that decedent and the driver were employees of 
defendant owner at the time of the accident and that they 
were acting in the course and scope of their employment. 
Believing that the accident was caused as a result of a 
dangerous condition of public property, defendants also 
cross-complained against the state. The state sought 
dismissal based on a design immunity defense (Gov. 
Code, § 830.6), and the trial court ruled in its favor. 
Accordingly, fee trial court entered judgment for 
defendants in the main action and entered a judgment of 
nonsuit on the cross-complaint. (Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, No. C268389, Charles H. Older, Judge.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in favor 
of defendants in the main action and affirmed the 
judgment in favor of the state on the cross-complaint. The 
court held that defendant owner's deduction of premiums 
from the subhaulers* pay, in violation of Lab. Code, § 
3751s precluded a finding that he had secured payment of 
compensation and further precluded him from asserting 
the exclusivity provisions of Lab. Code, § 36017 as a bar 
to the action. The court also held that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding that decedent and the 
driver were employees at the time of the accident, not 
independent contractors, since the record indicated that 
defendant had the right to exercise control over the 
subhaulers. As to the cross-complaint, the court held that 
substantial evidence supported the state's contention that 
the design of a rolled gutter adjacent to the curve on 
which the accident occurred was reasonable, since there 
was testimony from a licensed civil engineer who had 
designed freeways that the rolled gutter could be driven 
over safely and served a valid purpose. The court also 
held that there was sufficient evidence of adequate notice 
or warning to the public of the curve, since the evidence 
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showed that curve warnings and sp^ed advisory signs 
were in plain view and were visible to approaching 
drivers. (Opinion by Kingsley, Acting R J.5 with 
McClosky, J., and Schneider, J.; * concurring.) 
* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial 
Council. 
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(1) Workers ' Compensation § 7 — Exclusivity of 
Remedy — Scope and Extent of Exclusivity — 
Necessity of Showing That Employer Secured 
Payment of Compensation — Special Verdicts, —in a 
wrongful death action arising out of the death of a 
subhauler in which defendant truck owner asserted that 
workers' compensation was plaintiffs* exclusive remedy 
(Lab. Code, § 3601), the trial court properly declined to 
submit a special verdict to the jury to determine whether 
defendant had secured payment of compensation {Lab. 
Code, § 3706). Although plaintiffs1 complaint did not 
include allegations of an employer-employee relationship 
and defendant was thus required to show that he had 
secured payment of compensation in order to invoke the 
exclusive remedy provisions of § 3601\ such issue was a 
question of law for the trial court and not a question for 
submission to the jury in the form of a special verdict, 
which is a device by which the jury finds facts (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 624). 
(2a) (2b) Workers ' Compensation § 127 - Judicial 
Review — Scope — Exclusivity of Remedy — Questions 
of Law Not Raised in Trial Court- - I n a wrongful 
death action in which the trial court rendered judgment 
for defendants on grounds that decedent, a subhauler, was 
an employee of defendant truck owner and was acting in 
the course and scope of his employment at the time of the 
traffic accident at issue, thus rendering workers' 
compensation the exclusive remedy (Lab, Code, § 3601% 
plaintiffs were entitled to assert for the fust time on 
appeal that defendant owner did not secure payment of 
compensation, as required by Lab, Code, § 37069 and thai 
he was therefore barred from raising the exclusive 
remedy provisions of § 3601 as a defense. Since it was 
undisputed that the truck owner had arranged for a 
workers1 compensation policy and had then deducted part 
of the payments from his subhauiers' pay, the question of 
whether or not these undisputed acts constituted 
"securing payment of compensation" was one of law that 
was open to the reviewing court on appeal. 
(3) Appellate Review § 32 - Presenting and 
Preserving Questions in Trial Court — Issues Not 
Raised at Trial — Questions of Law. —An issue of law 
not raised at trial may be considered tor the first time on 
appeal when it relates to noncurable, undisputed evidence 
as a pure question of law. 
(4) Appellate Review § 55 - Presenting and 
Preserving QoestioBs in Trial Court — Adherence to 
Theory of Case — Questions of Law. —An appellant 
may change the theory of his case when a question of law 
is presented on the facts appearing in the record, since, in 
such case, the opposing party is not required to defend for 
the first time on appeal against a new theory which 
contemplates a controverted factual situation. 
(5) Estoppel and Waiver § 17 — Estoppel — Appeal — 
Failure to Raise Issue in Trial Court, —The issue of 
equitable estoppel may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
(6a) (6b) Workers ' Compensation § 7 — Exclusivity of 
Remedy — Scope and Extent of Exclusivity — When 
Employer Fails to Secure Payment of Compensation. 
—An employer who seeks payment from his employees 
for the cost of workers' compensation insurance, in 
violation of Lab. Code3 § 3752, cannot be found to have 
secured payment of compensation and is precluded from 
asserting the exclusivity provisions of Lab. Code, § 3602, 
as a defense to a damage suit by an injured employee. 
(7) Statutes § 21 — Construction — Legislative Intent. 
—In construing a statute, a court should ascertain the 
intent of the Legislature. 
(8) Workers* Compensation § 6 — Exclusivity of 
Remedy — Determination of Whether Worker Is 
Employee or Independent Contractor- —In a wrongful 
death action arising out of the death of a subhauler in 
which defendant truck owner asserted that decedent was 
an employee and that workers1 compensation was 
plaintiffs1 exclusive remedy (Lab. Code, § 3601% and in 
which plaintiffs asserted that decedent was an 
independent contractor, the trial court properly instructed 
the jury on right to control as the dominant criterion in 
determining decedent*s status. The jury was also properly 
instructed that it could consider the subhaul contract 
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between decedent and defendant, but that its terms were 
not conclusive. The right to control is the most significant 
test and the written agreement is a significant factor in 
determining whether one is an independent contractor. 
(9a) (9b) Workers1 Compensation § 6 ~ Exclusivity of 
Remedy — Determination of Whether Worker Is 
Employee or Independent Contractor — Sufficiency of 
Evidence. —In a wrongful death action arising out of the 
death of a subhauler in which defendant truck owner 
asserted that workers' compensation was plaintiffs' 
exclusive remedy (Lab. Code, § 3601), the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding that decedent and another 
subhauler were employees at the time of the accident at 
issue, not independent contractors, where defendant truck 
owner testified that he instructed drivers where and when 
to pick up loads, that he inspected the loads and the 
tractors for safety, and that he had the right to tell drivers 
which route to take. Thus, the record indicated that 
defendant had the right to exercise control over the 
subhaulers. 
(10) Appellate Review § 148 ~ Review - Questions of 
Law and Fact — Sufficiency of Evidence — Testimony 
of One Witness. —The testimony of one witness, even a 
party himself, may be sufficient to support a finding of 
fact. 
(11) Discovery and Depositions § 27 — Request for 
Admissions — Relief From Denial- —The rule which 
permits a trial court, for good cause, to relieve a party 
who is served with a request for admissions from the 
consequences of a failure to admit or deny, or from a 
defective denial (Code Civ. Proa, §§ 2033, 2034), may 
not be applied to relieve a party who makes an 
unequivocal denial. In such case, relief should be sou^it 
under Code Civ. Proc, § 473 (amendment of pleadings). 
Granting relief from an unequivocal denial is not the 
same as granting relief from a defective denial, or a 
failure to deny, since a defective denial or a failure to 
deny may involve simple oversight or carelessness, while 
relief from an unequivocal denial may be related to the 
discovery of new information or other factors. 
(12a) (12b) Government Tort Liability § 28 - Actions 
— Trial — Questions of Law and Fact — Lack of Due 
Care - Driving in Excess of Speed L i m i t -Whether or 
not driving in excess of a posted speed limit indicates a 
lack of due care, so as to preclude a finding that a 
dangerous condition existed on a highway (Gov. Code, § 
830% and thereby relieve the government of liability ( 
Gov. Code, § 835), is a question of fact. Consistent with 
the rule that driving in excess of a prima facie speed limit 
is not negligence as a matter of law, going in excess of a 
posted speed limit should not indicate a lack of due care 
as a matter of law. 
(13) Government Tort l iabi l i ty § 28 — Actions - Trial 
— Questions of Law and Fact — Existence of 
Dangerous Condition. —The existence of a dangerous 
condition of public property is usually a question of tact 
and may be resolved as a question of law only if 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. 
(14) Government Tort Liability § 10 — Grounds for 
Relief - Liability Arising From Governmental 
Activities — Dangerous Condition of Public Property 
— Plans, Designs and Improvements — Design 
Immunity Defense. —In a government tort liabihty 
action based on an alleged dangerous condition of public 
property, the governmental agency may raise the design 
immunity defense (Gov. Code, § 830.6) on a motion for 
summary judgment, nonsuit, or directed verdict. On 
submitting such matter, the trial court is invited to rule 
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defense, 
and, if it so determines, the jury is instructed that the 
public entity is immune as a matter of law from liability 
for design-related damages. 
(15) Government Tort Liability § W ~ Grounds for 
Relief — Liability Arising From Governmental 
Activities — Dangerous Condition of Public Property 
— Plans, Designs and Improvements — Design 
Immunity Defense. —In order for the state to establish 
design immunity as a defense.(Gov. Code, § 830.6) to a 
government tort liability action based on an alleged 
dangerous condition of public property, it must show a 
causal relationship between the plan and the accident, 
discretionary approval of the plan prior to construction; 
and substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of 
the design. The state is entitled to a defense of design 
immunity if there is any substantial evidence on which 
the discretionary approval can be reasonably based, and it 
is error to submit a design immunity defense to a jury. 
For example, a conflict will not create a triable issue of 
fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment In 
determining whether evidence before the trial court is 
substantial, the question is whether the evidence 
reasonably inspires confidence and is of solid value. 
(16) Government Tort Liability § 10 - Grounds for 
Relief — Liability Arising From Governmental 
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Activities — Dangerous Condition of Public Property 
— Plans, Designs and Improvements — Design 
Immunity Defense - Design of Rolled Gutter. -In a 
wrongful death action arising out of a freeway accident in 
which defendant, decedent's employer, cross-complained 
against the state, alleging that a Foiled gutter adjacent to 
the curve on which the accident occurred was a 
dangerous condition of public property, substantial 
evidence supported the state's contention, io support of its 
design immunity defense (Gov. Code, § 830.6), that the 
design of the gutter was reasonable, where there was 
testimony from a licensed civil engineer who had 
designed freeways that the rolled gutter couid be driven 
over safely and served a valid purpose. 
(17) Government Tort Liability § 9 - Grounds for 
Relief — Liability Arising From Governmental 
Activities — Dangerous Condition of Public Property 
— Causation. —In order for a condition of public 
property to be a cause of an injury, it must be the cause in 
fact of the injury. However, there may be more than one 
legal cause of an accident 
(18) Government Tort Liability § 28 - Actions - Trial 
— Questions of Law and Fact — Causation. —Whether 
a condition of public property was a cause of an injury is 
a question of fact 
(19) Government Tort Liability § 9 - Grounds for 
Relief - Liability Arising From Governmental 
Activities — Dangerous Condition of Public Property 
— Notice of Danger, —In a wrongful death action arising 
out of a freeway accident in which defendant, decedent's 
employer, cross-complained against the state, alleging 
that the curve on which the accident occurred was a 
dangerous condition of public property, there was 
sufficient evidence of adequate notice or warning to the 
public of the curve, where the evidence showed that 
curve warnings and speed advisory signs were in plain 
view and were visible to approaching drivers, but that the 
driver was concentrating on a lane change and did not sec 
them. 
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OPINION BY; KINGSLEY 
OPINION 
[*295] [**76] Plaintiffs sued defendants Silas 
Royster, San Francisco Royster Trucking Company, 
Philip Harmon, and other defendants for damages for the 
wrongful death of Melvin Muffett 
Defendants [***2] Royster and the Royster 
Trucking Company answered with a general denial and 
the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. 
Defendants' amended answer added the bar of Labor 
Code section 3601, dlleging worker's compensation to be 
the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. 
The court denied plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment against defendants. This motion had 
alleged that decedent was not an employee of defendants 
Royster and Royster Trucking Company at the time of 
the accident. 
The court granted defendants leave to file a 
cross-complaint for indemnity against the State of 
California. 
The jury returned special verdicts that Melvin 
Muffett, plaintiffs' decedent, and defendant Harmon, 
were employees of defendant Royster at the time of the 
accident and that they were acting in the course and scope 
of their employment The court gave judgment to 
defendants. 
Defendants, believing the accident was caused as a 
result of a dangerous condition of public property, 
cross-complained against the State of California, 
Department of Transportation. 
The state sought dismissal based on "design 
immunity" ( Gov. Code, § 830.6 [***3] ), and the trial 
court ruled in favor of the state. The courtruled that the 
freeway was not a "dangerous condition" at the time of 
the accident on the basis that there was no evidence that a 
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person observing the posted speed sign (45 m.p.h.) would 
encounter difficulty driving the curve involved. 
The cross-defendant^ State of California's motion for 
nonsuit was granted removing the State of California 
from the case. The decision of the trial court granting the 
motion for nonsuit is the subject of the cross-appeal The 
[*296] cross-complainants assert that if the verdict of the 
jury and the judgment entered thereon are affirmed by 
this court, the points raised by way of their appeal are 
moot, and that appeal may be dismissed. 
Cross-complainants allege that the state did not carry 
its burden with respect to design immunity and that the 
court erred in deciding that there was not a "dangerous 
condition" on the basis that the posted speed was also the 
maximum speed at which a prudent driver, using due 
care, would negotiate this curve. 
After the nonsuit was granted, the wrongful death 
action was submitted to the jury. After the judge entered 
a special verdict in favor of defendants, [***4] plaintiffs 
moved for new trial and judgment notwithstanding die 
verdict The motions were denied. 
Plaintiffs appeal from judgment on the special 
verdict, and cross-complainants appeal from the 
judgment of nonsuit on the cross-complaint. 
Facts 
Decedent, Mefvin Muffett, was riding as a passenger 
in a tractor driven by defendant and cross-complainant, 
Philip Harmon, and owned by defendant and 
cross-complainant Silas Royster. Royster had entered a 
conditional sales agreement for the tractor with Harmon. 
The tractor was hauling two trailers owned by Royster, 
[**77] loaded with wooden pallets which were to be 
delivered to Los Angeles. Harmon and decedent knew 
each other for six years and were close friends. 
Decedent went to truck driving school and 
approached Royster to purchase a 1966 tractor. Decedent 
also entered a "sub-haul agreement" in which during the 
term of their contract of sale the decedent agreed to 
"drive said tractor and perform such other functions as 
may be necessary from time to time including* but not 
limited to, loading, unloading, tarping, tying down loads, 
washing tractor and trailers, servicing and general 
maintenance of same." The agreed compensation for 
[***5] services rendered by decedent was 78 percent of 
the state rate for ail hauling done by him, less Public 
Utilities Commission transportation tax, trailer rentals 
and any advances. 
The agreement identified Muffett as an independent 
contractor, and specifically states that Muffett is not an 
employee but is self-employed. Muffett was to provide 
his own liability insurance as well as worker's 
compensation. Muffett paid for his own fuel, 
maintenance, parts and service, received no vacation pay 
or pension benefits, and Royster did not withhold S.D.L 
or social security. 
[*297] Defendant and cross-complainant, Harmon, 
entered into a similar relationship with Royster. Royster 
agreed to assist in training Harmon to operate the truck, 
with the understanding that Harmon would not be able to 
remove Hie truck from Royster's yard until Royster was 
satisfied that Harmon knew how to operate it Royster 
had Harmon practice with the truck in his yard. Other 
subhaulers had similar contracts with Royster and they 
kept their trucks in Royster's yard. Loads were assigned 
to subhaulers by Royster's wife. Either Royster or his 
wife would tell the drivers where and when to pick up 
loads, and where [***6*] and when to make deliveries. 
Royster had the right to tell his drivers what route to take, 
how loads should be placed on their trailers, how to tie 
down a load, and how to maintain and service their 
tractors. On occasion, he inspected their loaded tractor 
and trailer to be sure the load was tied down properly 
He also inspected die tires and felt that if the tires 
were unsafe, he could refuse to allow the drivers to haul a 
load. On occasion, he instructed his drivers (including 
decedent and Harmon) to perform maintenance operation 
on trailers. 
The tractors purchased by decedent were painted 
with the company colors and bore the company logo and 
the company's Public Utilities Commission number. 
Decedent and Harmon made all hauls under authority 
Royster obtained from the Public Utilities Commission. 
On occasion, drivers would call mid trip to obtain the 
next assignment and if drivers did not perform 
satisfactorily, Royster had the right to terminate them. 
The drivers were paid on the first and fifteenth by 
Royster, and not by the companies that make shipments. 
The truck purchase and subhaul agreements were 
common within the industry. 
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The subhaul agreements provided that Royster 
[***7] would not carry a worker's compensation policy, 
but, on the advice of his broker, Royster acquired a 
policy. He met with his drivers and took a vote on 
obtaining such coverage. The agreement was that he 
would deduct $ 40 per month from their gross hauling 
receipts. The pay records relating to decedent indicate 
that the first deduction made for worker's compensation 
insurance from his pay was two weeks after the accident. 
The deduction was S 120 for June, July and August. 
The decedent assisted Harmon in learning the 
mechanics of the truck. Harmon and decedent picked up a 
load and Royster told decedent that he was going to 
switch the load and have him pick up a load of pallets to 
be [*298] delivered to Los Angeles. Harmon was upset 
at having the load switched at the last minute, but he felt 
he did not have a choice. They were instructed to unload 
the truck and give that load to someone else. Harmon 
viewed Royster as his boss and considered himself at 
Royster's beck and call 
[**78] Harmon suggested that it would be best to 
use the tractor decedent was buying from Royster. They 
asked Royster if he had any objection to switching 
tractors and Royster responded that he [***8] did not as 
long as it was understood that decedent was in charge and 
decedent was to be paid. Harmon had a learner's permit 
and Royster told him he needed one more trip to Los 
Angeles before Royster would consider "signing offf his 
license, because fac felt Harmon needed a little more 
experience. 
During the trip decedent instructed Harmon. 
Decedent told Harmon to get into the number two lane, to 
head toward Santa Ana, at the sign advising drivers of a 
road change. Harmon put on his blinker, traffic was 
heavy and he slowed down from 55 to 50 just prior to the 
accident. Two diamond shaped signs indicated 45 miles 
per hour. The vehicle was drifting to the right, hit the 
gutter and flipped over. Sometime after, at the hospital, 
Muffett died 
The curve where the accident occurred was banked. 
On the high side of the curve there was a gutter and 
shoulder at a different slope than the road surfaces. 
Evidence showed that the rapid change in slope causes a 
rapid change in the center of gravity and that loss of 
control may result. Tn 1971 and 1972 there were 41 
accidents here. Prior to the accident in question, the 
traffic department recommended that the gutter and 
shoulder be paved [***9] over to match the 
super-elevation of the road surface, in order to "reduce 
further danger to the public safety." 
The legal speed at the curve was 55 miles per hour 
but the posted speed was 45 miles per hour. A highway 
patrol officer and tow truck driver testified to many 
trucks overturning here. According to some testimony, 
the 45 mile per hour speed was the recommended speed 
but not the mandatory speed limit. 
The design plan for the curve specified that a rolled 
gutter be constructed on the shoulder. The purpose of the 
rolled gutters is to discourage people from driving on the 
shoulder except in an emergency. The design was 
approved by at least three civil engineers, and a civil 
engineer testified that the design was reasonable. The 
roiled gutter was constructed in accord with the gutter 
described in the department's manual. 
The Department of Transportation's planning manual 
had also described the curve and the warning speed — 
advisory signs that were actually in place [*299] at the 
time of the accident were signs also approved by the 
planning manual. The two sets of curve warnings, speed 
advisory signs were in plain view and were visible to 
approaching drivers. 
Piaintiffi' [***10] Appeal 
(1) Appellants first argue that "the courterred in 
failing to properly submit special verdicts to the jury such 
that judgment was entered for defendants on inadequate 
findings feat plaintiffs' recovery was barred by the 
exclusive remedy of workers compensation." Appellant 
asserts that, in order to invoke the exclusive remedy of 
worker's compensation, a special verdict that defendant 
Royster "secured payment of compensation" had to be 
made. 
On submitting the case to the jury, the court 
instructed the jurors on the special verdicts they would be 
required to return. The first four questions of the special 
verdict concerned two issues dealing with whether 
Harmon and Muffett were employees of Royster and 
whether they were acting in the scope of employment. 
The court instructed the jurors that if they answered 
"yes" they were to disregard other issues. Based on the 
jurors* wyesn answers, the court ordered judgment for all 
defendants and against plaintiffs. Thus, the court 
concluded rixat defendants met their burden under Labor 
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Code section 3601, i so as to bar plaintiffs* recovery 
under the common law theory of negligence, without 
[***!!] ever having a special verdict that the employer 
had secured £**79] payment of compensation under 
Labor Code section 3706. 2 
1 Labor Code section 3601 refers to the 
employer's burden to secure the worker's 
compensation. 
2 Labor Code section 3706 reads: "it any 
employer fails to secure the payment of 
compensation, any injured employee or his 
dependents may bring an action at law against 
such employer for damages, as if this division did 
not apply." 
Appellants are correct that where plaintiffs, as here, 
include no allegations in their complaint of an 
employer-employee relationship, the employer defendant 
must show that he "secured payment of compensation." ( 
Lab. Code, § 3706; Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 
Cal3d 91, see fn. 8 [151 CalRptr. 347, 587 R2d 
1160].) Appellants are also correct that, where the 
employer fails to secure payment, the employee may 
[***12] bring a civil action. ( Lab. Code, §3706.) 
However, we see no reason why the court would be 
required to submit the question of whether Royster 
"secured payment of compensation" to the jury in the 
form of a special verdict A special verdict is a device by 
which [*300] the jury finds^cte only, leaving judgment 
to the court. ( Code Civ. Proc, § 624.) Whether 
Royster's conduct in arranging for the worker's 
compensation policy and making the $ 1,000 payment, 
and then improperly deducting the equivalent of 
premiums from the driver's paychecks, 3 legally 
amounted to "securing payment of compensation" is in 
part a legal question, and therefore is a matter for the 
judge rather than the jury. 4 Thus, there was no reason to 
submit this question to the jury in the form of a special 
verdict. 
3 It is clearly improper under the Labor Code to 
shift the payments for worker's compensation 
from the employer to the employee. (See § 3751.) 
4 In the case at bench, there was no dispute as to 
the operative facts. 
[***13] I 
(2a) Appellants argue that defendant Royster did 
not "secure payment of compensation as required by 
Labor Code section 3 706" and is not, therefore, entitled 
to the immunity of the act. Appellants admit to not 
raising the issue below. (3) An issue not raised at trial 
can be considered for the first time on appeal when it 
relates to "noncurable, undisputed" evidence as a pure 
question of law. ( Wilson v. Lewis (1980) 106 
CaLApp.3d 802 [165 CalRptr. 396].) (4) An appellant 
may be permitted to change his theory when a question ot 
law is presented on the facts appearing in the record. 
That is because in such a case the opposing party is not 
required to defend for the first time on appeal against a 
new theory which contemplates a controverted factual 
situation. (See Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal2d 736 
[336 P2d 534].) 
(2b) Here, the facts are not disputed that Royster 
arranged for the policy, paid $ 1,000, and then was to 
deduct some payments from the haulers pay. 5 Whether 
or not these undisputed acts by Royster legally constitute 
"securing [***I4] payment of compensation" is a legal 
question which we may deal with for the first time on 
appeal. Thus, although counsel did not suggest below 
that payment by the decedent of a portion of the cost of 
procuring fhe policy haired defendants from raising 
Labor Code section 3601 as a defense we conclude that 
question is open to us on appeal. 
5 -
Failure to secure payment of compensation 
by one who knows or should know of the 
obligation is a misdemeanor. ( Lab, Code, § 
375L) 
II 
(5) Defendants object to raising the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel for the first time on appeal. ( Roam v. 
Koop (1974) 41 CalJipp.3d W35r 1044 [116 CalRptr. 
539].) Appellants never raised the issue of equitable 
estoppel and should not be permitted to do so now. 
However, as we said earlier, [%301] appellants may raise 
the issue of whether Royster "secured payment" for the 
first time on appeal. 
HI 
(6a) Appellants argue [***15] that section 3601 
must be interpreted with reference to 3751. Under 37517 
it is a misdemeanor for employers [**8G] to deduct 
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payment for worker's compensation from their 
employees, and under 3601, an employer may not raise 
worker's compensation as a bar to a civil suit unless he 
has "secured payment of compensation." 
Defendants argue that only 3601 applies and that 
Labor Code section 3751 6 has no application to this 
case. Defendants point out that there is no authority that 
violation of section 3751 precludes the employer from 
raising Labor Code section 3601 as a defense to a civil 
action. 
6 Under 3751, an employer's deduction from the 
earnings of an employer to cover all or part of the 
worker's compensation coverage is a 
misdemeanor. 
We hold that Royster's deduction of premiums from 
die hauler's pay precludes a finding that Royster "secured 
payment of compensation." The law clearly puts the 
burden of payment on the employer and does not permit 
shifting [*** 16] the burden of payment to the employee. 
To allow the employer to raise the worker's compensation 
acts as a bar to the civil suit where the employer so 
blatantly fails to comply with so fundamental a part of the 
act, would be inconsistent with the purposes of the act. 
While defendants may be correct that 3751 does not 
specifically relate to barring a civil action by an 
employee, it is clear that an employee is not barred from 
bringing a civil action when the employer has not 
"secured payment." It is also clear that the Legislature 
intended to put the burden on the employer to pay the 
premiums and "to secure payment." (7) In construing a 
statute, a court should ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature. ( In re O'Neil (1977) 74 CaLApp.3d 120 
[141 Cal.Rptr. 338].) (6b) We hold that the act of the 
employer in seeking payment from an employee for the 
cost of the worker's compensation insurance in violation 
of the Labor Code, also precludes the employer from 
raising the worker's compensation act as a bar to a civil 
suit. 
IV 
(8) Appellants argue that the court erred in refusing 
to instruct the jury to give significant weigjht to the 
contracts between decedent and [***17] Royster in 
determining whether MmYett was an independent 
contractor or an employee. 
[*302] Plaintiffs requested and were retused the 
following instructions: 
I. "An independent contractor is one who . . . so long 
as he retains the right of control over the methods to be 
used to accomplish the end result The terms of the 
contract between the parties is a significant factor to be 
considered m determining the issue. However those 
terms are not conclusive." 
2 "A written contract between two parties will be 
construed strictly against the person who drew up the 
contract. Any ambiguities or uncertainties will be 
decided against the person who prepared the contract." 
There was no error in the court's instructions. 
Certainly the written agreement is a significant factor in 
determining whether one is an independent contractor. ( 
Mission Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp, Appeals Bd. (1981) 
123 CaLApp3d 211 [176 Cal.Rptr. 439J.) However, 
appellants' assertion in their briefs that the "courts should 
have looked primarily to the controls to determine the 
issue of employment" is not correct. The court properly 
instructed on right to control. [*** 18] Right to control is 
the dominant criterion {Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal 
Emp. Com. (1946) 28 CaL2d 33, 43 [168 R2d 686]) 
and is the most significant test. ( Tieberg v. 
Unemployment Ins, Appeals Bd. (1970) 2 Cal 3d 943, 950 
[88 Cal.Rptr. I75p 471 PJd975].) 
Further, the jury below was instructed that the 
contract may be considered although they were told the 
terms of the contract are not conclusive. That instruction 
was correct As we have said, right to control is the most 
significant test {Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals 
Bd., supra) and the written agreement is "a significant 
factor/' ( Mission Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals 
Bd, sttpraT 123 Cal.App.3d 211.) 
[**8I] The instructions of the court that were given 
did ask the jury to consider the terms of the contract, and 
that is all that is required under the law. 
V 
(9a) Appellants argue that defendants failed to 
present sufficient e:vidence to support a finding that 
Melvin Muffett and Philip Harmon were employees of 
defendant Royster at the time of the accident. 
While it is true that there was a great deal of 
147 Cal. App. 3d 289, *302; 195 Cal. Rptr. 73, **81: 
1983 CaL App, LEXIS 2191, ***18; 49 Cal. Comp, Cas 806 
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conflicting [***19] evidence on the subject, there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Muffed: and 
Harmon were employees. It was Royster's practice "with 
a new driver to have other drivers go along on a driver's 
first haul. Royster had the right to inspect the load to be 
sure it was properly tied down. Royster inspected [*303] 
the tractors for safety. Royster testified that he had the 
right to control the route and other rights. (10) The 
testimony of one witness, even a party himself, may be 
sufficient ( In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 CaiJd 
604, 614 [122 CaLRpir. 79, 536R2d479J.) 
The case of Flickenger v Industrial Ace. Com. 
(1919) 181 CaL 425 [184 P. 851, 19 A.L.R. 1150], is 
cited here. In Flickenger, the contract provided that the 
hauler transport a truckload of freight between specified 
points each day for a specified time at a specified rate, 
with the hauler to pay its own expenses and upkeep, -with 
no control by his employer. The hauler therein was held 
to be an independent contractor. 
(9b) The Flickenger case, supra, is to distinguished 
from the case at bar on several grounds. [***20J Royster 
supplied the trailer. Royster would tell the drivers where 
and when to pick up the load. Royster inspected the load, 
and Royster had the right to tell the drivers which route to 
take. In short, Royster had the right to exercise control 
Although at times the cases are difficult to distinguish 
based on the "right to control" test, the "result in each 
case seems to turn on the subjective knowledge of the 
employer." (Samuelsen, Employee or Independent 
Contractors (1975) 10 TJ.S.F. L.Rev. 133, 145.) There 
was sufficient evidence to support the view that the 
decedent and Harmon were employees. 
VI 
Appellants argue that the court exceeded its authority 
and abused its discretion in allowing admission of 
evidence on the issue of whether Harmon was acting in 
the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 
This issue was raised by way of interrogatories and there 
was a denial by Royster that Harmon was acting in the 
scope of employment Appellants concede that 
admission of such evidence was improper only as it 
related to defendant Royster. 
(11) Royster made a sworn denial that Harmon was 
acting in the scope of employment at the lime of [***21] 
his admission. Code of Civil Procedure section 473 
empowers the trial court to relieve a party served with a 
request for admission from the consequences of a 
defective denial, but no motion was made under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 473. However, Royster argues 
that he may be relieved under Code of Civil Procedure 
sections 2033 and 2034. Kaiser Steel Co. v 
Wesiinghouse Elec. Corp. (1976) 55 Cai.App.3d 737, 744 
[127 Cal.Rptr. 838], which permits the court to relieve a 
party of the consequences of failing to admit or deny 
where there is good cause, or from a defective denial. 
However, that case does not relieve parties who have 
made an unequivocal denial, as here. Royster should 
have sought relief [*304] under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 473. Granting relief from an unequivocal denial 
is not the same as granting relief from a defective denial, 
or a failure to deny, since the defective denial or failure to 
deny may involve simple oversight or carelessness, and 
relief from as unequivocal [***22] denial may be related 
to the discovery of new information or other factors. 
Cross-Complainants' Appeal 
Nonsuit was granted in favor of cross-defendant, 
State of California, and against all cross-complainants, 
Royster, Royster Trucking Company [**82] and 
Harmon. Cross-complainants appealed from judgment 
on the cross-complaint. 
Royster, in his appeal, asserts that the tractor turned 
over as a result of a "dangerous condition" of state 
property (the rolled gutter) and that the curve warning 
and speed signs were inadequate notice of the danger. 
Specifically, Royster contends that the court's 
determination that the road was not in a "dangerous 
condition/1 on the ground that a person driving under the 
posted speed would not have difficulty on the curve, was 
in error. Royster also contends that the state failed to 
carry its burden of proof with respect to design immunity 
in that it has not proved a defective design, and because 
the state failed to ^ive adequate warning of a "dangerous 
condition" of which it had notice. The state contended 
that the road was not th^ proximate cause of the accident, 
the road was not in a "dangerous condition" because there 
was no use of the road with [***23] "due care," that the 
state is immune from liability on die theory of "design 
immunity," and that there were adequate warnings to the 
public of the danger. 
I 
(12a) First, appellants argue that the trial court 
erred in holding, as a matter of law, that any driver 
147 CaL App. 3d 289, *304; 195 CaL Rptr. 73, **82: 
1983 CaL App. LEXIS 2191, ***23; 49 CaL Camp. Cas'806 
Page 10 
traveling in excess of the posted speed was not using 
"due care." A finding that the property was not used with 
"due care," precludes the possibility of finding a 
"dangerous condition" of public property, under the terms 
of Government Code section 830, and unless there is a 
"dangerous condition" the government is not liable. 7 
7 Government Code section 830 reads: "(a) 
'Dangerous condition* means a condition of 
property that creates a substantial (as 
distinguished from a minor, trivial or 
insignificant) risk of injury when such property or 
adjacent property is used with due care in a 
manner m which it is reasonably foreseeable that 
it will be used, [para, ] (b) Trotect against7 
includes repairing, remedying or correcting a 
dangerous condition, providing safeguards against 
a dangerous condition, or warning of a dangerous 
condition, [para. ] (c) 'Property of a public entity' 
and 'public property' mean real or personal 
property owned or controlled by the public entity, 
but do not include easements, encroachments and 
other property that are located on the property of 
the public entity but are not owned or controlled 
by the public entity." 
Government Code section 835 reads: 
"Except as provided by statute, a public entity is 
liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition 
of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the 
property was in a dangerous condition at the time 
of the injury, that the injury was proximately 
caused by the dangerous condition, that the 
dangerous condition created a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was 
incurred, and that either: [para. ] (a) A negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the 
public entity within the scope of his employment 
created the dangerous condition; or [para. ] (b) 
The public entity had actual or constructive notice 
of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a 
sufficient time pnor to the injury to have taken 
measures to protect against the dangerous 
condition." 
[***24] (13) [*305] We agree that the existence 
of a "dangerous condition" is usually a question of fact 
and may be resolved as a question of law only if 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. ( 
Harlandv State of California (1977) 75 CaI.App.3d 475, 
483 [142 CaLRptr. 201].) (12b) Therefore, the question 
before us is whether driving over the curve over the 
posted speed limit indicates a lack of "due care" as a 
matter of law, such that the government can incur no 
liability under Government Code section 835, or whether 
going over the posted speed limit creates a factual 
question as to whether or not the property was used with 
"due care." 8 Stated another way, can there be a 
"dangerous condition" on a highway, within the meaning 
of Government Code section 830, such that a public 
entity may incur liability, under Government Code 
section 835, where a driver violates a posted speed limit 
at the time of the accident, in view of the fact that the 
definition of the term "dangerous condition" in 
Government Code section 830 [***25] , subdivision (a) 
requires "due care" in the use of the public property? 
S Thus, we are not here, at the moment, 
concerned with whether or not there was use of 
the property with due care, for purposes of 
comparative negligence or contributory 
negligence, but only whether there was use with 
"due care" such that there was a "dangerous 
condition"' for which the public entity may be 
liable tinder the Government Code. 
[**83] There is much discussion in the briefs as to 
whether the posted speed was "advisory" or "mandatory." 
9 Our research has not disclosed any cases suggesting that 
speed signs posted by the state refers to "advisory" speed 
or "suggested" speed. Nevertheless, we see no reason to 
depart from the general rule that whether or not there ts a 
"dangerous condition" is a question of fact. ( Torkelson 
v. City of Redtands (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 354 [17 
CaLRptr. 899]; Ellis v. City of Los Angeles (1959) 167 
CaLAppJd ISO [334 P.2d 37f) If a "dangerous 
condition** [***26] is a factual question, and use with 
"due care" is one aspect of the existence of a "dangerous 
condition," it follows that any questions as to whether a 
defendant used "due care" when exceeding the posted 
speed on the curve are also factual questions. 
9 There was testimony that the posted speed 
limit was not the maximum safe speed. 
We think this conclusion is pragmatically sound. 
First of all, it is conceivable that some rare traffic 
situations may occur where going five miles per hour 
over the rate on the sign on the curve may actually avoid 
a collision with other vehicles, and, that, under those 
circumstances the act of going over the posted speed may 
147 Cai. App. 3d 289, *305: 195 CaL Rptr. 73, **83; 
1983 CaL App. LEXIS 2191, ***26; 49 CaL Comp. Cas 806 
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be prudent, and "due care." 
[*306] Furthermore, to hold that going over the 
posted speed on a curve is not "due care" as a matter of 
law would encourage the state to avoid liability by 
posting lower and lower speed limits, and the state would 
have no incentive to remedy potentially dangerous 
situations upon a highway. 
Our holding here is supported by those [***27] 
cases which hold that speed in excess of a mere prima 
facie limit is not negligence as a matter of law, and the 
burden is on the party asserting negligence. ( Miller v. 
Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 500 
[24 CalRptr. 99J.) If speeding in excess of the prima 
facie limit is not negligence as a matter of law, then going 
faster than the posted speed (whether characterized as 
"advisory" or not) should not indicate nlack of due care" 
as a matter of law. *° 
10 There is also dicta in Wilding v. Norton 
(1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 374 [319 P.2d 440], 
suggesting that the presence of signs which create 
a special speed zone is a factor to be given 
consideration in judging the reasonableness of 
motor vehicle speed. 
II 
The appellants argue that the state was not entitled to 
a nonsuit on the theory of design immunity. We disagree. 
(14) The "Design Immunity" defense ( Gov. Code, 
§ 830.6) is raised on a motion for summary [***28] 
judgment, nonsuit, and directed verdict. On submitting 
such matter, the trial court is invited to rule whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support the design immunity 
defense, and if the trial court determines that the defense 
has been established, the jury is instructed that the public 
entity is immune as a matter of law for design related 
damages. ( Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 
Cal.App.3d 565 [136 CalRptr. 751].) For reasons stated 
below, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to 
support its design immunity defense. 
(15) In order for the state to establish design 
immunity as a defense, the state must show (1) A causal 
relationship between the plan and the accident; (2) 
discretionary approval of the plan prior to construction; 
(3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of 
the design. ( Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks (1976) 
65 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 [135 CalRptr. 127].) The state is 
entitled to a defense of design immunity if there is any 
substantial evidence on which the approval can be 
reasonably based, and it is error to submit a design 
defense to a jury. ( Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane, supra, 
67 CaI.App.3d 565.) [***29j [*307] For example, a 
conflict will not create a triable issue of fact to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment ( Moritz v. City of Santa 
Clara (1970) 8 CalApp.3d573 [87 CalRptr. 675].) 
In determining whether evidence before the trial 
court is substantia!, the question is whether the evidence 
"reasonably [**84] inspires confidence" and is of "solid 
value." ( Davis v. Cordova Recreation & Park Dist. 
(1972) 24 CalAppJd 7899 798 [101 CalRptr. 358].) 
(16) Although the evidence below was conflicting, there 
was substantial evidence supporting the view that the 
design of the gutter was reasonable. A witness, Mr. 
Harlan Weatherhold, a licensed civil engineer, who had 
himself designed freeways, testified that the rolled gutter 
can be driven over safely and served a valid purpose and 
this was in itself substantial evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of the design. 
i n 
The state also argues that there was no substantial 
evidence to show that the rolled gutter was a cause of the 
injury. (17) (18) For a condition to be a cause of an 
injury, it must be the cause in fact of the injury. [***30] 
( Akins v. County of Sonoma (1967) 67 Cal2d 185\ 
198-199 [60 CalRptr. 499, 430 P.2d 57].) As the state 
admits, two witnesses, Harmon and Dr. Henry Hahnk, 
testified that the rolled gaiter was a cause of the accident. 
Causation is a question of feet ( Osborn v. City of 
Whiitier (1951) 103 Cai.App.2d 609, 616 [230 P2d 
132]) and there may be more than one legal cause of an 
accident ( Vesefy v. Soger (1971) 5 CaUd 153, 163 [95 
CalRptr. 623t 486 P.2d 151].) There was substantial 
evidence to show the rolled gutter was a cause of the 
accident l* 
i I The parties do not raise questions as to 
whether there was discretionary approval. 
IV 
(19) Appellants' claim of inadequate warning is 
without merit. The evidence shows the two signs were 
clearly visible and the driver did not see them because he 
was concentrating on the lane change. There was 
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sufficient evidence of adequate notice or warning to the 
public. 
Thus, even if appellants [***3I] could show that 
exceeding the posted speed did not preclude a finding of 
use of property with due care, the state was still able to 
show that it had the defense of design immunity. 
P308] The judgment in favor of defendants on the 
complaint is reversed; the judgment in favor of the state 
on the cross-complaint is affirmed. Appellants shall 
recover their costs on appeal. 
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TREVOR BUERKLEY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, v. ASPEN MEADOWS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PARKVIEW CONVALESCENT CARE, A 
PARTNERSHIP, BILL MCLAIN, A GENERAL PARTNER OF ASPEN MEADOWS AND 
PARTNER OF PARKVIEW, STEVE MCLAIN, A PARTNER OF PARKVIEW AND COMCARE, 
INC., A PARTNER OF PARKVIEW, DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
[6] Counsel OF Record: For Appellant: Gene R. Jarussi; Jarussi & Bishop; Billings, Montana For 
Respondents: Patrick E, Melby; Luxan & Murfitt, Pllp; Helena, Montana (for Aspen Meadows, 
Parkview Convalescent Care, Bill McLain, and Steve McLain) 
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler 
[8] APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of 
Yellowstone, The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding, 
[9] Submitted on Briefs: October 15,1999 
[10] f 1. The plaintiff, Trevor Buerkiey, filed suit in the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial 
District in Yellowstone County to recover damages from the defendants, Aspen Meadows, Parkview 
Convalescent Care, and Bill McLain and Steve McLain, for an injury to his hand. The District Court 
awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
[11] f 2. The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it concluded that the Workers' 
Compensation Act was Buerkleyfs exclusive remedy. 
[12] FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
[13] <p. Trevor Buerkiey was hired by Parkview Convalescent Care as a maintenance worker on 
August 9,1993. Prior to the start of his employment, Buerkiey was not asked to submit an employment 
application, nor was he required to comply with any of Parkview's other existing hiring procedures. 
Until the time of Iris injury, two months after he started work at Parkview, Buerkiey worked a normal 
forty-hour week but did not use a time clock as other employees did, his paycheck was not drawn from 
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Parkview's payroll account, and no payroll deductions were taken from his paycheck. In other words. 
Parkview employed Buerkley "under the table." Buerkley was not held out by Parkview to others as its 
employee. Furthermore, Buerkley was not reported as an employee on the payroll reports provided to 
the Montana Health Network's Workers' Compensation Insurance Trust by which Parkview's employees 
were provided with coverage for work-related injuries. 
[14] f 4. Aspen Meadows is a limited partnership which operates a retirement community. It is a 
separate business entity; however, it has common principals with Parkview. The two homes occasionally 
shared personnel and other resources. On October 8,1993, Aspen's maintenance director contacted the 
maintenance director for Parkview and asked him to send Buerkley to Aspen with one of Parkview's 
snowblowers to clear the remains of an early snow from Aspen's parking lot. While Buerkley was 
operating the snowblower at Aspen, the teeth of the machine became blocked with heavy, wet snow. 
Buerkley inserted his left hand into the snowblower to clear the blockage and seriously injured his hand. 
[15] %5. Sometime after the accident, Buerkley completed an employment application and portions 
of other employee paperwork for both Parkview and Aspen. Both applications were back-dated to reflect 
an employment date for Buerkley of September 27, 1993, prior to the date of his injury. Beginning 
October 14, 1993, Buerkley's paychecks began to reflect deductions for workers' compensation, 
Medicare, and FICA; however, they were still drawn on an account which was not Parkview's regular 
payroll account. Beginning October 25, 1993, Buerkley began using Parkview's time clock to record his 
hours worked. After the accident, Buerkley was also issued at least one paycheck by Aspen, despite the 
fact that the morning he was injured was the only time he performed any labor at Aspen. The paycheck 
from Aspen was also drawn on an account different from its regular payroll account. 
[16] f 6. On December 8, 1993, Aspen filed an "Employer's First Report of Notice" with Montana 
Health Network. Compensation Adjusters, Inc. was authorized by contract to adjust MHN claims and to 
pay all benefits. It determined that Buerkley was entitled to benefits and paid all medical claims and 
compensation benefits. Compensation Adjusters also made Buerkley a settlement offer for a release of 
any future permanent partial disability claim. Buerkley rejected the settlement offer and brought suit for 
damages in District Court. Compensation Adjusters discovered that Buerkley's employment records had 
been falsified after it received notice of the lawsuit. 
[17] DISCUSSION 
[18] [^7, Did the District Court err when it concluded that the Workers1 Compensation Act was 
Buerkley's exclusive remedy? 
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[19] f 8. Our standard of review on appeal from summary judgment orders is de novo. See Motaire v. 
Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist (1995), 274 Mont 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156; Mead v. 
M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465,470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. We review a district court's summary 
judgment to determine whether it was correctly decided pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., which 
provides that summary judgment is appropriate when where there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, evidence must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, see Bowen v. McDonald (1996), 276 Mont. 
193,199,915 P.2d 201,205, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the party opposing 
the motion. See Porter v. Galarneau (1996% 275 Mont. 174, 179, 911 P.2d 1143, 1146. 
[20] 1f9. On appeal, Buerkley contends that an employer who has aot properly complied with the 
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requirements of § 39-71-401, MCA (1993), is an "uninsured employer" pursuant to § 39-71-501, MCA 
(1993), and, therefore, subject to the civil remedies provided pursuant to §§ 39-71-508 and -515, MCA 
(1993), and should not, as a matter of law and public policy, be allowed to rely on the exclusive remedy 
provision found at § 39-71-411, MCA. 
[21] % 10. The defendants argued, and the District Court agreed, that whether or not Buerkley's 
employment was reported to the trust by which they were self-insured, they elected coverage under the 
Workers' Compensation Act and, therefore, pursuant to § 39-71-411, MCA, the Workers1 Compensation 
Act was Buerkley's exclusive remedy. 
[22] Ifl 1. Section 39-71-411, MCA (1993), provides in relevant part: 
[23] "For all employments covered under the Workers' Compensation Act or for which an election 
has been made for coverage under this chapter, the provisions of this chapter are exclusive. Except as 
provided in part 5 of this chapter for uninsured employers and except as otherwise provided in the 
Workers' Compensation Act, an employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the death of or 
personal injury to an employee covered by the Workers' Compensation A c t . . . . "The defendants 
contend that because they were covered under the Act the provisions of the Act are exclusive. However, 
§ -411 specifically provides an exception to the rule of exclusivity where provided in part 5 for 
uninsured employers. Uninsured employers are defined at § 39-71-501, MCA (1993), as follows: "For 
the purposes of 39-71-501 through 39-71-511 and 39-71-515 through 39-71-520, 'uninsured employer' 
means an employer who has not properly complied with the provisions of 39-71-401." (Emphasis 
added.) 
[24] f 12. Section 39-71-401, MCA, requires any employer of any employee to enroll in and be 
bound by the provisions of Compensation Plan No. 1, 2, or 3. Defendants contend that they did enroll in 
and were bound by Compensation Plan No. 1 and, therefore, they complied with § 39-71-401, MCA. 
However, § -501 defines an uninsured employer as one who has "not properly complied" with the 
enrollment obligations. (Emphasis added.) 
[25] f 13. In this case, Bill McLain, who was a general partner in Parkview Convalescent Care at the 
time of Buerkley's employment, testified that Parkview was insured against workers' compensation by 
the Montana Health Network, which calculated premiums based on the previous year's payroll. He 
testified that it would have been a breach of the agreement with Montana Health Network to omit an 
employee from that payroll report. From this testimony, we conclude that a condition of Parkview's 
enrollment in Plan No. 1 of the Workers' Compensation Act was the accurate and honest identification 
of its employees on a quarterly basis, and that by deleting Buerkley's name from that payroll report, 
defendants had not properly complied with the enrollment requirement of § 39-71-401, MCA, and, 
therefore, were an "uninsured employer'1 for purposes of part 5 of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
[26] K14. Section 39-71-508, MCA (1993). provides in relevant part that: 
[27] An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment 
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while working for an uninsured employer as defined in 39-71-501 . . . may pursue all remedies 
concurrently, including but not limited to: 
[28] "(1) a claim for benefits from the uninsured employers' fund; "(2) a damage action against the 
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Hezekiah SHIFFLETT, Jr., as Personal Representative of William Mark Shifflett, Plaintiff Below, 
Appellant, v. Robert MeLAUGHLIN, Michael R. Staup and Better Business Systems, a Corporation, 
Defendants Below, Appellees. 
No. 19841 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 
Submitted May 8,1991. 
Decided July 12, 1991. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1 " An employer who failed to timely remit workers' compensation premiums pursuant to W. Va. Code § 
23-2-5 (1982) (amended 1984) was delinquent within the meaning of the statutory scheme and was 
mandatorily deprived of immunity from common-law liability." Syl. pt. 2, Kosegi v. Pugliese, No. 
19554, 185 W.Va. 384, 407 SJE.2d 388 (1991). 
2. "'Workmen's compensation statutes, or amendments of such statutes, which affect merely the 
procedure may be construed to have a retroactive operation; but any such statute or amendment which 
affects the substantial rights or obligations of the parties to the contract arising from the employment 
relationship or which impairs the obligation of such a contract cannot be construed to operate 
retroactively.1 Syl. Pt. 3, Maxwell v. State Compensation Director, 150 W.Va. 123,144 S.E.2d 493 
(1965), overruled on another point by 
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Sizemoie v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W Va 100, 219 S E.2d 912 (1975)." Syl. pt 
1, Kosegi v Pugliese, No, 19554, 185 W.Va. 384,407 S.E.2d 388 (1991). 
Mark A. Swartz, W. Michael Moore, Kay, Casto, Chaney, Love & Wise, Charleston, for appellant. 
Carl F Stucky, Jr., Mark R Kinley, Step- toe & Johnson, Charleston, for appellees. 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal by the appellant, Hezekiah Shifflett, Jr., as personal representative of William 
Mark Shifflett, from an order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County dated May 31,1990, dismissing the 
appellant's complaint against the appellees, Robert McLaughlin, Michael R. Staup and Better Business 
Systems, a corporation The appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the appellees are not entitled to 
the immunity from liability set forth in W Va Code, 23-2-6 [1974] and 23-2-6a [1949](&1) on the 
ground that Better Business Systems was in default by failing to report its part- time employees1 wages 
and pay workers' compensation premiums for those part-time employees as required under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. The appellees maintain that they cannot be depnved of their immunity from liability 
under the Workers' Compensation Act because no notice of delinquency was ever given to Better 
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Business Systems by the Workers' Compensation Fund. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the 
order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County dismissing the appellant's complaint. 
William Mark Shifflett was employed by Better Business Systems as a part-time laborer.(fh2) On 
February 9, 1983, he left work with his supervisor, Robert McLaughlin, and another part-time employee, 
Rick Shifflett, in an automobile owned by Better Business Systems. They drove to a local tavern where 
they drank beer for a few hours. While driving the Shifflett brothers home after leaving the tavern, 
Robert McLaughlin drove through an intersection and failed to stop at the stop sign. The vehicle then 
collided with a guardrail and rolled over an embankment. Mark Shifflett was killed in the accident. 
The appellant initially filed a complaint only against Robert McLaughlin. Mr. McLaughlin had been 
indicted on the criminal charge of causing a death while driving under the influence of alcohol and 
entered into a plea bargaining agreement pursuant to which he plead guilty to and was convicted of the 
charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. The complaint was later amended to add Better 
Business Systems, a corporation, and its owner, Michael Staup, as defendants. As one of their defenses, 
the appellees argued that they were entitled to assert immunity from liability under the Workers' 
Compensation Act as set forth in W. Va.Code, §§ 23-2-6 [1974] and 23-2-6a [1949]. 
[S.E.Page 401] 
The appellant subsequently filed a motion to strike the appellees' defense of immunity from liability 
on the ground that Better Business Systems had failed to re-port 
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its part-time employees' wages and also failed to pay premiums with regard to those wages as required 
under the Workers' Compensation Act. The circuit court denied the appellant's motion by order entered 
November 17, 1987. Thereafter, on May 31, 1990, the circuit court entered a stipulation and order 
dismissing the appellant's complaint to provide the appellant an opportunity to appeal from the 
interlocutory order denying the appellant's motion to strike entered on November 17, 1981. This matter 
is now before this Court on an appeal of that order. 
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the appellees are entitled to the benefit of the 
immunity from liability provided under W. Fa. Code, §§ 23-2-6 [1974] and 23-2-6a [1949]. The 
appellant avers that Better Business Systems failed to report its part-time employees' wages and to pay 
premiums as required under the Workers1 Compensation Act, and therefore the appellees are not entitled 
to immunity from liability under the provisions of W Va Code, §§ 23-2-6 [1974] and 23-2-6a [1949]. 
The appellees maintain that they cannot be deprived of their immunity from liability under the Workers' 
Compensation Act because no notice of delinquency was ever issued by the Workers' Compensation 
Fund to Better Business Systems and no determination was made by the Workers' Compensation Fund 
that Better Business Systems was in default. 
A review of the record before us reveals that Ute Staup, who kept the books for Better Business 
Systems, testified at a deposition that she did not include the wages paid to Mark and Rick Shifflett in 
her report to the Workers' Compensation Fund.(fh3) Mrs. Staup also testified that she did not complete a 
W-4 form for either Mark or Rick Shifflett. Moreover, Mrs. Staup acknowledged that the wages paid to 
Mark and Rick Shifflett were never included in any of the reports she filed.(fn4) 
In his deposition, Mr. Staup also acknowledged that the wages paid to Mark and Rick Shifflett were 
not included in the quarterly reports to the Workers' Compensation Fund.(fh5) Mr. Staup also disclosed 
that Mark and Rick Shifflett were paid in cash. 
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Each employer who subscribes to the Workers' Compensation Fund is required to pay premiums 
which are "calculated as a percentage of the employer's payroll at the rate determined by the 
commissioner and then in effect." W. Va. Code, 23-2-5 [1986], When an employer fails to timely pay 
premiums or timely file payroll reports, the employer's account becomes delinquent under W. VaCode, 
23- -2-5 [1986]. Moreover, the relevant provisions of W. Va. Code, 23-2-5, in effect at the time of the 
accident in 1983, mandate that an employer who is delinquent in the payment of workers' compensation 
premiums "shall be deprived of the benefits and protection afforded by this chapter, including section 
six [§ 23-2-6] of this article, and shall be liable as provided in section eight [§ 23-2-8] of this article, as 
well as for all benefits paid to said employee as provided by this chapter."(fh6) Based on the foregoing 
language of this statute, we recently held in syllabus point 2 of Kosegi v. Pugliese, 185 W.Va. 384, 407 
SJE.2d 388 (July 9, 1991): 
An employer who failed to timely remit workers1 compensation premiums pursuant to 
W.Va. Code § 23-2-5 (1982) (amended 1984) was delinquent within the meaning of the 
statutory scheme and was mandatorily deprived of immunity from common-law liability. 
(in!) 
[1] What we find from the depositions and what the parties have essentially conceded is that Better 
Business Systems failed to include its part-time employees in its quarterly payroll reports as required, 
and also failed to pay premiums as required under the Workers1 Compensation Act Thus, recognizing 
that Better Business Systems' account was delinquent at the time of the accident as a result of failing to 
pay premiums pursuant to W. Va. Code, 23-2-5, we proceed to the thrust of this case concerning whether 
the appellees can be deprived of their immunity from liability since no notice of the delinquency was 
ever given to Better Business Systems by the Workers' Compensation Fund.(fh8) 
The appellees have argued that they cannot be deprived of their defense of immunity because no 
notice of delinquency was ever given by the Workers' Compensation Fund to Better Business Systems in 
accordance with W. Va. Code, 23-2-5(b). A similar argument was asserted in Kosegi v. Pugliese, supra. 
[2] In Kosegi v. Pugliese, the appellees argued that the 1984 amendment to W. Va, Code, 23-2-5, 
which now requires the 
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Workers' Compensation Fund to give employers notice of all delinquencies, should be applied 
retroactively to preclude them from being declared in default since they never received any notice of 
delinquencies. We considered the retroactive application of Workers' Compensation statutes in syllabus 
point 1 of Kosegi v. Pugliese: 
'Workmen's compensation statutes, or amendments of such statutes, which affect merely the 
procedure may be construed to have a retroactive operation; but any such statute or 
amendment which affects the substantial rights or obligations of the parties to the contract 
arising from the employment relationship or which impairs the obligation of such a contract 
cannot be construed to operate retroactively.' Syl. P t 3, Maxwell v. State Compensation 
Director, 150 W.Va. 123,144 SJE.2d 493 (1965), overruled on another point by Sizemore 
v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 100, 219 S.E.2d 912 (1975). 
[3] We then recognized in Kosegi v Pugliese, that, although the 1984 amendment to W, Va. Code, 
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23-2-5 requiring the Commission to give notice to an employer of its delinquent status is procedural in 
nature, a retroactive application of this amendment should affect the substantive rights of an individual 
who would be prohibited jfrom bringing a common-law negligence civil action under the 1984 version of 
the statute, while being entitled to bring that type of action under the 1982 version of the same statutory 
provision. Id, 185 W.Va. at 387,407 S.E.2d at 391. We concluded that the 1984 amendment to W. Va. 
Code, 23-2-5 could not be applied retroactively. 
Thus, based on our ruling in Kosegi v. Pugliese, we conclude that the appellees do not receive the 
benefit of the notice provisions now included in W. Va.Code, 23-2-5 since the 1984 amendment to that 
statute cannot be applied retroactively.(fn9) Therefore, the order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County 
dismissing the complaint is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
the principles set forth in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Footnotes: 
1. The immunity from liability provided employers under the Workers1 Compensation Act is set 
forth, in relevant part, in W. Va.Code, 23-2-6 [1974]: 
Any employer subject to this chapter who shall subscribe and pay into the workmen's [now 
workers'] compensation fond the premiums provided by this chapter or who shall elect to 
make direct payments of compensation as herein provided, shall not be liable to respond in 
damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death of any employee, however 
occurring, after so subscribing or electing, and during any period in which such employer 
shall not be in default in the payment of such premiums or direct payments and shall have 
complied fully with all other provisions of this chapter. 
Furthermore, W. Va.Code, 23-2-6a [1949] extends this immunity jfrom liability "to every 
officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of such employer when he is acting in 
furtherance of the employer's business and does not inflict any injury with deliberate 
intention." 
2. The employees subject to the Workers' Compensation Act axe identified, in relevant part, in 
W. VaCode, 23-24a [1986]: "Employees subject to this chapter are all persons in the service oi 
employers and employed by them for the purpose of carrying on the industry, business, service or work 
in which they are engagedf.]" (emphasis added). 
3. Mrs. Staup gave the following explanation when asked why she had not reported the part- time 
employee's wages: 
Q. Why did you not include their wages in that figure or include them as employees? A. 
Because they did not supply a social security number, and they were usually never paid by 
check and they were only hired on a daily or hourly basis, maybe two, three times a year. 
Q. Did you ask them for a social security number? 
A. No. 
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Q. Do you have their social security numbers now? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you requested any other information from Rick or Mark Shiffiett when they 
worked for Better Business Services? 
A. No. 
4. An affidavit of Nelson B. Robinson, Jr., former commissioner of the Workers1 Compensation 
Fund, is also included in the record before us. In the affidavit, Mr. Robinson represented that he had 
reviewed the deposition testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Staup. Based upon their testimony that wages for 
part-time employees were not reported to the Workers' Compensation Fund and that no premiums were 
paid with respect to those wages, Mr. Robinson concluded that Better Business Systems was in default 
by reason of its failure to report all wages for all employees and to pay premiums thereon. 
Two affidavits were submitted by Marsha Petrucci, the account manager of the accounting division 
of the Workers' Compensation Fund. In her first affidavit, Ms. Petrucci stated that Better Business 
Systems was not in default to the Workers' Compensation Fund at the time of the accident. However, in 
her second affidavit, Ms. Petrucci stated that she had not been previously advised that Better Business 
Systems had failed to report wages of part-time employees and to pay premiums to the fund for those 
wages. Ms. Petrucci, therefore, opined that Better Business Systems was not in good standing for any 
periods during wliich time part-time employee wages were not reported and premiums were not paid for 
those wages, and that Better Business Systems was in default under the Workers' Compensation Act by 
reason of its failure to fulfill those requirements. 
5. Mr. Staup merely confirmed the earlier testimony of his wife: 
Q. This morning we took the deposition of Ute Staup, the bookkeeper, and she informed us 
that those amounts for labor charges were not included in the Workmen's Compensation 
quarterly reports? Can you confirm that? 
A. If she said so, that's true, yes. 
6. The 1984 amendment to W. Va.Code^ 23-2-5 essentially rewrote the section. Among other 
changes, W. Va.Code, 23-2-5(b) now requires the commissioner, in writing, to "notify all delinquent 
employers of their failure to timely pay premiums, to timely file a payroll report, or to maintain an 
adequate premium deposit" within sixty days of the end of each quarter. Furthermore, W. Va.Code, 23-2-
5(d) provides, in pertinent part: 
(d) Failure by the employer, who is required to subscribe to the fond and who fails to 
resolve his delinquency within the prescribed period, shall place the account in default and 
shall deprive such defaulting employer of the benefits and protection afforded by this 
chapter including section six [§ 23-2- 6] of this article, and he shall be liable as provided in 
section eight [§ 23-2-8] of this article. 
In addition to other minor changes, the 1986 amendment to W. Va.Code, 23-2-5 rewrote subsection 
(f) regarding the reinstatement of employers who are either in default or have had their accounts 
terminated. 
r age u Ui O 
. See Canterbury v Valley Bell Dairy Co., 142 W,Va. 154, 158, 95 S.E.2d 73,75 (1956) where we also 
recognized that: "a subscriber, upon 'Failure to pay premiums as herein provided or to make the 
quarterly payroll reports required', is deprived rof the benefits and protection afforded by' such statutes. 
Code, 23-2-5, as amended." 
8. As stated in Kosegi v. Pugliese, payments are due before the end of the month following the 
quarter. During hearings, appellees' counsel also contended that because the death of Mark Shifflett 
occurred before the end of the month following the quarter in which the Better Business Systems was 
required to remit a payment, the appellee was not delinquent. By that reasoning, an employer could 
always correct a deKnquency in the case of death, by paying within the required period, even though not 
reporting the wages. The flaw in this argument is obvious. Moreover, the record reflects that Better 
Business Systems not only failed to pay premiums on its part-time employees' wages preceding the 
death of Mark Shifflett, but it also failed to pay premiums on those wages at the end of the quarter 
following his death. 
9. We question how, under the new statute requiring notice, the commissioner can give notice of 
delinquency to an employer who is not reporting all employees, such as were the facts in this case. The 
commissioner would have no way of knowing that the employees were not being reported to the Fund 
until perhaps an accident would occur. Then, under the new statute, the employer could claim no notice 
was given of the delinquency. 
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ARLENE LORRAINE SMITH, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL-RELATED SERVICES, 
Defendant 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
765F.Supp. 1061:1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8522 
Case No. 90-C-936A 
June 18,1991, Decided 
Counsel Robert F. Orton, Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Gottfredson, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Attorney for Plaintiff. 
Robert C. Keller, Snowt Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Attorneys for Defendant.] 
Judges: Aldon J. Anderson, Senior United States District Judge. 
Opinion 
Opinion by: ANDERSON 
{765 F. Supp. 1062} ORDER SUPPLEMENTING DECISION ANNOUNCED FROM THE BENCH 
ALDON J. ANDERSON, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
The above captioned case is now before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The court heard oral arguments {765 F. Supp. 1063} and ruled at a hearing on June 7,1991. The 
court believes a written explanation of its bench ruling will be useful and so files this memorandum 
opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
This case revolves around the Utah state workers' compensation program. The court feels that a brief 
outline of that scheme is useful for placing the current dispute in context. Based on the 
representations of counsel and the court's experiences in the area, the court understands the workers' 
compensation scheme to function generally as follows. Workers' compensation schemes are the 
modern American method of dealing with the societal problems resulting from employment related 
injuries. It is a system that is neither entirely based on the principles of tort law nor the doctrine of 
social insurance but incorporates elements of both. Workers' compensation is a system for providing 
wage benefits and medical care to the victims of work-connected injuries without regard to fault. The 
scheme is designed to pass the cost of these injuries along to the consumer of the product, the 
manufacturing of which led to the injury. 
Before an employer may begin operations, the employer must secure insurance that meets certain 
legal requirements. Through this insurance, the employer is required to pay the cost of all work related 
injuries suffered by its employees regardless of fault. In return for undertaking this burden of 
quasi-strict liability, the employer receives a form of immunity from private personal injury lawsuits 
instituted by injured employees. The employee makes a similar trade. In return for a no fault 
guarantee of a payment of damages, the employee sacrifices his or her right to pursue private 
litigation against the employer. If both sides follow the rules, the courts have no involvement. High 
transaction costs and delays associated with civil litigation are thereby reduced. Any disputes over the 
degree of compensation due is decided by an administrative agency. See generally A. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation for Occupations Injuries and Death § 1 (desk ed. 1991) (describing theory 
© 2008 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
underlying workers' compensation). 
The grant of a quasi-immunity from private suit is not a complete bar to private suits. Two methods of 
avoiding the limitation are relevant in this case. The first results from the employer's actions. The 
quasi-immunity from suit is based on the exclusive remedy provision in the workers' compensation 
act. The section provides that workers' compensation system is the exclusive remedy available to the 
injured employee if the requirements of the act have been fulfilled. See U.C.A. § 35-1-60 (1988). If the 
employer has failed to provide approved insurance as required, the employee has a choice of 
proceeding by civil litigation, U.C.A. § 35-1-57, or by pursuing damages payments under the workers' 
compensation system, U.C.A. § 35-1-58. 
The second method of avoiding the exclusive remedy limitation is based on the scope of workers' 
compensation. Workers' compensation only provides coverage for work related injuries. Under the 
Utah workers' compensation act, the only injuries covered are those "arising out of and in the course 
of 
. . . employment" U.C.A. § 35-1-45 (1988). The employee is, therefore, not bound by the exclusive 
remedy limitation if his or her injury does not arise out of or in the course of employment. 
ANALYSIS 
In the current suit, Plaintiff is attempting to pursue a personal injury suit directly against her employer. 
Plaintiff asserts that both of the above described lines of reasoning permit her to bypass the exclusive 
remedy limitation. She asserts that her employer, the Defendant, failed to fulfill his obligation under the 
workers' compensation act. Plaintiff also argues that her injury did not "arise out of and in the course 
o f her employment. 
1. Employer's Failure to Fulfill Duty. 
Plaintiffs first argument is that Defendant failed to honor its obligation imposed under § 35-1-46 of the 
Utah Code. The section states, "Employers . . . shall {765 F. Supp. 1064} secure the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for their employees. . . . " U.C.A. § 35-1-46. Plaintiff asserts that § 
35-1-46 makes her employer the guarantor of her actual receipt of all benefits. Plaintiff alleges that 
she has not received payment of all the benefits to which she is entitled. Plaintiff contends that since 
her employer has refused to "secure" the payment of benefits owed, it has not fulfilled its duty and she 
is, therefore, not bound by the exclusive remedy limitation. 
Plaintiff misinterprets § 35-1-46 by failing to read the section in its entirety. The section actually 
requires the employer to "secure" payment of benefits "by" one of three described methods. In 
pertinent part, the section states, "Employers . . . shall secure the payment of workers' compensation 
benefits for their employees:... (b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this 
compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of 
workers' compensation insurance in this state. . . . " U.C.A. § 35-1-46 (emphasis added). The duty, 
therefore, imposed on the employer by this section is merely to provide a qualifying insurance policy. 
That Defendant provided a qualifying insurance policy for Plaintiff through an authorized stock 
corporation is not disputed by the parties. The court, therefore, finds that the parties have presented 
no issue of material fact that could be resolved so as to permit Plaintiff to escape the exclusive 
remedy provision based on this line of argument. 
2. Injuries Not Within Workers' Compensation. 
Plaintiffs second line of argument is based on the nature of the accident that caused her injuries. 
Plaintiff asserts that her injuries are not injuries "arising out of and in the course of [her] employment." 
The workers' compensation system and its exclusive remedy provision, therefore, should not apply to 
her quest for payment of damages. 
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Plaintiff works in a building owned by her employer, Defendant. Plaintiff was injured when she fell on 
the sidewalk outside Defendant's building. Defendant owns and/or controls the sidewalk on which 
Plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff slipped and fell on the Defendant's sidewalk when she was returning to 
work after having visited a nearby bank on personal business. Plaintiff essentially contends that, 
because she was outside the building and returning from a personal errand, her injury was not in the 
course of nor did it arise out of her employment. If this were true, Plaintiff would not be limited by the 
exclusive nature of workers' compensation. 
Plaintiffs argument, however, ignores the pronouncements of the Utah appellate courts on this issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated the relevant general rules in Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 
P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985). Trips to and from work are not typically considered to be in the course 
of employment. As in all legal matters, however, courts have recognized exceptions to this simple 
rule. Under the exception relevant to our case, "the accident is covered if it occurs on the employer's 
premises, even if the employee has not yet arrived at [her] work site or has left the work site." Id. 
(citation omitted) (court's opinion focused on explanation of a different exception). This exception is 
called the "premises rule." On first blush, the premises rule appears to decide this case in favor of 
Defendant since the accident occurred on the Defendant employer's premises. 
The Court of Appeals of Utah opinion in Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), however, 
even more directly addresses the case now before this court. The Hope case involved a 
pedestrian-vehicle accident. Both parties to the accident were employees and the accident occurred in 
the employer's parking lot as the employees were going home after work. Based on the bright line test 
of the premises rule, the court held "that both [employees] were in the scope and course of their 
employment when the accident occurred." Id. at 103. 
{765 F. Supp. 1065} Taken together, these two cases seem to require that Plaintiff be bound by the 
exclusive remedy provision since she was injured on her employer's premises while traveling to work. 
Plaintiff, however, asserts that these two cases are not applicable because they were decided prior to 
a recent amendment made to § 35-1-45. The amendment changed "arising out of or in the course of 
to "arising out of and in the course of employment. U.C.A. § 35-1-45 ("Amendment Notes"). Plaintiff 
contends that this change from the disjunctive to the conjunctive alters the requirements of the 
statute. Plaintiff cites an old Utah Supreme Court case that strongly supports her contention. See 
Tavey v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 106 Utah 489, 150 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1944) (noting change in 
meaning of workers' compensation statute when legislature changed conjunctive to disjunctive in 
same phrase). Though logic and precedent may agree that the amendment did effect a change in 
meaning, Plaintiff offers no explanation of what that change is or how it might affect the legal 
precedents as they apply to the facts now before the court. 
This court can find no reason to believe the amendment undermines the precedential value of Soldier 
Creek or Hope as applied to the current facts. Despite the disjunctive language in effect at the time, 
the Court of Appeals of Utah specifically used the conjunctive in Hope. See Hope, 756 P.2d at 103. 
When the Utah courts have previously mentioned this issue, their pronouncements give no indication 
that a result different than that in Hope should be reached here. In M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132,134 (1948), the Utah court, quoting a previously accepted authority, 
stated, "the words 'arising out of are construed to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and the 
words, 'in the course of to refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which it occurred." Id. 
This court believes that the Utah Supreme Court would determine that the current facts satisfy both 
requirements. The Plaintiff suffered injuries while returning to her place of work for the purpose of 
working. When she was injured, she was about to enter her employer's building where she worked 
and was on a sidewalk adjacent to the building and owned by her employer. In other words, her walk 
to work was the "origin" of her injury and the injury occurred under time, place, and circumstances 
closely allied with her workplace. See generally Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 72 L. Ed. 
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507, 48 S. Ct. 221 (1928) (employment includes reasonable margin of time and space necessary for 
passing to and from work); Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 64, 133 
P.2d 314 (1943) (public walkway slick with snow and ice that is only practical means of entrance is 
hazard peculiar to employment and within workers' compensation coverage). For these reasons, this 
court finds that the Hope decision is applicable and directs this court to reject Plaintiffs argument that 
her injuries were not within the workers' compensation scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
The court rejects Plaintiffs claim that Defendant has failed to "secure" payment of workers' 
compensation benefits as required by the Utah Code and thereby invalidated the exclusive remedy 
clause. The court further finds no merit in Plaintiffs assertion that her injuries are not the type of injury 
intended to be covered by workers' compensation. Plaintiffs claims, therefore, are barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
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Thomas A. Paulsen Company, Petitioner, v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, and Default 
Indemnity Fund of the Utah Industrial Commission, Respondents 
Supreme Court of Utah 
770 P,2d 125:101 Utah Adv. Rep. 43;1989 Utah LEXIS 14 
No. 21049 
February 9,1989, Filed 
Editorial Information: Prior History 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 1} Original Proceeding in this Court 
Counsel Brad L. Englund, Earl D. Tanner, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
Steven M. Hadley, Susan Pixton, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Judges: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice, Christine M. Durham, 
Justice 
Opinion 
Opinion by: ZIMMERMAN 
Thomas A. Paulsen, dba Thomas A. Paulsen Company ("Paulsen"), petitions for review of an order of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah ("the Commission") finding Paulsen liable for workers' 
compensation benefits paid to an injured employee by the Commission's Default Indemnity Fund ("the 
Fund") and ordering Paulsen to satisfy that liability by making payment to the Fund. 1 Paulsen 
challenges the order on a number of substantive and procedural grounds. We affirm that portion of 
the Commission's decision holding Paulsen liable for the employee's benefits but reverse that portion 
directing Paulsen to make payment directly to the Fund. The Fund will have to seek satisfaction of 
Paulsen's obligation through proceedings in the district court. 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 2} Paulsen's employee suffered an injury to his spine during the construction of a 
building in April of 1984. The employee sought workers' compensation benefits through the 
Commission. In October of 1984, a hearing was held on the employee's claim before an 
administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Both Paulsen and the employee appeared and testified. In January of 
1985, the ALJ entered an order, accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law ("the original 
order"), which directed the payment of benefits to the employee. 
Although the precise scope of the original order is in dispute, it is clear the ALJ found that the 
employee was injured in an industrial accident while employed by Paulsen, that Paulsen did not carry 
insurance coverage for workers' compensation benefits due its employees, that Paulsen was for all 
practical purposes insolvent and unable to pay the benefits to which the injured employee was 
entitled, and that the Fund was, by statute, required to step in and compensate the employee. 2 Based 
on these findings, the ALJ ordered the Fund to pay the employee's medical expenses and his 
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, all totalling approximately $ {1989 Utah 
LEXIS 3} 21,000. None of the parties sought review of the original order, and after fifteen days from 
the date of entry, the order became final and was not subject to review by the Commission or the 
courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.54, -82.55 (Supp. 1983). 
In the original order, the ALJ did not expressly order Paulsen to pay any of the amount awarded the 
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employee. Approximately eight months after the original order became final, the Fund asked the ALJ 
to enter an amended order expressly stating that Paulsen was liable for all amounts the Fund had paid 
the employee and that Paulsen was to pay directly to the Fund all such amounts. The ALJ entered the 
requested {770 P.2d 127} order ("the amended{1989 Utah LEXIS 4} order") in October of 1985. 
Paulsen unsuccessfully sought review by the Commission and then filed a petition with this Court. 
The questions presented can be grouped as two broad legal challenges to the amended order. First, 
did the ALJ err when he amended the original order to include an express finding that Paulsen was 
liable to the Fund for the amounts paid the injured employee? Second, did the ALJ err when he 
ordered Paulsen to pay the amounts due directly to the Fund? 
The first issue-the propriety of amending the order to expressly find Paulsen liable to the 
Fund-subsumes two subsidiary questions: First, as a matter of substantive law, could Paulsen be 
held liable for the compensation? Second, were the proper procedures followed in entering the 
amended order finding Paulsen liable? 
There can be no doubt that Paulsen could be held liable for the compensation paid. If an employee is 
injured in an accident during the course of employment and the employer is properly insured, the 
employee's sole means of obtaining redress is through the workers' compensation system. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988). However, when an employer is not insured as required by statute, see 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 5} Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46 (Supp. 1983), the employee has the option of 
seeking damages from the employer in a civil action brought in the courts or of obtaining a workers' 
compensation award from the Commission. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-57, -58, -59 (1988). If the 
employee elects to proceed through the workers' compensation system and obtains an award, the 
employer is liable for the amount of that award. See American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 
483, 484-89, 187 P. 633, 633-35 (1920); Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-58 (1988); id. §§ 35-1-45, -81 
(Interim Supp. 1984). 3 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 6} A number of Utah employers are unable to pay compensation awards entered 
against them because they are uninsured or underinsured and are lacking in other financial resources. 
As a result, a number of employees' awards have proven to be uncollectable. In 1984, the legislature 
acted to remedy this problem by passing the Workers' Compensation Default Indemnity Fund Act. 
See 1984 Utah Laws ch. 77, § 1. The purpose of the legislation was to assure that employees' awards 
would be paid by the Fund if the employer or the insurer was unable to do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-107(1) (Interim Supp. 1984). The Fund was given by subrogation the right to proceed against the 
employer for all amounts paid to the employee. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107(3) (Interim Supp. 1984); 
see generally 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 67.40 (1988). Here, the ALJ 
found Paulsen was uninsured. 4 The employee had claimed workers' compensation benefits {770 
P.2d 128} and received an award. Under the relevant law, Paulsen became primarily responsible for 
the amount of that award either to the employee, as an initial matter, or to the Fund, to the extent it 
paid the employee in the employer's stead. 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 7} Having concluded that the ALJ could have stated in the original order that 
Paulsen was liable to the Fund for all amounts it paid the employee, the next question is whether 
proper procedures were followed in entering the amended order containing that pronouncement. The 
gist of Paulsen's argument is that even if an express statement of liability to the Fund could have been 
placed in the original order, it was not. And when no party sought review of that order, it became final 
and the issue was foreclosed from further consideration. He argues that when that issue was 
addressed in the amended order some eight months later, it was already beyond the ALJ's reach. The 
Fund counters that the original order did include an imperfectly expressed determination of Paulsen's 
liability; however, because of a clerical error, that determination was not made sufficiently clear so that 
the Fund could be sure that the original order would be enforceable against Paulsen. The Fund 
contends that it was entirely proper for the ALJ to correct the clerical error by way of an amended 
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order. 
The original order could, in truth, have been written more clearly; 5 however, we think that it did 
effectively settle{1989 Utah LEXIS 8} the issue of Paulsen's liability. Our conclusion is based on a 
reading of the specific language of the order in light of the legal principles that govern the workers' 
compensation program. The original order, after specifying the medical expenses the employee had 
incurred, states, "These expenses are the responsibility of the employer." {770 P.2d 129} Also, after 
describing the compensation awarded the employee and noting that Paulsen was insolvent and 
lacked insurance, the order states, "[T]he employer was in no position to pay the medical bills or the 
compensation benefits due in this matter." Finally, the order directed the Fund to pay the employee 
the amount of the award, something the Fund is obliged to do only if the employer is first found 
responsible and unable to pay. See Cahucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335,1337 (Utah 
1986); Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107(1) (Interim Supp. 1984). These statements, read in light of the 
underlying law, are sufficient to show that the ALJ did determine that Paulsen was liable and did make 
that determination sufficiently clear to provide the parties with notice. 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 9} Having concluded that the original order determined and adequately described 
Paulsen's liability, the question is whether the ALJ erred in entering the amended clarifying order. A 
brief explanation of why the clarification was sought should be helpful. Once the Commission enters 
an order finding an employer liable for benefits and the Fund pays those benefits to the employee, the 
Fund has a right by subrogation to proceed against the employer for reimbursement. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-107(3) (Interim Supp. 1984). The Fund's usual method of exercising this right is to follow the 
procedure set forth in section 35-1-59. Under that provision, the Fund may file with the district court an 
abstract of the Commission order finding the employer liable; once filed, that order is treated as a 
judgment. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-59 (1988) 6 In the present case, the Fund reasoned that 
absent a clarification, it might encounter some difficulty in docketing the original order as a judgment 
against Paulsen because the order did not make it entirely clear that Paulsen was liable. As a 
precaution, it sought the amended order. 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 10} In attacking the amended order, Paulsen argues that the Commission lacks 
the power to make modifications in outstanding final orders, especially substantive changes such as 
those made in the order at issue. The Fund responds that the Commission has the power to correct 
clerical errors and that the modification made was clerical, not substantive. We find the Fund's 
argument persuasive. 
The initial question is whether the Commission has authority to correct clerical errors in orders. None 
of our prior cases have addressed this question, and the relevant statutes do not expressly grant the 
Commission this power, much less spell out the procedures to be followed. However, we find support 
for such authority in section 35-1-78 of the Code. 
Section 35-1-78, as it was worded at the time in question, provides: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may from 
time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with respect 
thereto, as in its opinion may be justified.Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (Supp. 1983). We have held that 
this section gives the Commission broad authority to make substantive {770 P.2d 130} changes 
in{1989 Utah LEXIS 11} its orders when substantial changes in the circumstances have occurred. 
See, e.g., Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 380, 382, 135 P.2d 266, 270, 272 
(1943); id. 103 Utah at 389,135 P.2d at 275 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring). We see no reason that section 
35-1-78 should not also be construed to permit mere clerical changes in the Commission's orders. 
The overall philosophy governing the interpretation of Utah's workers' compensation statutes is one of 
liberal construction. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Industrial Comm'n, 725 P.2d at 1338. And the legislature 
has directed that workers' compensation proceedings are not to be burdened with technicalities but 
are to be conducted so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties within the spirit of the workers' 
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compensation statutes. Gardner v. Edward Gardner Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 693 P.2d 678, 681 
(Utah 1984); see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1988). On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that 
the authority of the Commission to correct clerical errors under section 35-1-78 is comparable to that 
provided to trial courts by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), which provides in relevant 
part:Clerical{1989 Utah LEXIS 12} mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a); cf. Callihan v. Department of Labor 
and Indus., 10 Wash. App. 153,156-58, 516 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1973 (discussing similar 
error-correction authority in that state's workers' compensation system). Cases interpreting rule 60(a) 
may be referred to in elaborating on the Commission's authority. 
The next question is whether the amendment obtained by the Fund was one correcting a clerical 
error. We think it was. Again, useful analogy may be made to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), 
which addresses the power of trial courts to correct clerical errors. Under that rule, we have drawn a 
distinction between "clerical errors," which a court may correct, and "judicial errors," which it may not. 
A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does 
not conform to the actual intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in 
rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect{1989 Utah LEXIS 13} judgment. See 
Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984); Stangerv. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1206 (Utah 1983); see also State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) (addressing 
substantially similar Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b)). As explained above, the original order did reflect a 
determination that Paulsen was liable. We are persuaded that the ALJ's failure to state this in clearer 
terms was merely a matter of inadvertence, i.e., a clerical error, and was properly correctable by way 
of an amended order. 7 
{1989 Utah LEXIS 14} Having found that the amended order expressly stating that Paulsen is liable 
was properly entered, we must consider Paulsen's final claim, that the Commission erred when it 
included in the amended order a provision expressly directing Paulsen to reimburse the Fund. 
Paulsen argues that the Commission has no authority to order an employer to pay such 
reimbursement directly to the Fund; rather, the Fund's only remedy is through the docketing procedure 
specified in section 35-1-59. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-59 (1988). 
{770 P.2d 131} The Fund counters that the Commission has such power and relies on section 
35-1-107(3). That section provides that to the extent the Fund has paid benefits on behalf of an 
employer, "by subrogation, [it] has all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employee . . . against the 
employer." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107(3) (Interim Supp. 1984). The Fund argues that this provision 
should be interpreted as authorizing the Commission to enter an order for direct reimbursement 
because the employee, in whose stead it stands, has the right to have the Commission order the 
employer to pay benefits directly to the employee. 
Although as a matter of policy we find the Fund's argument{1989 Utah LEXIS 15} appealing, the 
statutes are not susceptible of the interpretation for which the Fund argues. Rather, we conclude that 
the Fund's sole statutory remedy is to proceed under section 35-1-59 and docket in the district court 
an abstract of the order determining liability. 
We have considered the remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Paulsen's motion to 
vacate the amended order in its entirety is denied, and the order is affirmed with respect to that portion 
which clarifies that Paulsen is liable to the employee, that Paulsen has not paid the employee, that the 
Fund has paid in Paulsen's stead, and that the Fund is therefore subrogated to the employee's rights 
against Paulsen. The portion of the order which purports to order Paulsen to pay reimbursement 
directly to the Fund is vacated. The Fund may now proceed against Paulsen as provided in section 
35-1-59. 
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Dissent 
Dissent by: STEWART 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
In my view, the Commission has no authority to hold an uninsured employer liable to the Default 
Indemnity Fund. That liability can only be established in a district court. The Commission's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law establish that "the employer was in no position{1989 Utah LEXIS 16} to 
pay the medical bills or the compensation benefits due" the injured worker and that those expenses 
were the obligation of the employer. The Commission also established that the Default Indemnity 
Fund was liable to pay to the injured employee the amount of the award. All that is simply a predicate 
for establishing the Default Indemnity Fund's liability, which the Commission is clearly authorized by 
statute to do. But the Commission has no power to award the Fund subrogation rights against the 
uninsured employer or to hold the employer liable to the Fund. Even if that were the Commission's 
intent, it has no statutory authority whatsoever to do that. The Fund's right of subrogation against the 
employer ought to be established in a court of law, not by the Commission, and especially not by the 
so-called correction of a "clerical error." 
Footnotes 
1 
In 1986, the Fund was redesignated the "Uninsured Employers' Fund." See Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-107 amendment notes (1988); compare id. § 35-1-107 (Interim Supp. 1984) with id. § 35-1-107 
(1988). We confine our analysis to the law in effect at the time of the injury and proceedings below, 
April of 1984 through October of 1985, and therefore refer to the Fund by the name it carried at that 
time, the Default Indemnity Fund. Further, unless otherwise indicated, all code references are to 
sections in effect during that time period. 
2 
As stated in the version of section 35-1-107 in effect at the time in question, the Fund was created 
for the purpose of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to, workers' compensation benefits when 
an employer becomes insolvent... or otherwise does not have sufficient funds . . . to cover workers' 
compensation liabilities.... If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund will be liable for all 
obligations of the employer as set forth.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107(1) (Interim Supp. 1984). 
3 
As in effect at the time, these sections provided in relevant part: 
Every employee . . . who is injured, and the dependents of every such employee who is killed, by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposefully self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account 
of injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital service and medicines, and, in 
case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for 
compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (Interim Supp. 1984) (emphasis added). 
In addition to the compensation provided for in this chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall 
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pay such reasonable sum for medical [and related expenses] as the Industrial Commission considers 
just. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-81 (Interim Supp. 1984) (emphasis added). 
Any employee, whose employer has failed to comply with the [insurance requirements]... may, in lieu 
of proceeding against his employer by civil action in the courts . . . , file his application with the 
commission for compensation in accordance with the terms of this title, and the commission shall hear 
and determine such application for compensation as in other cases; and the amount of compensation 
which the commission may ascertain and determine to be due to such injured employee . . . shall be 
paid by such employer to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after receiving notice of the 
amount thereof as so fixed and determined by the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-58 (1988) (emphasis added). 
4 
The ALJ did not that Paulsen had made a good faith effort to obtain insurance, but an insurance 
agent had absconded with Paulsen's premium and had not arranged for an insurance policy. For our 
purposes, Paulsen's good faith effort is irrelevant: section 35-1-46 imposes an unconditional obligation 
on employers to be properly insured, and Paulsen was, in fact, uninsured. See 2A A. Larson, The Law 
of Workmen's Compensation § 67.22 (1988). 
5 
The original order, in relevant part, provided as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein sustained an industrial injury on April 1,1984 while employed by the defendant, 
Thomas Paulsen, general contractor. 
The case was referred to a medical panel for a determination of the permanent partial impairment. 
The medical panel found that the applicant has sustained a 15% permanent partial impairment of the 
whole body due to the industrial injury of April 1,1984. The Administrative Law Judge adopts the 
findings of the medical panel as his own. 
As a result of this injury, the applicant has sustained . . . medical expenses . . . [totalling] $ 6,804.49. 
These expenses are the responsibility of the employer, since the employer was uninsured for workers' 
compensation purposes at the time of the industrial injury. However, some mention should be made of 
the situation surrounding the defendant's] being uninsured. The file contains information indicating 
that the employer, in good faith made efforts to obtain workers' compensation coverage.... When the 
applicant tried to make a claim . . . he was advised that no policy for insurance had been issued. 
Rather, it appeared that the insurance agent... absconded with the employer's funds and did not 
purchase the coverage Upon taking testimony from the employer, it was determined by the 
Administrative Law Judge that the employer was in no position to pay the medical bills or the 
compensation benefits due in this matter, for the reason that for all practical purposes the employer is 
insolvent. Accordingly, the Administrative L$w Judge finds that the provisions of Section 35-1-107, 
regarding the Default Indemnity Fund have been triggered such that [the employee] is entitled to an 
award from the Default Indemnity Fund for the injuries he has sustained as a result of his industrial 
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injury. 
. . . [T]he applicant... [is entitled]... to temporary total disability benefits . . . and permanent partial 
impairment benefits... . CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
[The employee] is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for the industrial injury he sustained on 
April 1, 1984, which accident arose out of or during the course of his employment with the defendant, 
Thomas A. Paulsen, (uninsured). 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary vouchers 
directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to pay to [the employee] compensation . . . as 
temporary total disability...; said benefits to be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary vouchers 
directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to pay to [the employee]... compensation 
for a 15% permanent partial impairment.... 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary vouchers 
directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to pay to [the employee] the sum,.. . , which 
amount represents the medical expenses incurred by [the employee] as a result of the industrial injury 
of April 1,1984; [the employee] is to pay the medical care providers listed in the Findings of Fact of 
this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 
fifteen (15) days from the date hereof specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and 
unless so filed this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
6 
That section provides in relevant part: 
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of any county in the 
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of the district court thereof.... When so filed and 
docketed the award shall constitute a lien upon the real property of the employer Execution may 
be issued thereon . . . in the same manner and with the same effect as if said award were a judgment 
of the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-59 (1988). 
7 
A final observation must be made with respect to the power to correct clerical errors. In its reply brief, 
Paulsen has pointed out that the ALJ, at the Fund's request, amended the order without notifying 
Paulsen or providing an opportunity to respond and that Paulsen may have thus been denied 
procedural due process. We do not reach this argument regarding the procedures followed because it 
was not raised in either the motion for review before the Commission or in Paulsen's opening brief 
before this Court. See Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980); Rekward v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah App. 1988); R. Utah S. Ct. 24(c) (formerly Utah R. App. 
P. 24(c)). Further, our review of the entire record persuades us that Paulsen has, in fact, had ample 
opportunity to contest every significant issue in this case. We do observe, however, that section 
35-1-78 was recently amended and, as amended, clearly requires that notice and a hearing be 
provided when an order is amended. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) (1988). 
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APPENDIX 13 
Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, 
148 P.3d 545 (Utah 2006), 2006 Utah Lexis 207 at P 16. 
Marilyn Touchard, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. La-Z-Boy Inc., Defendant and Petitioner. 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
2006 UT 71;148 P.3d 945;565 Utah Adv. Rep. 15;2006 Utah LEXIS 207;25 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1327 
No.20050361 
November 17, 2006, Filed 
Editorial Information: Subsequent History 
Released for Publication January 5, 2007. 
Editorial Information: Prior History 
Certification from the Federal Court. On Certification from the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, the Honorable Teena Campbell. 
Counsel Erik Strindberg, Ralph E. Chamness, Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
Jathan W. Janove, Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Judges: DURHAM, Chief Justice: Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and 
Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The court addressed questions on certification from the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, regarding whether the termination of an employee in retaliation for the 
exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 
(2005; Supp. 2006), provided the basis for a wrongful termination claim.Under Utah law, an employer who 
has terminated an employee, either actually or constructively, in retaliation for the employee's exercise of 
his rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act has violated a clear and substantial public policy 
and may be sued for wrongful discharge by the discharged employee. 
OVERVIEW: The employee at issue in this case alleged that she was fired in retaliation for expressing her 
opposition to how her employer was treating employees who were entitled to claim workers' compensation 
benefits. This led to the federal district court's certification of several legal questions to the Supreme Court 
of Utah. The Utah court held that retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim violated the 
public policy of Utah because it violated the state's clear and substantial public policy as expressed by the 
Utah Workers* Compensation Act. Thus, an employee who was fired or constructively discharged in 
retaliation for claiming workers' compensation benefits would have a wrongful discharge cause of action 
under the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. However, because the court did not 
believe that the same policy was implicated to the same degree in certain other situations, the court 
declined to extend this cause of action to an employee who had suffered only harassment or 
discrimination, or to an employee who had been retaliated against for opposing an employer's treatment of 
employees who were entitled to claim workers' compensation benefits. 
OUTCOME: The court responded to the questions certified by the federal district court. 
LexisNexis Headnotes 
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Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Jurisdiction > Certified Questions 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Jurisdiction > Certified Questions 
When a federal court certifies a question of law to a state court, the state court is not presented with a 
decision to affirm or reverse. Consequently, traditional standards of review do not apply. Moreover, on 
certification, the court answers the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying dispute. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
General Overview 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
General Overview 
Under Utah law, all employment relationships entered into for an indefinite period of time are presumed to 
be at-will. When employment is at-will, either the employer or the employee may terminate the 
employment for any reason (or no reason) except where prohibited by law. Accordingly, an employer's 
decision to terminate an employee is presumed to be valid. A discharged employee can overcome this 
presumption in three narrow situations by showing that (1) there is an implied or express agreement that 
the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of some agreed-upon condition; (2) 
a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under certain conditions; 
or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
All employers have a duty not to terminate any employee, whether the employee is at-will or protected by 
an express or implied employment contract, in violation of clear and substantial public policy. If an 
employer breaches that duty, an employee has a tort cause of action against the employer for wrongful 
discharge. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
A discharged employee has a cause of action under the public policy exception if his or her termination 
violated a clear and substantial public policy. Categories that invoke a clear and substantial public policy 
include: (1) discharging an employee for refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act; (2) discharging an 
employee for performing a public obligation; (3) discharging an employee for exercising a legal right or 
privilege; and (4) discharging an employee for reporting an employer's criminal activities to the appropriate 
authorities. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
Under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 (2005; Supp. 
2006), an employee who is injured by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment is entitled to compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
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34A-2-401(1); 34A-2-105(1) (2005). By its terms, the Act establishes that an employee injured in the 
course of employment has a right to receive workers' compensation benefits. Thus, if an employee's 
attempts to claim workers' compensation fall within one of the recognized categories of public policy, it 
must be because it is the exercise of a legal right or privilege. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
The fact that an employee can point to a legal right or privilege does not automatically mean that the 
employee has established a clear and substantial public policy for purposes of the exception to the at-will 
rule. The exercise of a legal right or privilege category poses analytical challenges different from, and 
generally greater than, the other categories of the public policy exception. With regard to the other 
categories, an employer owes a duty to an employee not to exploit the employment relationship by 
demanding that an employee choose between continued employment and violating a law or failing to 
perform a public obligation of clear and substantial import. This is because an employer's use of 
termination to coerce an employee to commit unlawful acts or avoid public obligations serves no legitimate 
economic objective and corrodes civil society. In contrast, an employer's attempts to dissuade or prevent 
an employee from exercising a legal right may not always lack a legitimate objective. Rather, when the 
exercise of a legal right category is implicated, both the employer and the employee may be able to invoke 
public policy in aid of their cause. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
The analysis of whether the public policy exception applies to a particular legal right or privilege will 
frequently require a balancing of competing legitimate interests: the interests of the employer to regulate 
the workplace environment to promote productivity, security, and similar lawful business objectives, and 
the interests of the employees to maximize access to their statutory and constitutional rights within the 
workplace. 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
The Utah Supreme Court makes determinations of clear and substantial public policy under the at-will rule 
on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, it has stated that determining what employee conduct implicates or 
furthers a clear and substantial public policy is a still-developing inquiry. Although the court has 
established certain conduct that will almost always implicate a clear and substantial public policy, there are 
other situations that the court will have to address as they come before it. When making determinations of 
public policy for purposes of the exception to the at-will rule, the court will construe public policies 
narrowly, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental that there can be 
virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public good. This is much narrower than 
what may typically be characterized as public policy. 
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Public Policy 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
The Utah Supreme Court concludes that the exercise of workers' compensation rights furthers a clear 
public policy. A public policy is clear only if plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional 
standards, or judicial decisions. By adopting the Workers' Compensation Act and imposing penalties on 
an employer for noncompliance, the legislature plainly established the public policy that an employee 
injured in the scope of employment has the right to receive compensation. 
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Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Exceptions > 
Public Policy 
To determine whether a public policy is substantial, the court conducts a two-step inquiry. First, it asks 
whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public as opposed to the parties 
only. A policy that affects a duty that inures solely to the benefit of the employer and employee is generally 
insufficient to give rise to a substantial and important public policy. Second, it asks whether the public 
interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that it should place the policy beyond the reach of 
contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of 
equal bargaining power. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
The Utah Supreme Court concludes that workers' compensation is a policy of overarching importance to 
the public, as opposed to the parties only. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
Workers' compensation not only is a question of importance to the public, but also furthers a public 
interest that is so strong that the policy should be placed beyond the reach of contract. By statute, an 
employer cannot relieve itself of its obligation to provide workers' compensation by asking employees to 
contract away their rights. The legislature itself has placed workers' compensation beyond the reach of 
contract. It follows that an employer should not be able to free itself of its workers' compensation 
obligations by discharging employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Accordingly, the Utah 
Supreme Court holds that workers' compensation constitutes public policy that is both clear and 
substantial. 
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In order to give effect to the legislature's pronouncement that workers' compensation is in the public's 
interest, an employer's right to workplace autonomy must yield. Accordingly, an employer owes its 
employees a duty not to exploit the employment relationship by forcing employees to choose between 
their jobs and compensation under the worker's compensation law. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
The Utah Supreme Court holds that an employee's exercise of workers' compensation rights constitutes 
the exercise of a legal right that embodies a clear and substantial public policy. An employer who 
terminates an employee in retaliation for the employee's exercise of that right has violated a clear and 
substantial public policy and may be sued for wrongful discharge by the discharged employee. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > Remedies Under Other Laws > Exclusivity > General Overview 
The exclusivity provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105, does not 
bar an employee's wrongful discharge cause of action. It is well settled that the Act covers only mental and 
physical injuries sustained on the job. Accordingly, the exclusivity provision only bars common-law tort 
actions requiring proof of physical or mental injury. That would not include wrongful termination actions. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
A resignation underworking conditions that a reasonable employee would consider intolerable is 
equivalent to a termination. Thus, an employee's cause of action for wrongful discharge as a result of the 
exercise of workers' compensation rights extends to constructive discharge. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
To make out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, an employee must show (I) that his employer 
terminated him; (ii) that a clear and substantial public policy existed; (iii) that the employee's conduct 
brought the policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are 
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causally connected. When an employee alleges only retaliatory harassment or discrimination, that 
employee has failed to satisfy the first element and the wrongful discharge tort does not apply. The Utah 
Supreme Court therefore declines to extend the public policy exception to the at-will rule to encompass 
retaliatory discrimination. That is, employees who have suffered retaliatory discrimination as a result of 
claiming workers' compensation benefits do not have a cause of action against their employers. 
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Internal reporting can give rise to a wrongful discharge cause of action where it furthers a clear and 
substantial public policy. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
The Utah Supreme Court narrowly construes the public policies' which might be used to support a public 
policy claim. Although it relied on the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 
(2005; Supp. 2006), to conclude that an employee who is terminated for exercising his or her workers' 
compensation rights has a wrongful discharge cause of action, it does not follow that all employee 
complaints relating to workers' compensation also further the same clear and substantial public policy. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
Reporting employee harassment in retaliation for the employees' exercise of workers' compensation rights 
does not further a clear and substantial public policy. That is, an employee does not have a wrongful 
discharge cause of action for complaining about an employer's treatment of injured employees. 
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Workers' Compensation & SSDI > General Overview 
Retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation violates Utah's clear and substantial public policy as 
pronounced by the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 (2005; Supp. 
2006). Thus, an employee who has been terminated or constructively discharged from his or her job in 
retaliation for the exercise of workers' compensation rights has a wrongful discharge cause of action 
against his or her employer under the public policy exception to the at-will rule. However, the same policy 
is not implicated when an employee suffers retaliatory harassment or discrimination, or when an employer 
discharges an employee who opposes the employer's treatment of employees who are entitled to benefits. 
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Opinion 
Opinion by: DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
Opinion 
{148 P.3d 947} DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
P1 We accepted the following question on certification from the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah: "Whether the termination of an employee in retaliation for the exercise of rights under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. . . implicates a 'clear and substantial public policy' of the State 
of Utah that would provide a basis for a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy." If we 
conclude that it does, the federal court then asks whether the cause of action applies (1) when "the 
employee is not fired but resigns under circumstances that constitute a 'constructive discharge'"; (2) 
when "the employee who has filed for benefits under the [Workers' Compensation Act] is neither fired 
nor constructively discharged, but experiences other discriminatory treatment or harassment from an 
employer"; or {148 P»3d 948} (3) when "the employee has not filed for benefits under the [Workers' 
Compensation Act] but is retaliated against for opposing an employer's treatment of other injured 
employees who are entitled to file for benefits under the [Act]." We hold that retaliatory discharge for 
filing a workers' compensation claim violates the public policy of this state; thus, an employee who has 
been fired or constructively discharged in retaliation for claiming workers' compensation benefits has a 
wrongful discharge cause of action. We decline to extend this cause of action, however, to an 
employee who has suffered only harassment or discrimination or to an employee who has been 
retaliated against for opposing an employer's treatment of employees who are entitled to claim 
workers' compensation benefits. 
P2 When a federal court certifies a question of law to this court, we "are not presented with a 
decision to affirm or reverse. " Robert J. Debry & Assocs. v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 2006 UT 41, P11, 144 
P.3d 1079. Consequently, "traditional standards of review do not apply." Id. Moreover, "[o]n 
certification, we 'answer the legal questions presented' without 'resolving the underlying dispute.'" In re 
Kunz, 2004 UT 71, P6, 99 P.3d 793 (quoting Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc, 2000 UT 
87, P1 n.2, 16 P.3d 533). We therefore proceed directly to our analysis of Utah law. 
P3 Under Utah law, all employment relationships "entered into for an indefinite period of time" are 
presumed to be at-will. Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, P7, 96 P.3d 950. When employment 
is at-will, either "the employer or the employee may terminate the employment for any reason (or no 
reason) except where prohibited by law." Id. Accordingly, an employer's decision to terminate an 
employee is presumed to be valid. Id. A discharged employee can overcome this presumption in three 
narrow situations by showing that 
"(1) there is an implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for 
cause or upon satisfaction of [some] agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts 
the right of an employer to terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the termination 
of employment constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy.'7d. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Fox v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997)). 
P4 The federal court's questions invoke the public policy exception to the at-will rule. We have 
stated that "all employers have a duty not to terminate any employee, 'whether the employee is at-will 
or protected by an express or implied employment contract,' in violation of clear and substantial public 
policy." Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998) (quoting Retherford v. AT&T 
Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 960 (Utah 1992)). "If an employer breaches 
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that duty, an employee has a tort cause of action against the employer" for wrongful discharge. Id. 
P5 We thus begin our analysis by answering the federal court's first question: whether the 
termination of an employee for "the exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation A c t . . . 
implicates a 'clear and substantial public policy'" that gives rise to a wrongful termination claim. 
P6 A discharged employee has a cause of action under the public policy exception if his or her 
termination violated a "clear and substantial" public policy. Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, 
P7, 96 P.3d 950. We have previously identified four categories that invoke a "clear and substantial 
public policy": (1) discharging an employee for "refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act"; (2) 
discharging an employee for "performing a public obligation"; (3) discharging an employee for 
"exercising a legal right or privilege"; and (4) discharging an employee for reporting an employer's 
criminal activities to {148 P.3d 949} the appropriate authorities. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 
P.2d 395, 408 (Utah 1998). 
P7 We have not yet had the opportunity to consider whether retaliatory discharge for claiming 
workers' compensation benefits falls under one of the public policy categories. We did mention 
workers' compensation claims as an example of the third category in Ryan, 972 P.2d at 408, but the 
issue was not before us in that case, nor had it been decided in any prior case. Thus, Ryan did not 
conclusively establish that claiming workers' compensation benefits constituted the exercise of a legal 
right or privilege for purposes of the public policy exception to the at-will rule. We now conduct that 
analysis. 
P8 Under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to -905 
(2005 & Supp. 2006), "[a]n employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment" is entitled to compensation pursuant to the provisions of the 
Act. Id. § 34A-2-401(1) (2005); see also id. § 34A-2-105(1) (2005) By its terms, the Act establishes 
that an employee injured in the course of employment has a right to receive workers' compensation 
benefits. Thus, if an employee's attempts to claim workers' compensation fall within one of the 
recognized categories of public policy, it must be because it is "the exercise of a legal right or 
privilege." 
P9 Nevertheless, the fact that an employee can point to a legal right or privilege does not 
automatically mean that the employee has established a clear and substantial public policy for 
purposes of the exception to the at-will rule. We have recognized that the "exercise of a legal right or 
privilege" category "poses analytical challenges different from, and generally greater than, [the other 
categories of the public policy exception]." Hansen, 2004 UT 62, P10, 96 P.3d 950. With regard to the 
other categories, we have explained that "[a]n employer owes a duty to an employee . . . not to exploit 
the employment relationship by demanding that an employee choose between continued employment 
and violating a law or failing to perform a public obligation of clear and substantial import." Id. This is 
because an employer's use of termination to "coerce an employee to commit unlawful acts or avoid 
public obligations serves no legitimate economic objective and corrodes civil society." Id. In contrast, 
an employer's attempts to dissuade or prevent an employee from exercising a legal right may not 
always lack a legitimate objective. Rather, when the "exercise of a legal right" category is implicated, 
both the employer and the employee may be able to invoke public policy "in aid of their cause." Id. 
P11. This was the case in Hansen, where the employer terminated three employees for possessing 
firearms on business premises in violation of company policy. Id. PP1-5. The employees argued that 
their termination contravened public policy because they had a constitutional "right to keep and bear 
arms," id. PP13-14, while the employer invoked its right to maintain a safe workplace, see id. P14 & 
n.6. Recognizing that both the employer and the employee could support their positions with public 
policy, this court stated: 
The analysis of whether the public policy exception applies to a particular legal right or privilege 
will frequently require a balancing of competing legitimate interests: the interests of the employer 
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to regulate the workplace environment to promote productivity, security, and similar lawful 
business objectives, and the interests of the employees to maximize access to their statutory and 
constitutional rights within the workplace.Id. P11. 
P10 Thus, under Hansen, we must determine whether an employee's exercise of his or her 
workers' compensation rights invokes a clear and substantial public policy that outweighs the 
employer's interests in "regulat[ing] the workplace environment to promote productivity, security, and 
similar lawful business objectives." Id.A. Workers' Compensation Is a Clear and Substantial Public 
Policy 
P11 In order to conduct the balancing required by Hansen, we first determine whether the exercise 
of workers' compensation rights amounts to a public policy that is {148 P.3d 950} both clear and 
substantial. We make determinations of "clear and substantial" public policy under the at-will rule on a 
case-by-case basis. Indeed, we have stated that 
determining what employee conduct implicates or furthers a clear and substantial public policy is a 
still-developing inquiry. Although we have established certain conduct that will almost always 
implicate a clear and substantial public policy . . . there are other situations that we will have to 
address as they come before us.Ryan, 972 P.2d at 408. When making determinations of public 
policy for purposes of the exception to the at-will rule, we "will construe public policies narrowly[,]. 
. . applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental that there can be 
virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public good." Berube v. Fashion 
Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). This is much narrower "than what may typically be 
characterized as 'public policy.'" Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405 (defining public policy as '"community 
common sense and common conscience' and 'general and well-settled public opinion relating to 
[people's] plain, palpable duty to [others].'" (alterations in original) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 
1231 (6th ed. 1990))). 
P12 We begin our discussion of the status of workers' compensation under the public policy 
exception by addressing whether the exercise of workers' compensation rights furthers a clear public 
policy. We conclude that it does. "A public policy is 'clear' only if plainly defined by legislative 
enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions." Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. In this case, the 
Utah Legislature has declared that "[a]n employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and 
in the course of the employee's employment" is entitled to compensation pursuant to the provisions of 
the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1); see also id. § 34A-2-105(1). An employee's right to 
compensation for injuries sustained in the course of employment arises "irrespective of negligence on 
the part of employers or employees." Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996). In 
accordance with the Act's requirement that an employee injured in the course of employment has the 
right to compensation, the Act requires an employer to "secure the payment of workers' compensation 
benefits for its employees," Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (2005), and imposes criminal penalties on 
employers who fail to comply, id. § 34A-2-209 (2005). We think that by adopting the Act and imposing 
penalties on an employer for noncompliance, the legislature plainly established the public policy that 
an employee injured in the scope of employment has the right to receive compensation. 
P13 However, it is not enough that a public policy be clear; it must also be substantial. To 
determine whether a public policy is substantial, we conduct a two-step inquiry. First, we ask "whether 
the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public as opposed to the parties only." 
Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 966 (Utah 1992). A policy 
that affects a duty that inures solely to the benefit of the employer and employee is generally 
insufficient to give rise to a substantial and important public policy. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. Second, we 
ask "whether the public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should place 
the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot 
modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining power." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966. 
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P14 We conclude that workers' compensation is a policy of "overarching importance to the public, 
as opposed to the parties only." Id. at 966. This court has previously discussed the policy underlying 
workers' compensation. "The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide economic 
protection for employees who sustain injuries arising out of their employment, therefore alleviating 
hardship upon workers and their families." Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have stated that we will liberally construe the Act in 
favor of employee compensation. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1998). 
While workers' compensation provides economic support for injured workers and {148 P.3d 951} their 
families, it was not enacted solely for their benefit. Rather, workers' compensation was designed to 
"provide speedy compensation" to injured workers, Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 773, thereby "relieving] 
society of the care and support of the unfortunate victims of industrial accidents." Reteuna v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 55 Utah 258, 185 P. 535, 537 (Utah 1919) (emphasis added). Indeed, this court has stated, 
"The theory of workmen's compensation is based largely upon the doctrine that society itself is vitally 
concerned in the prompt payment of compensation to injured and the dependents of killed employs 
[sic]. It is a matter relating to the promotion of the general welfare"1 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
Rosen steel v. Niles Forge & Mfg. Co., 7 Neg. & Comp. Cases Ann. 798). 
P15 The text of the Act lends further support to the proposition that workers' compensation is not 
just a private benefit affecting only the interests of the employer and the employee. For example, the 
Act provides a means by which an injured employee can obtain compensation even where his or her 
employer fails to comply with the Act's requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-208(1) (2005). To this 
end, the Act creates the Uninsured Employers' Fund to "assist[] in the payments of workers' 
compensation benefits to any person entitled to the benefits, i f : . . . that person's employer... does 
not have sufficient funds . . . to cover workers' compensation liabilities." Id. § 34A-2-704(1) (2005). 
Moreover, an employer who fails to provide sufficient workers' compensation insurance "is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor." Id. § 34A-2-209(1)(a)(l). Similarly, it is a criminal misdemeanor for an 
employer to "deduct[] any portion of the [workers' compensation insurance] premium from the wages 
or salary of any employee entitled to the benefits of [the Act]." Id. § 34A-2-108(3) (2005). 
P16 Workers' compensation not only is a "question . . . of. . . importance to the public," but also 
furthers a "public interest [that] is so strong . . . that we should place the policy beyond the reach of 
contract." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966. Evidence of this lies within the text of the Act itself. Section 
34A-2-108(1) declares that "an agreement by an employee to waive the employee's rights to 
compensation . . . is not valid." 1 Similarly, that section provides that an employee's agreement "to pay 
any portion of the [insurance] premium paid by his employer is not valid." Id. § 34A-2-108(2). Thus, by 
statute, an employer cannot relieve itself of its obligation to provide workers' compensation by asking 
employees to contract away their rights. The legislature itself has placed workers' compensation 
"beyond the reach of contract." It follows that an employer should not be able to free itself of its 
workers' compensation obligations by discharging employees entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits. Accordingly, we hold that workers' compensation constitutes public policy that is both clear 
and substantial. 
P17 Having concluded that workers' compensation represents a clear and substantial public 
policy, we now must weigh that policy against La-Z-Boy's interests. In this case, La-Z-Boy has invoked 
the policy that underlies at-will employment-that employers ought to be able "to manage their 
workforces" and regulate their workplace environments "to promote productivity, security, and similar 
lawful business objectives." However, an employer's ability to regulate its workforce primarily inures to 
the benefit of the employer and the employee, not to the public in general. Moreover, while there may 
be public policies underlying an employer's general ability to manage its employees free {148 P.3d 
952} from judicial interference, we can think of no public policy that would be furthered by permitting 
employers to discharge employees who seek to exercise their workers' compensation rights. 
P18 In contrast to La-Z-Boy's stated interests, La-Z-Boy's employees raise a public policy that 
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provides a benefit outside of the private employer-employee relationship. By design, workers' 
compensation benefits the public as a whole. See supra P14. It follows, then, that limiting an 
employer's ability to interfere with workers' compensation serves the greater good. We therefore 
conclude that in order to give effect to the legislature's pronouncement that workers' compensation is 
in the public's interest, an employer's right to workplace autonomy must yield. 2 Accordingly, "an 
employer owes its employees a duty "not to exploit the employment relationship" by forcing employees 
to choose between their jobs and compensation under the Act. See Hansen, 2004 UT 62, P10, 96 
P.3d 950. 
P19 We therefore hold that an employee's exercise of workers' compensation rights constitutes 
the "exercise of a legal right" that embodies a clear and substantial public policy. An employer who 
terminates an employee in retaliation for the employee's exercise of that right has violated a clear and 
substantial public policy and may be sued for wrongful discharge by the discharged employee. 
C. The Act Does Not Preempt Our Holding that Employees Terminated for Exercising Their Workers1 
Compensation Rights 
Have a Wrongful Discharge Cause of Action 
P20 La-Z-Boy has argued that the Act prohibits this court from using workers' compensation as 
the basis of a wrongful discharge cause of action because (1) the Act does not include a retaliation 
provision, and (2) the Act provides employees with their "exclusive remedy" against their employer. 
P21 La-Z-Boy notes, correctly, that the Act does not contain a provision that forbids an employer 
to discharge an employee in retaliation for claiming workers' compensation. According to La-Z-Boy, 
this court should not allow an employee who has been the subject of a retaliatory termination to bring 
a wrongful discharge cause of action in the absence of an anti-retaliation provision. To lend support to 
its argument, La-Z-Boy points to this court's general reluctance to construe a statute to include a 
private cause of action where the statute does not specifically provide one. It is true that Utah courts 
are reluctant to imply a private statutory cause of action in the absence of express statutory language. 
Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, P40, 99 P.3d 842. In this case, however, we are not determining 
whether the Act includes a private statutory cause of action. Rather, we are applying our common law 
wrongful discharge cause of action to retaliatory termination for the exercise of rights guaranteed by 
the Act. Because wrongful discharge is a common law claim, this determination is entirely within our 
province. The lack of an anti-retaliation provision in the Act does not affect this court's ability to 
recognize this state's public policy for purposes of a wrongful discharge cause of action. 
P22 Moreover, the absence of an anti-retaliation provision does not diminish the Act's function as 
a source of clear and substantial public policy. There would be no more effective means of 
undermining the purposes behind the Act than allowing an employer to terminate an employee in 
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims. See Frampton v. Cent Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 
297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973). As the Indiana Supreme Court stated, 
{148 P.3d 953} The [Workers' Compensation Act] creates a duty in the employer to compensate 
employees for work-related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive 
such compensation. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for public policy to be 
effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without being 
subject to reprisal. If employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's 
compensation claims, a most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being 
discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right. Employees will not 
file claims for justly deserved compensation-opting, instead to continue their employment without 
incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation.Id. 
(construing a provision in the Indiana workers' compensation statute that prohibited an employer's 
use of any "device" to relieve the employer of his workers' compensation obligations). In other 
words, the recognition of a retaliatory discharge cause of action for seeking workers' 
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compensation benefits is essential to maintaining an employee's rights under the Act. 
P23 Other courts have also concluded that workers' compensation implicates a clear public policy 
for wrongful discharge purposes despite the lack of a statutory prohibition against retaliation. For 
example, in Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394, 395 (Nev. 1984), two casino workers 
brought wrongful discharge suits alleging they were terminated for filing workers' compensation 
claims. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the "failure of the legislature to enact a statute expressly 
forbidding retaliatory discharge for filing workmen's compensation claims [did] not preclude [the court] 
from providing a remedy for what [it] conclude[d] to be tortious behavior." Id. at 396. In so holding, the 
court reasoned that "Nevada's workmen's compensation laws reflect a clear public policy favoring 
economic security for employees injured while in the course of their employment." Id. Furthermore, the 
court realized that "[f]ailure to recognize the cause of action of retaliatory discharge for filing a 
workmen's compensation claim would only undermine [the Nevada Workmen's Compensation Act] 
and the strong public policy behind its enactment." Id. Other states have used similar reasoning to 
adopt a public policy exception to the at-will rule to make discharge in retaliation for filing workers' 
compensation claims an actionable tort. See Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1373 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that "since an employee is granted the specific right to apply for and 
receive compensation under the [Workers' Compensation Act], an employer's retaliation against such 
an employee for his exercise of such right violates Colorado's public policy . . . [that] provides the 
basis for a common law claim by the employee to recover damages sustained . . . as a result"); 
Kelsayv. Motorola, Inc., 1A III. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 358-61, 23 III. Dec. 559 (III. 1978) (recognizing 
that the Illinois Legislature did not intend to make injured employees choose between compensation 
and their jobs and thus holding that the plaintiff had a retaliatory discharge cause of action, despite the 
lack of a legislative anti-retaliation pronouncement at the time of discharge); Murphy v. City o1 
Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186, 192-93 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff alleged a valid cause of action for retaliatory discharge where he 
was terminated for claiming workers' compensation rights, despite the lack of a retaliation provision in 
Act, because allowing an employer "to coerce employees in the free exercise of their rights under the 
act would substantially subvert the purpose of the act"); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 
S.W.2d 730, 732-34 (Ky. 1983) (recognizing a cause of action for discharge in retaliation for filing 
workers' compensation claims even though, at the time, the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act did 
not contain a retaliation provision); Jackson v. Morris Commc'ns Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 
634, 640-41 (Neb. 2003) (recognizing that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act "was 
promulgated to serve an important public purpose" that would be undermined if employees fear 
retaliation, and thus recognizing a public policy exception to the at-will rule for retaliatory {148 P.3d 
954} discharge due to the exercise of workers' compensation rights even though the statute did not 
contain an anti-retaliation provision); Shickv. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Pa. 1998) 
(holding that the "termination of an at-will employee for filing a workers' compensation claim violates 
public policy" despite the lack of a retaliation provision in the statute). 
P24 We also hold that the exclusivity provision of the Act does not bar an employee's wrongful 
discharge cause of action. Under the Act, "[t]he right to recover compensation . . . for injuries 
sustained by an employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-105. However, "[i]t is well settled that the Act covers only mental and physical injuries sustained 
on the job." Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, P19, 16 P.3d 555. Accordingly, the 
exclusivity provision only "bars common-law tort actions requiring proof of physical or mental injury." 
Id. In this case, the employees' wrongful discharge cause of action does not arise out of work-related 
physical or mental injuries. Therefore, the exclusivity provision does not hinder an employee's 
wrongful discharge cause of action brought against an employer who has discharged an employee in 
retaliation for the employee's exercise of rights. 
P25 Having concluded that an employee who has been terminated for exercising his or her 
workers' compensation rights has a wrongful discharge cause of action under the public policy 
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exception to the at-will rule, we turn to the federal court's remaining questions of whether this cause of 
action extends to constructive discharge, to workplace discrimination or harassment, or to the 
termination of an employee who has not actually sought compensation but who has opposed his or 
her employer's treatment of injured employees. 
P26 This court has not had the opportunity to address whether an employee who has been 
constructively discharged has a wrongful discharge cause of action. However, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has addressed this question. In Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, the court of appeals 
held that "an employee who believes that he or she has been constructively discharged may bring an 
action for discrimination [based on pregnancy] because 'an involuntary or coerced resignation is 
equivalent to a discharge.'" 904 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Bulaich v. AT&T Info. 
Sys., 113 Wn.2d 254, 778 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Wash. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In so 
holding, the court of appeals defined constructive discharge as resignation under "working conditions 
that a reasonable person would view as intolerable." Id. Like the court of appeals, other jurisdictions 
have recognized that a constructive discharge is the same as an actual discharge. See, e.g., 
Breitsprecher v. Stevens Graphics, Inc., 772 So. 2d 1125, 1130 (Ala. 2000) (recognizing that an 
employee who was constructively discharged for claiming workers' compensation benefits had a 
wrongful discharge cause of action against her former employer); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 
Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988) (upholding a wrongful discharge jury instruction based on 
substantial evidence of constructive discharge); Casenas v. Fujisawa USA, Inc., 58 Cal. App. 4th 101, 
67 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 835 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[A] constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing 
rather than a resignation."); Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1372-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that an employee who claimed that he had been constructively discharged for filing a 
workers' compensation claim had stated a proper wrongful discharge claim); GTE Prods. Corp. v. 
Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 653 N.E.2d 161, 168 (Mass. 1995) (recognizing that "constructive discharge is 
legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation"). 
P27 We agree with the Utah Court of Appeals and hold that a resignation under working 
conditions that a reasonable employee would consider intolerable is equivalent to a termination. Thus, 
an employee's cause of action for wrongful discharge as a result of the exercise of workers' 
compensation rights extends to constructive discharge. Holding otherwise would make it possible for 
{148 P,3d 955} employers both to escape their obligations to provide compensation by retaliating 
against injured employees with intolerable working conditions and to avoid a wrongful discharge cause 
of action by never actually terminating the employee. Just as allowing an employer to terminate an 
injured employee seeking compensation undermines the purpose of the Act, so too does allowing an 
employer to make conditions so intolerable that an employee has no choice but to resign. Therefore, 
we believe that recognizing constructive discharge as actual termination is necessary to give effect to 
the purposes of the Act. 
P28 Having concluded that the public policy exception applies to both actual and constructive 
discharge, we now address the district court's question regarding whether the wrongful discharge 
cause of action extends to retaliatory harassment or discrimination. To answer this question, we look 
to the elements of wrongful discharge. "To make out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, an 
employee must show (I) that his employer terminated him; (ii) that a clear and substantial public policy 
existed; (iii) that the employee's conduct brought the policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and 
the conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected." Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 
P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). When an employee alleges only 
retaliatory harassment or discrimination, that employee has failed to satisfy the first element and the 
wrongful discharge tort does not apply. 
P29 Moreover, we decline the invitation to create a new cause of action for retaliatory harassment 
or discrimination. While retaliatory discrimination or harassment is deplorable, it does not implicate a 
clear and substantial public policy to the same extent as a discharge. When an employee is 
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discharged in retaliation for pursuing a workers' compensation claim, that employee is placed in the 
untenable position of choosing between receiving compensation or maintaining employment. Because 
most employees would choose to retain their jobs, this would in turn relieve employers of their 
obligations under the Act. See Frampton v. Cent Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 
(Ind. 1973) (recognizing that when employees are forced to choose between their job and 
compensation, they will generally choose their job, the end result of which relieves the employer of his 
workers' compensation obligation). We do not think this policy applies to the same extent when the 
employee suffers unpleasantness, not amounting to constructive discharge, and does not have the 
fear of losing his or her employment. 
P30 In addition, we are concerned that creating a new cause of action for harassment would 
expand the public policy exception to the at-will rule beyond its intended narrow scope and encourage 
myriad claims against employers. The concept of discharge is fairly concrete-either the employer 
actually terminated the employee or the employee resigned under circumstances so unbearable that 
no reasonable employee could tolerate them. However, discrimination and harassment have the 
potential to implicate a much broader range of behavior, including demotions, salary reductions, job 
transfers, or disciplinary actions. See Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 III. 2d 29, 645 
N.E.2d 877, 882, 206 III. Dec. 625 (III. 1994) (stating the adoption of a cause of action short of 
termination would "replace the well-developed element of discharge with a new, ill-defined, and 
potentially all-encompassing concept of retaliatory conduct or discrimination"). If employees were 
allowed to bring a cause of action for retaliatory discrimination, we fear the courts "would be called 
upon to become increasingly involved in the resolution of workplace disputes which center on 
employer conduct that heretofore has not been actionable at common law." Id. We therefore decline 
to extend the public policy exception to the at-will rule to encompass retaliatory discrimination. See 
Mintz v. BellAtl. Sys. Leasing Int'l, 183 Ariz. 550, 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to 
recognize a cause of action for "wrongful failure-to-promote" where an employee claimed she had not 
been promoted due to retaliation against her for filing a sex discrimination {148 P,3d 956} claim); 
Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d at 882 (refusing to "extrapolate . . . a cause of action predicated on 
retaliatory demotion" from a wrongful discharge tort); Below v. Skarr, 569 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 
1997) (holding that "claimed harassment of a worker, including threatened termination, does not give 
rise to a claim at common law"). 
P31 Much as we might lament the suffering of an employee who has been harassed for exercising 
his or her statutory rights, it is not our prerogative to remedy the situation in the absence of a clear and 
substantial public policy. Employees under these circumstances should look to the legislature to 
define their recourse against employers who discriminate against them in retaliation for claiming the 
compensation to which they are entitled. Indeed, many states have enacted such legislation. See, 
e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-290a (2005) (prohibiting the discharge of or discrimination against an 
employee who has exercised workers' compensation rights and granting employees a private cause of 
action against employers who violate the statute); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780 (2000) (same); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 95-241 (2005) (prohibiting retaliatory discrimination against employees who have filed workers' 
compensation claims). Until our legislature joins these states, employees who have suffered 
retaliatory discrimination as a result of claiming workers' compensation benefits do not have a cause 
of action against their employers. 
P32 The final question the federal court has asked us to address is whether an employee who 
opposes her employer's treatment of injured employees has a wrongful discharge cause of action 
under the public policy exception to the at-will rule. To fully respond to this inquiry, however, we must 
recite the relevant facts. 3 
P33 La-Z-Boy hired Marilyn Touchard to serve as an "environmental/assistant safety manager." 
Her job responsibilities included investigating the cause of La-Z-Boy's high workers' compensation 
costs. After conducting her investigation, Ms. Touchard wrote La-Z-Boy a memorandum concluding 
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that the company had a high injury rate and that employees were "waiting for extensive periods of time 
to receive treatment, diagnostic testing, and/or resolution of their claims, due to the intentional 
mismanagement of their claims." Ms. Touchard also informed La-Z-Boy that its claims adjuster was 
"hostile" toward employees who filed workers' compensation claims and "documented that [the claims 
adjuster] attempted to deny benefits to . . . an employee with a documented work-related injury and 
extensive work history with the company." 
P34 In addition to her job investigating La-Z-Boy's workers' compensation costs, Ms. Touchard 
was the head of the ergonomics team. In this capacity, Ms. Touchard conducted a study and 
submitted a memorandum concluding that the practices employed on the upholstery production line 
could cause shoulder injuries. 
P35 The allegations of the complaint are that after submitting the memorandum detailing the 
problems in La-Z-Boy's production line, Ms. Touchard met with Mr Smith, the Human Resources 
Director, and informed him of her belief that the "alternate duty assignments" given to injured 
employees were demeaning. Moreover, she informed him that employees were deciding not to report 
injuries to avoid being harassed by management. She alleges that, as a result of her complaint, Mr. 
Smith began criticizing her, recommending that she be "written up," and delaying the implementation 
of programs she had recommended. 
{148 P.3d 957} P36 Several months after meeting with Mr. Smith, Ms. Touchard met with Mr. 
Garren, La-Z-Boy's vice president. At this time, Mr. Garren "falsely accused Ms. Touchard of coaching 
employees on how they could sue La-Z-Boy and told her that she could not tell employees they had a 
legal right to contact Utah's Labor Commission (emphasis added)." A few months after this incident, 
Ms. Touchard voiced her objections to the proposed adoption of a "120-day return to work rule." She 
alleges that at this time Mr. Garren "got angry with [her] and told her she was never to discuss 
employees' rights with the employees." 
P37 The final incident alleged by Ms. Touchard is that she reported to Mr. Garren that an 
employee had been injured and that his benefits were being improperly denied. At this time, she was 
allegedly told "that she would be fired if she ever talked to any employees about their Workers' 
Compensation issues or their injuries." Several months after this final meeting, Ms. Touchard took 
maternity leave, during which she was informed she had been terminated and her position had been 
filled. Ms. Touchard's complaint alleges that La-Z-Boy terminated her "because she opposed its 
practices of abusing employees who applied for [workers' compensation benefits] and maintaining an 
unsafe workplace." The employees' brief asserts that Ms. Touchard was fired for "inform[ing] injured 
workers of their rights to workers' compensation." While the complaint does allege that Ms. Touchard 
was warned not to discuss workers' compensation claims with La-Z-Boy employees and was accused 
of "coaching employees on how they could sue La-Z-Boy," an accusation her brief claims was false, 
she has not pled that she actually discussed workers' compensation benefits with La-Z-Boy 
employees or assisted them in pursuing claims. 
P38 We hold that Ms. Touchard's opposition to her employer's workers' compensation practices 
does not implicate a clear and substantial public policy of this state. This is not the first time this court 
has addressed whether an employee terminated for reporting to her employer potential policy or 
criminal violations has a cause of action under the public policy exception to the at-will rule. In Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), we were asked whether Mr. Heslop, a senior vice 
president and manager of the bank's Salt Lake Division, had a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 
Id. at 831. Specifically, Mr. Heslop alleged that he had been terminated for reporting to a bank officer 
and the bank president that the bank had misstated its income and assets, thereby creating a 
deficiency between the bank's stated capital and its actual capital. Id. While Mr. Heslop eventually 
reported the deficiency to federal and state bank regulators, id. at 832, this court recognized that Mr. 
Heslop's reporting furthered a substantial public policy because he "pursued all internal methods for 
resolving the problem. Id. at 838. This court did not require him to go "outside the Bank to try to 
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correct the policy violation." Id. at 838. 
P39 Several years later, we returned to the reporting question in Fox v. MCI Commications Corp., 
931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). In Fox, a sales representative reported to her employer that her coworkers 
were "making existing customer accounts appear new on the corporate records so that they could 
meet sales quotas and earn higher commissions." Id. at 858-59. She was terminated shortly after 
reporting her coworkers' practices. Id. The employee claimed she had been terminated in violation of 
public policy because her internal reporting furthered the public policy found in the sections of the Utah 
Code that criminalized computer-assisted fraud, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703 (1995), and "acts of 
fraud or embezzlement," Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-403, 405 (1995), as well as a statute regulating 
corporate responsibility, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204 (1995). Fox, 931 P.2d at 859. This court 
disagreed. Id. at 861. While we recognized that the criminal code implicated a clear and substantial 
public policy, id. at 860, we held that "if an employee reports a criminal violation to an employer, rather 
than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports, that does not, in our view, contravene a 
clear and substantial public policy." Id. In so holding, we explained that "[although employees may 
have a duty to disclose information concerning the employer's business to their employer, {148 P«3d 
958} that duty ordinarily serves the private interest of the employer, not the public interest." Id. at 861. 
P40 Despite its holding, Fox did not eliminate a cause of action for internal reporting in all cases. 
We recognized as much in Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 408 n.7 (Utah 1998). 
While internal reporting was not at issue in Ryan, we discussed both Heslop and Fox in a footnote to 
illustrate that "determining what employee conduct... furthers a clear and substantial public policy is 
a still-developing inquiry." Id. at 408 & n.7. The footnote suggests that Fox held only that internal 
reporting does not automatically further a clear and substantial public policy. See id. at 408 n.7. 
Specifically, we stated, "Although Heslop suggests that any internal reporting will support a wrongful 
discharge claim, we emphasize that only internal reporting that furthers a clear and substantial public 
policy will satisfy the third element of a wrongful discharge claim." Id. We now endorse this conclusion 
anew and hold that internal reporting can give rise to a wrongful discharge cause of action where it 
furthers a clear and substantial public policy. 
P41 Thus, the inquiry in this case is whether Ms. Touchard's complaints to La-Z-Boy management 
about La-Z-Boy's workers' compensation and ergonomic practices furthered a clear and substantial 
public policy. As we have previously stated, we '"narrowly construe the public policies' which might be 
used to support a public policy claim." Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405 (quoting Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 
1280, 1282 (Utah 1992)). Although we rely on the Workers' Compensation Act to conclude that an 
employee who is terminated for exercising his or her workers' compensation rights has a wrongful 
discharge cause of action, it does not follow that all employee complaints relating to workers' 
compensation also further the same clear and substantial public policy. 
P42 We first discuss Ms. Touchard's objections to the menial tasks being assigned to injured 
employees. Reporting employee harassment in retaliation for the employees' exercise of workers' 
compensation rights does not further a clear and substantial public policy. The assignment of 
demeaning job responsibilities in retaliation for the exercise of workers' compensation rights 
constitutes harassment. As we discussed in the previous section, an employee who has claimed that 
he or she was harassed for filing a workers' compensation claim does not have a cause of action 
under our wrongful discharge tort or under the Act. Because the La-Z-Boy employees who have been 
assigned demeaning tasks do not have a cause of action, it follows that Ms. Touchard also does not 
have a cause of action for complaining about the way in which the employees were being treated. 
P43 Likewise, Ms. Touchard's complaints about La-Z-Boy's management of claims did not further 
a clear and substantial public policy. Ms. Touchard told La-Z-Boy that she believed claims were being 
"intentionally mismanaged," that La-Z-Boy's claims adjuster had a hostile attitude toward injured 
employees who sought workers' compensation benefits, and that the claims adjuster had, in the past, 
attempted to deny a claim to an employee with a documented injury. Ms. Touchard reported her 
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findings as a result of an investigation, which she was hired to conduct, regarding La-Z-Boy's workers' 
compensation costs. Thus, it appears she conducted her study and reported her findings to further her 
employer's interests, to wit: to determine the cause of high workers' compensation costs. However, 
even if her reported findings furthered a public interest, we do not think it was sufficiently clear and 
substantial. Reporting the attempted denial of a past claim, however valid, does little to prevent an 
employer from avoiding its current or future obligations under the Act. Further, we think we would be 
construing public policy too broadly if we were to hold that an employee's complaint about a hostile 
claims adjuster or mismanagement of claims further a clear and substantial public policy. We fear that 
such a construction would render any complaint about an employer's workers' compensation practices 
actionable. 
P44 Moreover, Ms. Touchard's objections to the production line and the proposed 120-day rule did 
not invoke the actual policies furthered by the Workers' Compensation Act. For example, her claim 
that the production line had the potential to cause shoulder {148 P.3d 959} injuries did not directly 
implicate her employer's obligation to compensate employees for injuries incurred in the scope of 
employment; rather, it appears that Ms. Touchard's report regarding the ergonomics of the production 
line furthered the private interests of La-Z-Boy and its employees. Indeed, one reason to have an 
ergonomics team is to minimize employee injuries, thereby preventing a decrease in work productivity 
and an increase in workers' compensation claims. Likewise, while Ms. Touchard was opposed to the 
120-day return-to-work rule, there is no indication that an employer may not implement such a rule 
under the Act. Ms. Touchard has not provided us with any evidence suggesting that her opposition to 
this rule furthered a clear and substantial public policy. 
P45 We note that Ms. Touchard's complaints about La-Z-Boy policies were all made in 
furtherance of her job duties. La-Z-Boy hired her to conduct investigations regarding both workers' 
compensation and ergonomics. Ms. Touchard did so, and as part of these duties, reported her 
concerns and recommendations to La-Z-Boy. Employers are free to create internal monitoring or 
investigation positions. While the public may benefit when an employer chooses to create such a 
position, the creation of an investigatory or supervisory position is likely designed to serve the 
employer's private interests by minimizing its risk of liability. See Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
341 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (noting that an employee's complaints to the employer 
were made with "an eye toward correcting [improprieties in employer's wage and work hour reporting 
practices] and minimizing [the employer's] risk of liability"). Just as employers are free to create such 
positions, they likewise are free to disagree with the findings made by such employees and terminate 
employees who make findings with which the employer does not agree. 
P46 Finally, we hold that Ms. Touchard's allegation that she challenged La-Z-Boy's purported 
unfair treatment of an employee's claim also did not further a clear and substantial public policy. In this 
case, there is no evidence that Ms. Touchard was responsible for processing or overseeing claims or 
that she had any personal knowledge regarding the employee's claim. The public policy exception 
would be expanded beyond its intended narrow scope if we were to hold that an employee with no 
authority over or personal knowledge of an individual workers' compensation claim has a cause of 
action for expressing her beliefs about the propriety of the employer's treatment of that claim. We fear 
that if we were to so hold, employers could be held hostage by employees who complain about 
matters of which they had no personal knowledge. 
P47 We commend Ms. Touchard's willingness to express her objections to her employer's 
practices that she believed were unfair, but her complaints cannot be viewed to further a clear and 
substantial public policy. We therefore hold that Ms. Touchard does not have a wrongful discharge 
cause of action for complaining about La-Z-Boy's treatment of injured employees. 4 
P48 Based on the foregoing, we hold that retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation 
violates this state's clear and substantial public policy as pronounced by the Workers' Compensation 
Act. Thus, an employee who has been terminated or constructively discharged from his or her job in 
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retaliation for the exercise of workers' compensation rights has a wrongful discharge cause of action 
against his or her employer under the public policy exception to the at-will rule. However, we do not 
believe the same policy is implicated when an employee suffers retaliatory harassment or 
discrimination, or when an employer discharges an employee who opposes the employer's treatment 
of employees who are entitled to benefits. 
P49 Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur 
in Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
Footnotes 
1 
We note that section 34A-2-108 does provide for the settlement of workers' compensation claims in 
accordance with Utah Code section 34A-2-420. Section 34A-2-420(4) permits the parties to agree to a 
"settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements" or the "commutation and 
settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements." Id. 34A-2-420(4) 
(2005) (emphasis added). An administrative law judge must "review and .. . approve" these 
agreements. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(4). Thus, this section does not alter our conclusion that the 
Act does not allow an employee to contract away his or her workers' compensation rights. 
2 
This conclusion does not mark the first time an employer's interest in workplace autonomy has been 
outweighed by public interests. For example, an employer is not free to maintain an unsafe working 
environment, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (requiring employers to provide safe workplace environments in 
compliance with the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act), to compensate employees below 
the minimum wage, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-40-101 to -106 (2005) (requiring employers to pay the 
minimum wage), or to make employment decisions, such as hiring or firing, based on race, national 
origin, sex, religion, pregnancy, or disability, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-106 (2005) (prohibiting 
employers from making discriminatory employment decisions). 
3 
The facts we recite here are those alleged by the employees in their complaint before the federal court 
and in their brief before this court. We need only look to the facts as alleged to determine whether the 
plaintiffs have pled a valid cause of action under Utah law. We do not, however, comment upon the 
veracity of the plaintiffs' allegations. 
4 
We note that our holding is limited to the question certified to us-whether an employee who opposes 
an employer's treatment of employees who are entitled to workers' compensation has a wrongful 
discharge cause of action. Our opinion in this case does not address whether a wrongful discharge 
cause of action exists for an employee who goes beyond opposing employer practices and actually 
assists injured employees to file workers' compensation claims. Cf. McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 
F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a personnel manager who was terminated for reporting 
violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act did not allege a cause of action under that Act's 
anti-retaliation provision because she reported the violations within the scope of her employment, but 
recognizing that she would have had a cause of action under the anti-retaliation provision if she had 
"actively assisted] other employees in asserting their FLSA rights"). While the briefs in this case 
address whether a coworker's assistance furthers a clear and substantial public policy, that is not the 
question certified to us by the federal court, nor has Ms. Touchard alleged, either before us or in her 
complaint before the federal court, that she ever actually assisted an employee in filing a workers' 
compensation claim. Moreover, our opinion today does not address whether a wrongful discharge 
cause of action exists when an employer fires an employee who refused to follow the employer's order 
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to interfere with an employee's workers' compensation claim, see Wilkerson v. Standard Knitting Mills, 
Inc., 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 666, *1-3, 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (granting a wrongful discharge 
cause of action to a company nurse who claimed she had been terminated for her refusal to 
participate in the employer's scheme to cut workers' compensation costs by not sending injured 
employees for outside medical treatment), or to an employee who refused to terminate an employee 
who has filed a workers' compensation claim, see Lins v. Children's Discovery Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 95 
Wn. App. 486, 976 P.2d 168, 172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing the policy of workers' 
compensation would be "jeopardized if, without incurring liability, an employer can fire an employee for 
refusing to carry out a clearly unlawful order" (emphasis added)). 
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the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
APPENDIX 14 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
A Careful Balancing of Constitutional Rights 
UTAH WORKERS < COMPENSATION ACT 
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF C O N S T I T U T I O N A L RIGHTS. 
Employer 
1. Exclusive remedy U. C. A. 
§34A-2-105. 
Action can only be brought in 
administrative proceedings. 
2. Speedy resolution. No lengthy jury 
trial with its uncertainties. Less 
costly process for the litigants. 
U.C.A. §§34A-2-801 & 802 
3. Limited, predictable fixed 
damages. 
3• No pain and suffering 
damages. 
b. No projected future special 
damages. Damages paid as they 
accrue. 
4. 'Broad b a s e d risk 
spreading on industry through 
mandatory insurance or qualifying 
through bonding with Industrial 
Commission to be a self-insured 
employer. U.C.A. §34-A-2-201. 
5. Right to be reimbursed from 
third party recoveries §34A-2-
106 minus injured worker's 
attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in collecting from the 
third-party tortfeasor. 
a. Employer—"trustee" of the 
cause of action for injured 
worker or dependant heirs in 
death cases> 
b. However, see U.C.A. §§34A-2-
106(5)(b), 78-27-39 & 78-27-
41 regarding 40% subrogation 
and third party defendant 
damage limitation rule in 
third party civil actions 
brought by injured workers 
or dependent heirs in death 
cases. 
6. All employers treated alike. 
Injured Worker and/or 
Dependent Heirs 
1 . A sure, predictable, though 
limited remedy because of 
mandatory insurance coverage. 
Less costly to pursue. 
2 . No fault system — no reduction or 
elimination of workers compensation 
benefits by comparative fault. 
3 . Comparatively speedy and 
i n e x p e n s i v e 
administrative process. U.C.A. 
§§34A-2-801 & 802 
4. Wage replacement benefits: (1) 
Temporary Total Disability— 
U.C.A. §34A-2-410; (2) Temporary 
Partial Disability-U.C.A. §34A-
2-411; (3) Permanent Total 
Disability-U.C.A. §34A-2-413; 
(4) Death Benefits to dependent 
heirs—U.C.A. §34A-2-414. 
5 . Impairment/Loss of bodily 
function benefits: Permanent 
Partial Disability-U.C.A. §34A-
2-412. 
6. Medical Expense benefits: 
U.C.A. §34A-2-401. 
7 • Preservation of right to pursue 
third parties for full damages— 
U.C.A. §34A-2-106. 
8 . Employer and employee on same side 
in third party cases. 
9 • Continuing jurisdiction of the 
industrial Commission to modify 
awards based on changes in injured 
employee's condition. Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-2-420 
10. All employees treated alike. 
